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 This dissertation explores a series of eleven political factors nations would have to 
consider should they contemplate joining a military coalition or alliance that uses ballistic 
missile defense (BMD); which of these factors incentivize or dissuade states from joining 
this coalition, and whether they vary from region to region, or state to state. It uses a two-
stage case-study-based qualitative research design, in which the first theory generation 
phase was comprised of 21 experimentation events over a ten-year period with BMD 
policy experts from 24 nations led by the United States Strategic Command known as 
NIMBLE TITAN. The results of these 21 events were used to distill eleven BMD-related 
policy independent variables affecting the dependent variable, the decision to join a 
coalition or alliance that uses BMD. The second, data collection phase, interviewed 22 
BMD policy experts from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs of 17 nations 
and NATO, from four regions including the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Gulf, and North 
America. The results of the interviews were used to not only assess these variables as 
they contributed to the DV, but to create a causal model that looks at those which affect 
joining a coalition, those which were found to only matter within an existing coalition or 
alliance, and those which, if handled badly, would incentivize a state to leave a coalition 
or alliance. This work concludes with a series of recommendations for policy makers who 
may wish to create such a coalition in the future, and areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Research and popular writings on ballistic missile defense (BMD) to-date have 
focused on history, technology and the negative political effects BMD may have on 
deterrence, strategic stability, and crisis escalation. Although generally acknowledged to 
do so, there is very little written about how BMD assures partners and allies, how it could 
encourage states to cooperate and, more importantly, why.  
 This interdisciplinary work brings together research, policy papers, reports, and 
findings from over ten years of Defense Department style vignette-based experimentation 
to understand what kinds of BMD-related factors are likely to impact states’ interest in, 
and willingness to, cooperate. This work follows a constructivist approach, since its goal 
is to assess different country’s perceptions about such factors to determine their 
inclination to cooperate; such understanding can be used by policy makers and other 
practitioners to change the minds of desired partner states about cooperation and 
collective action. 
 
Background 
    Throughout the Cold War, acquiring the ability to defend against adversary 
ballistic missiles was an objective of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and there were several 
attempts on both sides of the Iron Curtain to develop an operationally-effective missile 
defense system. But it wasn’t until the end of the Cold War that an actual, functional 
BMD system was first used in combat. The United States Army’s PATRIOT (Phased 
Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target) air defense interceptors were first used in 
this unexpected role during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991; 
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although the Iraqi air force did not present any real threat to the coalition established to 
evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait, their ballistic missiles did. In fact, these very first 
BMD operations were conducted in a multinational, coalition setting, as U.S. PATRIOT 
batteries defended cities, military installations, forces, and populations in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and Israel from numerous Scud missiles. From the very beginning, BMD 
operations have been a multinational endeavor, and, as such, bring multinational policy 
challenges which must be overcome for effective collective use. 
      Today, the United States is actively involved in building up its own BMD 
capability, but it cannot defend the U.S. homeland, its deployed military forces, and all its 
partners and allies worldwide by itself. The scope of the ballistic missile (BM) threat is 
just too big, both in terms of the sheer numbers of missiles, as well as the number of BM-
owning states, and both numbers are growing rapidly. In 2018, 31 nations possess BM 
weaponry, up from eight countries at the end of the Cold War (Arms Control Association 
2014). “Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts over the last 30 years, 
including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen, the 1991 and 2003 
Persian Gulf conflicts, the Russian military actions in Chechnya and Georgia, and most 
recently in the conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine. Russia used cruise missiles for the first 
time during the conflict in Syria.” (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017, 4)  
 In 2018, 22 states own, or are in the process of acquiring, BMD capabilities, 
including China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Qatar, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. This number also continues to grow, which is a direct reflection of the 
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seriousness with which nations view the BM threat, and of the increasing technological 
need to counter them.  
      The political aspects of BMD during the Cold War revolved around its potential 
impact on bipolar strategic stability; today, its political nature stems from the competing 
need for BMD to not only defend deployed military forces in a conflict theater far away, 
but to defend the territory and homelands of participating nations. Adversaries who a 
short time ago could only reach next door are augmenting short-range BM arsenals with 
missiles of up to intercontinental ranges, allowing them to hold at risk friendly coalition 
homelands and populations previously thought safe from retaliation. Hence, tactical 
weapons now can have strategic effect even without nuclear warheads. (U.S. Congress 
2017)  
 The changing post-Cold War geopolitical landscape also complicates this. “The 
rise of the multipolar world, as should be expected, has critical implications for the U.S. 
military posture, especially missile defense. First, the U.S. can and should remain a 
global military power. Second, it should continue its vital alliance relationships, while 
recognizing that these relationships will change in significant ways. Third, it is to be 
expected that potential adversaries of the U.S. and its allies will become more aggressive 
in their attempts to achieve regional dominance. This will include the acquisition of more 
sophisticated weapons, both conventional and nonconventional. Fourth, the U.S. will find 
that its allies will pursue security arrangements and obtain weapons capabilities in ways 
independent of their alliance relationships with the U.S. This could include acquiring 
nuclear weapons. In short, meeting U.S. security requirements will become more 
complicated in the multipolar world than it was during the unipolar moment.” (Spring 
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2017) 
      Current U.S. national policy, as stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review, states, “The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. 
forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.” It 
further states that, “The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for 
missile defense,” and, “Strengthening cooperation with allies and partners to develop and 
field robust, pragmatic, and cost-effective capabilities is an important priority.” Lastly, 
“As regional protection capabilities begin to take shape, it is important to ensure effective 
operational and political cooperation with allies and partners.” (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2010, vi, 11)  
 It is foundational for the reader to understand that, due to the densely intertwined 
and international nature of global politics and economics, conflicts in today’s security 
environment are much more likely to be multinational in nature, and fought between 
coalitions or alliances of like-minded states, rather than as purely dyadic conflicts. (Stern 
& Druckman 2000, 1) If so, then BMD operations, as a sub-set of these non-dyadic 
conflicts, will also most likely be multinational. Even if not, the range and potential 
effects of BMD use may very well affect neighboring third party states, so by extension 
make such scenarios multinational.   
 
The Purpose of This Work—What I am Doing and Why 
 This work focuses on how BMD brings states together, with a heavy emphasis on 
how it engenders and supports assurance, cooperation, and collective action amongst 
states. My philosophical approach is constructivist and institutionalist, focusing first on 
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the ideational construct of what about the idea of missile defense compels or discourages 
nations from joining military coalitions or alliances which employ missile defense.  We 
then look from the institutional perspective of how these ideas translate into structured 
policy choices made in multinational political and military circles. 
        The study’s implications, ultimately, is to enable U.S. national policy-makers to 
engender the support of partner and ally states to achieve the national objectives, stated 
above, of defending homeland, partners, allies, and deployed forces; of cooperation to 
develop and expand allied or partner BMD capabilities; and of expanded burden-sharing 
and interoperability between the U.S. and allied or partner defenses. This can be done 
through a better understanding of the key policy issues which factor into the calculus of 
partner and ally states to motivate them to actively support, or participate in, a coalition 
or alliance that uses BMD. Not only must U.S. policy-makers know what these 
politically-charged BMD-related policy issues are, but they need to understand which are 
viewed as most important by individual states or regional security collective groups.  
Such information can be leveraged in negotiations for support or to convince these states 
to build their own BMD capability.   
 For our purposes, I here define “BMD-related policy issues,” as “Issues involving 
the use, or potential use, of BMD. This includes both discussions between national 
political and military leadership, and between nations involved in collective political-
military action. Such issues may require national or multinational decision or agreement.” 
 To clarify matters further, I use “coalition” in the military sense throughout this 
work; Lieutenant General Andrew Graham (2012), in The Oxford Handbook of War, tells 
us, “Military coalitions can be built and united under a singular power by multiple states 
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and governments. They are fluid in terms of membership—not only does a country not 
have to have been a traditional ally to join a coalition, but nations can join, vary their 
contributions and caveats, withdraw, and be replaced by new members as the situation 
changes or national agendas change.” (Lindley-French & Boyer, eds. 2012, 379) 
 I also use the term “alliance” in the military context throughout this work. Stefan 
Bergsman tells us, in Small States and Alliances, “A military alliance is an international 
agreement concerning national security, when the contracting parties agree to mutual 
protection and support in case of a crisis that has not been identified in advance. Military 
alliances differ from coalitions, as coalitions are formed for a crisis that is already 
known.” (Reiter & Gartner, Eds. 2001, 28) “Military alliances can be classified into 
defense pacts, non-aggression pacts and ententes.” (Krause & Singer, in Reiter & 
Gartner, Eds. 2001, 13-14) 
 
      As an analogy, assume the reader belongs to a club which has several key issues 
that are important to it, and these issues are ones the club has consistently wrestled with 
over time, and will likely continue to do so in the future. If the reader were asked to 
recruit new club members, he or she would want to know which of these issues are most 
important to your existing members and why, to help shape recruitment of new members.   
      In our case, the “club” is a group of states who view BMD as an important 
defense requirement, and who come from around the world. Do different “club members” 
from different regions of the world find different BMD-related policy issues more or less 
important, and if so, why? Do military members of these states place greater emphasis on 
different issues than their foreign affairs or state department counterparts, and if so, why?  
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 To that end, my central research questions are: What are the key BMD-related 
policy issues that would constrain or enhance support for multinational collective 
military action that could include the use of BMD, and why? These have three 
subordinate and sequential questions:  
 What are the key factors of each BMD-related policy issue that states use to 
prioritize its importance, and why? 
 How do these key factors of each BMD-related policy issue differ from state to 
state or region to region, and why? 
 What key factors of these BMD-related policy issues are dominant in priority 
in all regions, and why? 
The BMD-related policy issues explored in this work are touched on below and explained 
in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four. So, what has already been explored in the 
realm of cooperative BMD within the post-Cold War political environment? 
 
The Current State of BMD-Related Research 
 Because of the relative newness of BMD as a technology of conflict, there are a 
large number of military and popular works focused purely on the technology and science 
behind BMD as well as the history behind many BMD developments and fielding 
programs from around the world; we will not address these in any detail. Because BMD 
is so technologically complex, many political science works on BMD have also seen fit 
to include components describing the technology and history of the various programs. 
    As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, the majority of political 
science research on BMD concerns itself with BMD’s impact on deterrence, conflict 
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escalation control, or strategic stability between major state actors. Major examples 
include Brodie (1968), Carter & Schwartz (1984), Freedman (2004), Gray (2002), 
Handberg (2002), Jaspal (2014), Kahn (1960), Kenyon & Simpson (2013), Krepon 
(2003), Payne (1991), Peoples (2010), Rathjens & Ruina (1985), Schelling (1960), Steff 
(2013), and Yanarella (2002). Much of this research emphasizes the negative or divisive 
effects of BMD, including how it could conceivably undermine strategic stability by 
unbalancing “traditional” bipolar Cold War-centric nuclear deterrence, through defenses 
reducing the effectiveness of, or even removing, a nuclear first-strike capability, which 
could potentially incentivize a nuclear adversary to strike before a perfect shield could be 
emplaced. Such theory may have been interesting or even compelling at the time, but 
real-world missile defenses today are not sized, capable, nor intended, to offset the 
strategic balance of long-range nuclear forces between the U.S., Russia, and China. (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2010, 13)  
 Despite numerous claims by government officials throughout the Obama and 
Trump administrations that BMD can be used to assure and bind allies and partners 
together, (U.S. Department of Defense 2010; Rose 2012; Roberts 2014; Rose 2015) there 
has been little research in how this is accomplished.  The most comprehensive work on 
the political impacts of BMD found to-date, by Trexel (2013), compiled a referenced 
table of 54 theoretical political effects that missile defense can have; only three of these 
were related to assurance: “Protect or assure domestic populations,” “Demonstrate 
stake/commitment to assure allies or coalition partners,” and “BMD cooperation creates a 
more formidable and resolute coalition.”  (Trexel 2013, 351-353; Bowen 2001; Crouch, 
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et al. 2009; U.S. Department of Defense 2006)  The other 51 were related to the 
deterrence elements of “Deny Benefits,” “Impose Cost,” or “Encourage Restraint.”  
 In summary, the current state of BMD research consists of a large number of 
studies looking at the historical or technical background of BMD, or the negative or 
divisive aspects of BMD in its relationship with deterrence theory, escalation control 
theory, and strategic stability theory. Beyond research, there have also been numerous 
popular and governmental statements, reports, Congressional testimonies, and speeches 
professing the belief that BMD has the potential to assure partners and allies, and bring 
them together. I reiterate first that the negative or divisive potential in BMD discussed 
above is not the focus of this dissertation. Yet I have found next to no military science or 
political science research on just how BMD can strengthen collective action and bring 
states together for cooperative purposes. As an interdisciplinary work, bringing together 
BMD technical issues, policies, and literature on cooperation is the lacuna I wish to fill. 
 
Background to the Research in This Work 
I freely admit up front to being somewhat biased in my perspective and approach. 
I have spent the last fourteen years amongst some of the most brilliant missile defense 
experts from around the world, many of whom have grown to be great friends. For me 
assurance of partners and allies is not just a set of lofty political goals; I have seen in 
person repeatedly how missile defense can bind nations, organizations, and people 
together, so it is this aspect that I am most interested in investigating here. 
Since 2005, I have been involved in a series of multi-national two-year campaigns 
of BMD policy experimentation led by United States Strategic Command known as 
 
10 
“NIMBLE TITAN” (NT); this has placed me in an interesting position to see the 
confluence of military and political science first-hand. “NIMBLE TITAN is an 
unclassified, multinational, missile defense series of experiments executed within an 
integrated air and missile defense context. The campaign focuses on regional and global 
challenges through cooperatively developed concepts, objectives, and analysis…Through 
NIMBLE TITAN nations explore potential policies and operational constructs that will 
need to be in place in the future to facilitate cooperative missile defense. It serves as a 
forum for multinational collaboration that facilitates the exchange of views and 
experimentation to expand international relationships and enhances regional missile 
defense, and strengthens deterrence. Multinational participants from Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs jointly shape objectives, concept design, data collection and 
analysis. The experiment involves mock air and missile threats from fictitious countries 
in a scenario based 10 years in the future.” (U.S. Army Press Release 2017)   
      Today, NIMBLE TITAN 2018 (NT’18) includes participants from 24 states from 
North America, Europe (both NATO and non-NATO), the Arabian Gulf, and the Asia-
Pacific regions.  NATO (as an organization) is also a participant, although only 15 of the 
29 NATO nations so far have chosen to be NT participants.  The strength of NT is that it 
allows participants to collectively learn about and explore BMD and BMD policy issues 
in an unclassified and non-attributional forum, using realistic political-military scenarios 
set ten years in the future, and to share experience and fresh thinking between newer and 
more experienced states. It allows states which are considering acquisition of BMD 
capabilities to explore options, while also allowing states that cannot to understand how 
they can contribute to collective action. It provides a recurrent, concentrated forum of 
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Defense and Foreign Affairs experts in air and missile defense operations and policy 
from around the world to gather and network, and is a ripe environment for exploration.  
For my purposes, NT is ideally designed to better understand what factors are likely to 
lead states to cooperate, and which will fragment multinational alliances and coalitions.   
   
The Theory and Research Methodology Used 
 To answer my research questions above, I used a two-stage sequential case-study-
based qualitative research design. (Creswell 2013, 98-101)  This consisted of two 
qualitative strands in sequence to first develop an initial theoretical framework, and then 
to use follow-up qualitative data to elaborate, explain, or confirm the initial theory.  
 My dependent variable (DV) is the decision by a state to join a coalition or 
alliance which uses BMD; the by-products of this decision are to expand international 
relationships, develop regional layered missile defenses, and strengthen deterrence for 
participating nations and organizations.   
 To determine my independent variables (IVs) I began with a significant amount of 
qualitative foundation work done in 21 sets of vignette-driven political-military 
experimentation events with up to 24 nations
1
 over ten years throughout five two-year 
campaigns of NIMBLE TITAN; NT’10 had four events with nine participating nations, 
NT’12 had four events with 14 nations, NT’14 had five events with 22 nations, NT’16 
had four events with 24 nations, and NT’18 had four events with 24 nations. From the 
aggregate of lessons learned from these 21 experiments, I synthesized the eleven BMD-
related policy issues that became the basis for my IVs. These IVs logically group into 
                                                          
1
 Note that due to the non-attributional nature of NT and the political sensitivity of BMD in some nations, 
I cannot disclose exactly which nations are participants. 
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“threat-centric” IVs, “coalition-internal” IVs, and “coalition-external/third party-focused” 
IVs, and are explained in full detail in Chapter Three. They include: 
 Threat Perception (threat-centric) 
 Security Dilemma (threat-centric) 
 Contribution Requirements (coalition-internal) 
 Loss of Autonomy (coalition-internal) 
 Structures and Authorities (coalition-internal) 
 Information Sharing (coalition-internal) 
 Plans Development (coalition-internal) 
 Posture Decisions (coalition-internal) 
 Offensive Decisions (coalition-internal) 
 Consultation Processes (coalition-external/third party-focused) 
 Consequences of Engagement Planning (coalition-external/third party-focused) 
 The second phase was a qualitative analysis of 22 elite interviews of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs BMD policy experts from 17 nations and the NATO International Staff, 
conducted between December 2016 and April 2018. These interviews asked questions 
that looked to test a series of eleven hypotheses derived from the eleven BMD policy 
issue IVs, to determine their impact on my DV.  
 I cross-examine these variables through two lenses. The type of state the 
interviewee comes from represents an intervening variable (IntV) filter: are they from a 
state that already owns BMD capabilities of its own (a “BMD State”), a state that is in the 
process of acquiring BMD forces or provides active support to states who do own them (a 
“BMD Supporter”), or a state which is neither (a “Non-BMD State”)?  The second lens 
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breaks the individual national perspectives into Defense or Foreign Affairs professional 
perspectives, to further determine if priorities and perspectives are truly “national” or 
“regional,” or whether they differ based on governmental profession.   
 
Roadmap of the Dissertation 
         Chapter Two is a literature review which begins with BMD policy-related research; 
because this study is essentially one having to do with motivations for collective action, I 
focus also on appropriate collective action and cooperation works. It will also address 
literature concerning interaction effects between BMD and some (but not all) of the 
policy issues we will cover later in the study. This is principally because, being based on 
relatively emergent technology, not all of these BMD-related policy issues have extant 
literature within Political Science work, yet are emerging multinational policy issues 
nonetheless, as Chapter Three will highlight. 
      Chapter Three covers the theory and research methodology used in this study; it 
describes the theoretical framework of antecedent conditions, intervening variables, IVs 
and DV in more detail than discussed above. Chapter Three also explains, in detail, why 
the eleven “BMD policy issue” IVs are indeed multinational political issues, and not 
simply military issues. This section serves as a primer to BMD policy issues, and is more 
explanatory than exploratory.  
      Chapter Four covers the meat of the analysis, derived from the interviews that I 
conducted during the second qualitative strand. It presents key trends and patterns from 
the interviews across states, regions, and by profession of the national experts.  It 
highlights some interesting or surprising data which was not expected during the research 
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design, and ultimately builds to a model which shows us not only how preferences in 
BMD policy issues affect the decision to join in collective action against a ballistic 
missile-armed adversary, but how they interact once within a coalition, and, in some 
cases, potentially influence the decision to leave a BMD coalition or alliance. 
      Chapter Five provides a conclusion that includes a summary of the findings, and, 
based on the final model, provides recommendations for policy-makers who may in the 
future strive to build and maintain a multinational coalition or alliance which uses BMD. 
It also highlights areas for future study that fell outside the scope of this dissertation. 
 
Conclusion: 
      The explosive growth and active proliferation of missile technology continues, 
and has resulted in an emerging belief by many of the partners and allies of the U.S. in 
the feasibility of missile defense as a significant mitigation measure to protect our nations 
and deployed military forces worldwide. While I hope this study will be beneficial to 
U.S. policy-makers, military personnel, and diplomats in their quest to convince others to 
band together to combat the missile threat, I believe this work may prove just as valuable 
to policy makers, military personnel, and diplomats from other nations as well.    
 According to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby and 
Jim Thomas (2016), “No other like-minded country is strong enough to perform the 
United States’ leadership role in this alliance network. The United States is the only 
nation with the power, global reach, financial depth and standing to cohere and maintain 
such a diverse grouping for broadly liberal ends. Collective action is always difficult, but 
it is particularly challenging when dealing with states, and most so in the realm of 
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security and defense. Indeed, the United States is the only country that can overmatch 
regional hegemonic aspirants like China and Russia…With the United States, balancing 
against major regional states is a rational strategy; without it, bandwagoning and 
accommodation become considerably more compelling.” 
      Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of collective BMD activity will help 
others make informed decisions about the use of their time, talent, and treasure to counter 
the growing threat presented by BMs and weapons of mass destruction. Many nations are 
juggling limited budgets against many required defense missions; there is only so much 
money to go around for so many missions, and economy of effort is an imperative in 21
st
 
Century defense planning. Many states are balancing both offensive and defensive 
technologies in this budget-constrained environment, and “burden sharing” with partners 
is one way to offset the shortfalls of individual national militaries. In a more holistic 
approach, some states may be most willing to host defensive forces, while others may be 
better able to provide intelligence to find enemy missiles, while a third group may be 
more willing and able to provide offensive strike capabilities to destroy these threats 
before they launch, while the last group of coalition states provide active BMD to catch 
whatever attacking missiles get through.  
 All of these areas are addressed in this work. I believe it will stimulate future 
thought about ways to improve collective action and cooperation, both politically and 
militarily, beyond the BMD-centric policy issues studied here.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
      “Studies on national missile defence could easily fill a library. No other proposed 
weapon system has perhaps drawn more arguments than this defence project.” (Bormann 
2008, 58) Natalie Bormann speaks the truth in this matter; there are a huge number of 
works, and they generally do focus on the questionable, or negative, aspects of BMD. Her 
reference to “national missile defense” also highlights another issue: almost all studies 
focus on “national” or “homeland” BMD and disregard the other half of BMD which is 
the shorter-ranged “regional” or “theater” BMD used to defend others, including 
deployed military forces, partners and allies abroad. I have been unable to find much in 
governmental policy documents, military or political science that addresses just how 
BMD brings nations together to answer my central research question: What are the key 
BMD-related policy issues that would constrain or enhance support for multinational 
collective military action that could include the use of BMD, and why? The general 
theme of this chapter is to move beyond simple policy edicts to cooperate and link this 
idea to political science collective action material.  
      Why is BMD important politically?  It is relatively new technology that is 
improving rapidly and is being fielded by a growing number of states. Unlike nuclear 
weapons, acquisition of BMD is spreading around the world with little public opposition, 
primarily because it is defensive in nature. Yet academic or political opponents of BMD, 
as well as ballistic missile-armed adversaries, insist on claiming it is an offensive 
capability, politically, claiming its destabilizing nature as their principal rationale for 
opposition. Proponents claim it supports national objectives of assurance and 
cooperation, but generally do not explain how. 
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      There is nothing at present in academic, official policy, or military literature that 
neatly encapsulates a grouping, list, or framework of BMD-related policy issues that 
encourage or constrain nations in joining a coalition. To effectively study this with an 
interdisciplinary research goal of developing such an explanatory framework we must 
explore academic literature from political science with current BMD-related 
governmental and military sources, which generally do not cross each other’s paths.   
      In this chapter, we will deconstruct academic and military literature related to this 
topic.  In general, this literature is grouped into the broader, yet indirectly relevant, areas 
of “BMD and deterrence,” “BMD policy history,” and four distinct areas of international 
relations and comparative politics within Political Science which link to many of the 
eleven “BMD policy-related issue” IVs and their associated hypotheses described in 
detail in Chapter Three. Most of these hypotheses have some roots within the literature 
on “Collective Action,” “Burden Sharing,” “International Cooperation Regimes,” and 
“International Law.” I hope to further these areas of Political Science by introducing 
associated BMD policy issues in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
BMD and Deterrence 
      BMD is a highly politicized topic that has been studied for almost sixty years by 
academics. Unfortunately, the majority of existing Political Science literature on BMD is 
generally rolled up within the much broader subject of BMD’s relationship with the 
interrelated concepts of deterrence theory, strategic stability between major state actors, 
and conflict escalation control. These strategic or security studies works are written 
within the frameworks of Neoclassical Realism, Offensive Realism, or Hegemonic 
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Stability Theory, generally take a negative or divisive view of BMD as “destabilizing” 
(even within a unipolar deterrence construct), and minimize the potential contributions 
BMD can make in coalition building. Such works include Brodie (1968), Carter & 
Schwartz (1984), Freedman (2004), Gray (2002), Handberg (2002), Jaspal (2014), Kahn 
(1960), Kenyon & Simpson (2013), Krepon (2003), Payne (1991), Peoples (2010), 
Rathjens & Ruina (1985), Schelling (1960), Steff (2013), and Yanarella (2002). 
 The general premise of this “destabilizing” nature of BMD can be summed up as, 
“Given a stable situation, such as that presented by bilateral nuclear weapons parity 
leading to Mutually Assured Destruction, or other situations where the threat of 
overwhelming offensive force use deters conflict initiation for fear of an equally 
overwhelming response, missile defenses enable their owners to initiate conflict against a 
missile-armed opponent without fear of response. This makes them strategically 
destabilizing.”  
 This entire concept is based on the assumption that BMD either provides a perfect 
shield or has adequate capability and capacity to reduce a potential adversary response to 
an “acceptable” level of damage. Amongst nuclear-armed states, it is hard today to 
envisage any world leader being comfortable accepting a few dozen, or even a few, 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on their cities just so they could 
attack first. “The technical and financial demands of BMD mean that it will never have 
more than a marginal effect on the deterrent capabilities of a near-peer competitor such as 
Russia, whose offensive forces would overwhelm any defence.” (Stocker 2011, 59) Such 
theory may have been interesting or even compelling at the time, but real-world missile 
defenses today are not sized, capable, nor intended, to offset the strategic balance of long-
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range nuclear forces between the U.S., Russia, and China. (U.S. Department of Defense 
2010, 13)  
 However, the greater implications for BMD and deterrence, strategic stability, and 
conflict escalation control occur outside the realm of a bipolar nuclear state situation, and 
within circumstances of regional conflicts with smaller states. “However, against 
numerically and technologically limited capabilities (such as those of Iran, North Korea 
and others), it could serve to negate offensive forces without reliance on retaliatory 
threats or an acceptance of mutual (if asymmetric) deterrence. This will be especially so 
where the asymmetry extends to the stakes each party has in the conflict and where one 
party may be prepared to escalate in a way that the other is not.” (Stocker 2011, 59) 
 This area of interest in BMD-related research on the “zero-sum games” of 
deterrence, strategic stability and conflict escalation control, using mainly Realist theory, 
does not lend insight into the full spectrum of issues of coalition development and 
collective action. It is, however, of value when we consider its implications for the first 
two of my IVs, “Threat Perception” and “Security Dilemma,” and it is useful to flesh out 
the deterrence and escalation aspects of my eighth IV, “Posture Decisions,” all of which 
are described in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
BMD Policy History 
 Because of the relative newness of BMD as a technology of conflict, there are a 
large number of military and popular works focused purely on the technology and science 
behind BMD as well as the history behind many BMD developments and fielding 
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programs from around the world. Although interesting, they are less relevant to this work 
than are works on the history of national and multinational BMD policy. 
      Because BMD is so technologically complex, many political science works on 
BMD have also seen fit to include components describing the technology and history of 
the various programs. When exploring the area of BMD policy itself within academic 
literature, I found that most works address the history of the U.S. BMD program and the 
associated trends in national policies related to it. These include Bormann (2008), Burns 
(2010), Dudley (2003), Handberg (2002), Krepon (2003), Mitchell (2000), Payne (1991), 
Peoples (2010), Roberts (2014), Samson (2010), and Yanarella (2002). One of the most 
comprehensive works of this nature is Steff (2013), who traces the parallel development 
of, and relationships between, nuclear weapons and BMD policies from the Truman to 
Obama administrations, as well as the schools of thought within government and 
academia which underpinned both. 
 As mentioned in the section above, the vast majority of these put BMD policy 
into the broader scope of Realist deterrence theory, and do not get explore specific issues 
within multinational collective BMD policy itself.  Two interesting exceptions to this 
Realist dominance include Bormann’s (2008) Poststructuralist/Interpretivist analysis, and 
Peoples’ (2010) Critical approach; unfortunately, both focus exclusively on U.S. policy 
and thinking as well.   
 Many of the studies done in the international BMD policy area done between the 
1983 Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) speech and the 2001 U.S. 
abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty focused on the negative policy 
ramifications of implementing BMD on the Cold War nuclear deterrence paradigm, as 
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discussed in the section about BMD and Deterrence, above. Most fixated on U.S. BMD 
policy only. For example, a year after the Star Wars speech, Leon Sloss (in Carter and 
Schwartz 1984, 46-47) illustrated BMD’s roles in the four “possible” U.S. defense 
strategies: a minimum deterrent strategy, a countervailing strategy, a (nuclear) 
warfighting strategy, and a defense emphasis strategy. As prescient as he was in other 
areas of nuclear deterrence theory, none of his forecasts for the utility of BMD have come 
true; and none of these early works looked at BMD in a multinational context.  
 Unfortunately, most of these historical policy works tend to end with the 2010 
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review’s policy statements regarding U.S. leadership in 
expanding international BMD cooperation, cited in Chapter One, without further 
elaboration on how this cooperation will be achieved. Despite numerous claims by 
government officials throughout the Obama and Trump administrations that BMD can be 
used to assure and bind allies and partners together, (U.S. Department of Defense 2010; 
Rose 2012; Roberts 2014; Rose 2015) there has been little research in how this is 
accomplished. The most comprehensive work on the political impacts of BMD found to-
date, by Trexel (2013), compiled a referenced table of 54 theoretical political effects that 
missile defense can have; only three of these were related to assurance or cooperation: 
“Protect or assure domestic populations,” “Demonstrate stake/commitment to assure 
allies or coalition partners,” and “BMD cooperation creates a more formidable and 
resolute coalition.”  (Trexel 2013, 351-353; Bowen 2001; Crouch, et al. 2009; U.S. 
Department of Defense 2006)  The other 51 were related to the deterrence elements of 
“Deny Benefits,” “Impose Cost,” or “Encourage Restraint.”  
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      There is a newer and growing body of works, also of historical bent, regarding 
BMD technology and policy development in emerging BMD states other than the U.S. 
which begins to help us understand some of the rationale for “joining the club.” Asia 
leads the way in writings. Japan, as the second largest state in BMD acquisition in the 
world has gotten a commensurate amount of press (mann, 2007; Ghoshroy and 
Neunech, 2010; Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001; Trexel, 2013), as has India 
(Basrur, 2006; Jaspal, 2014) which is also developing a significant BMD capability.  
mann also addresses Chinese interests and concerns with BMD which have led to their 
nuclear force modernization and rationales for BMD development. The Republic of 
Korea has whole-heartedly begun investments in BMD club to offset threats from North 
Korea. (Montague 2015) Although focused on U.S. developments, Butler (2001) provides 
an Australian view of the impacts of BMD on arms control and counter-proliferation, 
while Davies and Lyon (2014) propose a direction for future Australian missile defense 
acquisition. 
 European missile defense policy, and principally that of NATO, has also been a 
topic of several works. Colin Gray (2002) provided a history of European perspectives 
about U.S. BMD prior to the 2010 NATO adoption of territorial BMD as a core NATO 
mission, focusing on American optimism to solve problems with technology versus the 
more traditional European desire to use politics first. Post-Chicago-Summit European 
works (including De Jonge 2013; Ferguson 2013; Kay 2012, and Warren 2011) tend to 
focus more on the burden-sharing aspects on European contributions to what is 
essentially a U.S.-provided NATO territorial defense system, which are useful in our 
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Chapter Three discussion on the IVs “Contribution Requirements,” “Loss of Autonomy,” 
and “Structures & Authorities.” 
 Interestingly enough, very little outside technical material in military journals has 
been written about Israeli BMD, or that of any of the BMD-equipped Gulf Cooperation 
Council States. Israel has spent a significant amount to acquire or co-develop (with the 
U.S.) and operationally deploy not just a substantial homeland BMD system, but also the 
foremost counter-rocket-artillery-and-mortar system, Iron Dome. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have all obligated 
substantially large amounts of treasure to acquire and field mainly U.S. BMD systems. 
(Ellison 2015) Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used successfully for the last two years to 
intercept rebel Houthi missile attacks into Saudi Arabia from Yemen. (The Times of 
Israel 2018) This explosion in Middle Eastern missile defense is an area which is ripe for 
research. 
 Although none of these works on BMD and Deterrence or BMD Policy History 
specifically provide us a detailed list of the IVs I wish to address, they do provide 
reinforcing insights to those of my research subjects, as discussed in Chapter Four. While 
helping frame certain pieces of the puzzle, other pieces can be pulled out of more 
traditional Political Science works, to which we now turn.   
 
Collective Action 
      Our first category of Political Science works fall within the category of Collective 
Action theory. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, my BMD-related 
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IVs “Threat Perception,” “Contribution Requirements,” “Information Sharing,” “Plan 
Development,” and “Posture Decisions” all have roots in Collective Action literature.   
      Today, the U.S. is in collective security arrangements which include missile 
defense with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the six Gulf Cooperation Council 
states, Canada, Israel, Japan and the Republic of Korea; these arrangements range from 
very limited bilateral security agreements, to “hub-and-spokes” multilateral 
arrangements, to a full treaty-based defensive alliance (Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 
2010, pp 31-34). Because our DV is the decision to join a military coalition or alliance 
which uses BMD, it is germane to determine first what work has been done to explore 
factors affecting states’ decision-making calculus to join collective self-defense 
arrangements, including permanent military alliances such as NATO, or more temporary 
military coalitions such as the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan. The follow-on task, in Chapter Three, will then be to generalize these 
factors in relation to a more specific BMD-centered coalition.   
      Military alliances have traditionally been formed for one of two reasons: to 
compel an adversary to do something, or to deter an adversary from doing something. 
(Schelling 1966, 69) Because alliances may or may not use conditional “activation 
clauses” (such as NATO’s Article 5, in which “an attack on one is considered and attack 
on all”), this establishes a typology of variations of “Unconditional Compellent,” 
“Conditional Compellent,” “Unconditional Deterrent,” and “Conditional Deterrent” 
alliances (Benson, 2011). Although defensive in nature,   BMD could be a capability 
harnessed by any of these alliance types to support compellence or deterrence as part of a 
larger set of objectives, so understanding the broader strategic objectives of alliances or 
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military coalitions vis-à-vis their adversary, and their triggers for use, are likely to be 
important factors in BMD coalition formation. Because a collective understanding of the 
adversary is central to both strategy- and BMD-related response option development, this 
idea underpins my IVs “Threat Perception,” “Information Sharing,” “Plan 
Development,” and “Posture Decisions,” which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three. 
      During the bipolar Cold War world, substantial thought in the Realist and 
Neorealist schools was put toward alliance formation by both Morgenthau & Thompson 
(1985) and Waltz (1979, 38) and expanded upon by many of their followers, including 
Walt (1988). One major concept to emerge from these works in determining when states 
would form alliances, and with whom, was the twin ideas of “balancing threats” and 
“bandwagoning.” In a classic balance-of-power sense, states band together to “balance” 
strong or threatening powers or will “jump on the bandwagon,” by allying with a strong 
or threatening state. Both of these ideas come with a price, however. The more states that 
fall under a collective security arrangement, the greater the potential of “dilution” of the 
alliance’s credibility; this is especially true if these “bandwagon” states provide little to 
collective defense. The act of “balancing” a larger or more aggressive state may itself be 
perceived as escalatory by this potential adversary, enflaming the situation. But both of 
these ideas are legitimate rationale for alliance building nonetheless, with numerous 
historical examples to underpin them. The fact that there are so few BMD equipped states 
means that “balancing” against a BM-armed adversary, or “bandwagoning” with a larger 
BMD-equipped state for deterrent or compellent objectives against such an adversary is a 
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potentially real reason for BMD-related collective action. Again, these concepts support 
my IV “Threat Perception.” 
      Because of changes in the security environment of the post-Cold War world, there 
is emerging thought from the Liberalist and Institutionalist schools that collective 
security arrangements have two additional purposes beyond deterrence or compellence: 
to maintain the status quo in an emerging conflict or to ensure change is peaceful, with 
force only used in self-defense. This is reflected in the growth of peace keeping and 
peace enforcement missions over the last three decades. These schools believe conditions 
are actually propitious for increases in collective security, preferably under UN auspices, 
with the diffusion of economic power, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and ballistic missiles, and the dissolution of other superpowers. Realists in post-
Cold War collective action theory believe in the continued dominance of offensive or 
defensive forces (including BMD) to reverse aggression and focus on the threats to 
balance posited by WMD. (Bennett & Lepgold 1993, pp 223-226) 
      The other major strand of coalition formation comes from well-established 
economic theory: coalitions form in order to change equilibrium, and to “win” within an 
existing multipolar order, by gaining the smallest possible number of members necessary 
to win; this is done to maximize the gains taken from the losers amongst the individual 
winners. Coalition formation relies on the initiating state making “side payments” 
consisting of currency in many forms, such as threat of reprisal, payment of money or 
other resources, promises on future policy, promises on subsequent decisions, or appeals 
to emotional satisfaction (Riker 1962; Sandler & Hartley 2001). As will be discussed in 
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Chapter Three, the promise of BMD has been used historically as part of quid pro quos 
with non-BMD states in defense coalition formation. 
      Size matters within a coalition as well. The economic theory discussed above that 
“the larger the coalition, the greater the sub-optimization of profits of victory” is coupled 
with the general observation that the largest member of the coalition bears the greatest 
burden and hence, in many ways, can be exploited by the smaller coalition members in a 
process known as “free-riding.” Coherence of purpose, ability to provide collective goods 
to individual members, and size of shares per individual, are each inverse to the number 
of members in the coalition, while organizational costs increase as the coalition grows in 
size, hence reducing profits as well (Olson, 1965). In our case, if BMD from another 
member is the benefit of joining, but there will only be so much missile defense to go 
around, then the more members you have the thinner you may have to spread the peanut 
butter.  This “free-riding” discussion is a significant element of my IV, “Contribution 
Requirements,” detailed in Chapter Three. 
 
Burden Sharing 
      Related to Collective Action literature are a sub-set of works on the concept of 
Burden Sharing, which appears to be a major element of coalition or alliance formation. 
Elements of my IVs “Threat Perception,” “Contribution Requirements,” “Structures 
and Authorities,” and “Plan Development” can be derived from within Burden Sharing 
literature.   
      In a collective self-defense regime, it is imperative to understand why some 
partners contribute and some do not. Directly related to coalition size and the economic 
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drivers behind collective action discussed above are the principles that underpin “burden 
sharing” amongst coalition or alliance partners, which can generally be thought of as, 
“Who pays for or contributes  what within a collective security arrangement?” These 
principles provide another level of fidelity in the development of my explanatory 
framework. Concepts such as “the cost of admission,” “national contributions and 
commitments,” and “national caveats,” recur throughout most of this category of 
literature.   
      Olson & Zeckhauser (1966), using Cold War NATO as their model, proposed that 
the size of military force a state provides to an alliance is regulated by the state’s value 
for collective defense vis-à-vis other non-defense goods, and balanced against the amount 
other allies provide. There is a disproportionate share of common burden borne by states 
with the highest value on common defense while states who value collective defense less 
bear less of the burden proportionately. This is offset by a couple factors. First, proximity 
to the adversary increases valuation of collective security, while the “loss of strength 
gradient” means the more distal the threat, the less likely a potential coalition partner may 
feel the need to join. (Boulding 1963, pp 430-431) Secondly, larger states or those with 
longer frontiers have more area to defend and therefore value collective defense more. 
Lastly, nations must balance resources between providing for collective defense and 
internal self-defense. “Strategic bargaining interactions” (in this case, reactions inside an 
alliance regarding disproportionality of forces provided by other members) are generally 
ignored due to the “irreversibility” of alliances and the need for alliance solidarity in the 
face of adversaries; this results in little or no pressure or cost to lesser states to provide 
their fair share. This is one reason for the “free rider” phenomenon discussed above. In 
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somewhat economic terms, NATO’s traditional Cold War defensive alliance, in which 
NATO states had Russia as an existential threat, provided excludable and non-rival goods 
to one another, and states were able to free-ride on US extended nuclear deterrence. 
(Olson and Zeckhauser 1966) After the Cold War this became more complex. NATO’s 
recent out-of-Europe peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions are non-excludable, 
require rival goods, and have an external threat to only certain members, making it harder 
to mobilize internal support today (Oneal 1990; and Lepgold 1998). Although focused on 
NATO, this is instructive in other regions as well. Of interest to us is that states who 
believe air and missile attacks are the main threat to their homelands may be inclined to 
invest more in air and missile defense, thus supporting refinement of my IVs, “Threat 
Perception” and “Contribution Requirements,” discussed further in Chapter Three.   
 Beyond the economic causes of “free-riding” and burden sharing, another strand 
of thought is emerging that believes there may be other, less tangible reasons for 
contributing to collective action. Davidson (2011), Miller (2011) and Park (2014) 
propose that such situational and perceptual factors as national reliability, credibility and 
prestige have historically been drivers in the decision of nations to join in and provide 
forces and resources to the shared burdens of collective action. 
      “Caveats” (or “red cards”) are becoming a better-understood phenomenon in 
Political Science, based in general on Principal Agency Theory, which addresses how 
much discretion is given to agents via contingent delegation contracts. This general 
phenomenon rests on the ideas in Tsebelis’ “veto players” concept in which implicit 
power in collective bargaining comes from the ability to impose a veto on something the 
other party in a contract desires. His general findings indicate that parliamentary 
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governments built on party coalitions (requiring more internal compromise) impose more 
caveats on their deployed militaries than presidential-led or single-party majoritarian 
parliamentary governments (in which a leader is empowered to delegate authority).  
Some exceptions to this general rule include: balance-of-threat neorealism (if the 
perception of threat is greater, less caveats are imposed), public opinion (if the situation is 
unpopular, more caveats are imposed), and national strategic culture (in which historical 
military norms previously developed shape the number of caveats imposed). (Tsebelis, 
2002)  
 As a general rule, too many caveats result in a loss of credibility. Also, the 
influence a nation has in coalition military operations is proportional to the number of 
troops contributed, but this influence is modified by how flexible and useful these troops 
are to the coalition, and hence is affected by the number of caveats imposed by national 
decision-makers. (Saideman & Auerswald 2012; Auerswald & Saideman 2014) Since 
caveats are used to restrict the scope of a military’s delegated authority to conduct certain 
activities within a coalition operation, it is easy to see how “red cards” could be applied 
within a BMD coalition context. For instance, one nation may “reserve” a certain number 
of interceptors for its own defense from a missile defense battery used for collective 
defense, or could restrict their forces from defending a particular area or partner due to 
external constraints such as interceptor overflight of a third party’s airspace. This concept 
lends itself to the refinement of my IVs, “Structures and Authorities,” and “Plan 
Development,” described in detail in Chapter Three. 
      Marton and Hynek (2012) have developed a useful coalition burden sharing 
typology using Threat Balancing (TB) and Alliance Dependence (AD) as two key 
 
31 
variables, with each having Weak (W) and Strong (S) variants in a 2 x 2 matrix. TB is 
related to the belief in the proximity or imminence of threat, while AD reflects strength of 
belief in collective versus individual action. TB-W/AD-W are termed “Onlookers,” TB-
W/AD-S are “Servants,” TB-S/AD-W are “Mavericks,” while TB-S/AD-S are “Strivers;” 
these categories reflect a contribution and leadership role within coalitions. Additional 
variables which affect a nation’s placement on this quad chart include the relative size of 
the nation, the national executive’s flexibility in policy formulation, and any domestic 
organizational interests in the operation (e.g., military, industrial, economic, etc.). This 
can be a useful way of looking at potential BMD-coalition members as well, as it is 
readily apparent that not all states are created equal in contributory power in this area any 
more than they are in other forms of military contribution; this idea reinforces my 
Intervening Variable of state types discussed in the Theory section in the next chapter. 
     In summary, the benefits of burden sharing by coalition members are best 
summarized by Marton & Hynek (2012, 549) thus: “Countries join coalitions in order to 
achieve at least partly common or compatible goals. Doing this in alliances, they spread 
costs and risks, and they gain additional legitimacy for certain actions, while they pool 
resources together to collectively dispose of quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced 
capabilities and augmented capacities…an individual coalition member’s contribution 
can be important in making available a missing or ‘niche’ capability or by adding critical 
mass to a coalition.” 
      The down sides to burden sharing by collective membership are that maintaining 
a coalition in the face of intra-member quarrels may be costly to a nation, and originating 
nations may need to compromise with newly joining recruits over the original goals, 
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diluting the purpose of the coalition. Potentially destabilizing factors in a coalition 
include the possibility of abandonment by other members, inequitable burden-sharing, 
commitments not being kept in good faith, and a lack of meaningful consultation on 
important issues. (Marton and Hynek 2012, 549-550)   
 
International Cooperation Regimes 
      Thus far we have focused on factors which would coerce states to work together 
and share the BMD burden. But we have overlooked international institutions and norms 
which may foster greater cooperation and participation. While there is little academic 
work in this area directly related to BMD it is possible to distill important first principles 
from a review of this principally Institutionalist literature which can later be applied to an 
“international BMD policy regime.” I believe that my IVs, “Information Sharing,” 
“Posture Decisions,” “Consultation Processes” and “Consequences of Engagement 
Planning” can be linked at least indirectly to International Cooperation Regimes 
literature.   
      Beyond the NATO alliance, there are currently no International Organizations 
(IOs) that focus specifically on BMD policy issues; in NATO’s case, BMD is only one of 
numerous issues in the Alliance portfolio. There are only a small number of domestic 
lobbyist groups such as the U.S.-based Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, but beyond 
that the vast majority of interested parties in BMD policy reside within the Ministries and 
Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense of many nations. Because these 
organizations network with each other extensively, it is more instructive for our purposes 
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to focus on multi- or trans-national norm-development and network-formation literature 
than IO institutional literature. 
      Because BMD policy issues affecting coalition formation must span many 
nations, the development of these “international regimes” overlaps heavily with 
Keohane’s (2005) “Functional Theory of International Regimes.” Understanding what 
drives cooperation versus defection is important to this work. The cooperative 
development of a BMD capability acquisition and use “framework” (just as with any 
other advanced military technology capability development) would most certainly 
include resolving issues of legal liability, transaction costs, uncertainty and information 
sharing, and potentially, irresponsibility on the part of some coalition members. 
(Keohane, 2005) The establishment of international norms in these areas, as they relate to 
BMD, would allow the interested parts of states to form “BMD coalitions” in the absence 
of BMD-specific IOs, and these areas directly relate to my IVs, “Information Sharing,” 
“Consultation Processes” and “Consequences of Engagement Planning” (the last 
because of the potential issues with international law and liability), described in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
      As stated above, the major interested parties in multinational BMD policy norm-
development are generally the military and diplomatic arms of interested states, so 
looking at network development between them benefits the development of my 
explanatory framework.  Slaughter’s grouping of these networks as “horizontal” 
(equivalent-level functional experts between states and IOs) or “vertical” (between 
equivalent functional experts from states “up” to their counterparts in supranational 
organizations) is useful in this context. (Slaughter, 2004)  Outside of NATO, the absence 
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of “supranational” IOs in the BMD arena leaves most of these interested action agents at 
the “horizontal” level. Horizontal network formation and function is an important aspect 
of this work, because the network of subject matter experts I interviewed from the 
NIMBLE TITAN community comprise a similar, real world network of like-minded 
specialists in BMD policy and operations.   
      Without authoritative power over other potential coalition states, a burgeoning 
horizontal BMD policy network must influence its partners and national constituents 
using “soft power;” although having no direct relation to BMD policy, Nye’s “soft 
power” theory illuminates the most likely method for propagating the norms and ideas 
that a BMD coalition builder will need to foster with potential partners. (Nye, 2004) Such 
“soft power” is instrumental in my two IVs that focus on external third parties, 
“Consultation Processes” and “Consequences of Engagement Planning,” as well as in 
the coalition-internal IV which has greatest potential impact on messaging domestic and 
foreign audiences, “Posture Decisions,” described in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
International Law 
      The last area of literature underpins my IVs “Structures and Authorities,” 
“Offensive Decisions,” and “Consequences of Engagement Planning,” which have 
elements derived from International Law-related literature. Because there are few 
established international norms associated with collective BMD, it has great potential for 
international controversy, especially those areas dealing with liability for damages and 
conflict initiation, including such concepts as preventive war, preemption, or anticipatory 
self-defense. Although this literature sits more within law than political science per se, 
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there are significant overlaps with International Relations because of the lack of 
internationally accepted jurisdiction or jurisprudence.  
      Conflict initiation by coalitions or alliances is an element of BMD policy because, 
frankly, there will likely never be enough interceptors to shield against a generally-larger 
number of cheaper threat ballistic missiles; this means national and coalition or alliance 
decision-makers must weigh the need to initiate offensive operations to reduce the 
adversary’s arsenal before they can be launched. The pressures which military leaders 
may bring to bear on political leadership to strike first is a phenomenon addressed in 
general terms by Levy (1986), who looks at institutional systemic, organizational, 
bureaucratic, and psychological variables, including “military necessity” that could drive 
a state to start a war before attacked. 
      While the need to attack before being attacked may be a military necessity, the 
decision to do so is purely political. There is a lack of international consensus on the fine 
lines between the definitions of “preventive war,” “preemption,” and “anticipatory self-
defense,” which are defined differently by various countries. There are international 
precedents, however, such as the 1837 Caroline Incident, which provide insights on when 
the international community generally considers the initial use of force to be acceptable. 
Due to the Bush era doctrine of Preemption, there is a phenomenal amount of legal work 
done in this arena, some of the most significant of which include Arend (2003), Richter 
(2003), and Dershowitz (2007.) Only James Turner Johnson, in Abrams (1998), attempts 
to put the principles of “Just War” and offensive strike into a relevant (BMD-related) 
context for us in a thought-provoking segment on the moral obligations of defense. This 
line of thinking supports the development of my IVs, “Structures and Authorities,” and 
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“Offensive Decisions,” both of which are related to multinational decision making about 
the legal use of force and authorities necessary to initiate it. 
 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, my IV, “Consequences of 
Engagement Planning,” is political because of the potential for damages and liability 
arising from both ballistic missile attacks and BMD use to mitigate them. To-date, there 
have been no agreed international conventions that address liability arising from a missile 
war, so we are somewhat hampered to find BMD-specific examples and must derive 
thinking on this subject from what little international legal conventions do exist. These 
are best summed up in Sucharitkul (1996). 
 
Conclusion 
      At the end of the day, this work is really a hybrid of several extant international 
relations ideas overlaid on a military capability backbone. What drives collective action 
and military coalition formation? How do these partners develop the international policy 
regimes and normative standards necessary for coalition formation? Do these regimes 
and norms help or hinder coalition formation and operations? What are the practical 
dynamics of burden sharing between technologically and financially disparate coalition 
partners, and does this affect coalition formation?   
      While these questions have long been focus areas for IR theorists, the application 
of an emerging military technology, BMD, forces us to ask these questions in a different 
way. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence theory was merely a minor 
extrapolation of Realist balance-of-power ideology. After Hiroshima, political scientists 
created entirely new and very powerful theories of strategic deterrence that effectively 
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drove the Cold War. Without this new military technology, the “Cold War” might have 
just been another act in the Congress of Vienna, with great power states continuing to 
balance each other. 
      While missile defense may not have the same revolutionary impact as nuclear 
weapons in becoming a centerpiece of political and military thought, it presents us with a 
change to the international environment in some ways comparable to the advent of 
nuclear weapons. Both are very expensive, technologically challenging to develop, 
require substantial economic and industrial bases of support, and come with a host of 
unique political issues relevant to their use which are not shared by conventional military 
forces. Like nuclear weapons, missile defense is here and not likely to go away. 
Ultimately, there is an imperative to understand the international political ramifications of 
missile defense before we are surprised by them.   
      To reiterate, the current state of BMD research consists of a large number of 
studies looking at the historical or technical background of BMD, or the negative or 
divisive aspects of BMD in its relationship with deterrence theory, escalation control 
theory, and strategic stability theory. Beyond research, there have also been numerous 
popular and governmental statements, reports, Congressional testimonies, and speeches 
professing the belief that BMD has the potential to assure partners and allies, and bring 
them together. Yet I have found next to no military science or political science research 
on just how BMD can strengthen collective action and bring states together for 
cooperative purposes.    
 That said, there is a lot in political science literature that has helped me form the 
theory and hypotheses behind my “BMD policy coalition-building explanatory 
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framework,” and all eleven of my IVs have been shown in this chapter to have some 
roots in extant literature, even if indirectly. But to add meat we will need to delve deeper 
into specific BMD-related operational policy issues. As an interdisciplinary work, 
bringing together BMD technical issues, policies, and literature on cooperation is the 
lacuna I wish to fill. For that we will need to cross over into military doctrine, writings, 
speeches and interviews to derive these issues for deeper analysis, which I will do in 
Chapters Three and Four.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 In this chapter I first start by laying out my research questions and the theory 
structure that I have developed to explore these questions. The second section explains 
how I derived the independent variables (IVs) I use, while the third section fully fleshes 
out these BMD policy-related issue IVs and their associated hypotheses. The fourth 
section explains the research methodology I used to answer the research questions. 
 
Theory, Part 1 - The Central Research Questions and Theory Structure 
 My central research questions are: What are the key MD-related policy issues that 
would encourage support for multinational (coalition or alliance) MD, and why? Three 
subordinate and sequential questions of interest include: 
 What are the key factors of each policy issue that states use to prioritize its 
importance, and why?  
 How do these key factors differ from state to state, or region to region, and why?  
 What key factors are dominant in priority in all regions, and why? 
 Theory. To answer these questions, the theory I used is depicted graphically in 
Figure 3-1 below.  The theory can be summarized as: States which feel threatened by 
ballistic-missile armed adversaries may wish to mitigate such threats through collective 
action. Given sufficient antecedent conditions for a state to potentially join a military 
coalition or alliance which uses BMD, there are certain BMD-related policy variables 
which may encourage the state to join, or discourage the state from joining, said 
coalition or alliance. The importance of these variables may vary between states or 
regions, and between military or political decision makers within each state.  
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Figure 3-1. Theory 
 Theory Framework. The decision by a state to join a coalition or alliance that 
uses BMD is my Dependent Variable (DV), while eleven BMD-related policy issues are 
my Independent Variables (IVs). Each of these IVs generates a separate and independent 
hypothesis, and each presents a slightly different theoretical perspective. The next two 
sections describe how these IVs were derived and described in detail.  
 But the need to join a multinational collective action arrangement such as a 
military alliance or coalition which uses BMD will not occur in a completely peaceful, 
steady-state situation where there are no security concerns, so I assume some antecedent 
conditions, without which there is no logic to creating a military coalition or alliance 
which uses BMD. First, I propose there must be a potential adversary of concern to a 
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state which is contemplating joining the coalition or alliance, and this adversary must 
own ballistic missiles. Second, there must be a change in the international environment, 
such as an emerging crisis, which would cause the state to want to join a military 
coalition or alliance for its own security. Third, one or more of the affected states must 
possess a credible BMD capability that could potentially provide protection for coalition 
members. Lastly, there has to be at least one or more other states with which to join, so 
the situation with the adversary must be of concern to multiple states. These four 
conditions are necessary for the development of a multinational military coalition or 
alliance requiring the protection afforded by BMD.   
 The states that are contemplating joining a BMD coalition or alliance view these 
antecedent conditions through different lenses, based on their own perceived need for 
security. As a set of Intervening Variables (IntVs) I have aggregated these into three 
types of states: 1) States who already own BMD capabilities and forces of their own 
(termed “BMD States” on Figure 3-1, such as the United States, Israel, Japan, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, etc.); 2) States who have historically supported the BMD 
operations of BMD-owning states (termed “BMD Supporters,” such as the Czech 
Republic, Great Britain, Romania, etc.) or that are in the process of acquiring BMD 
capabilities in the near future (such as Australia, Denmark, Poland, Turkey, etc.); and, 3) 
States who do not have BMD or have not provided direct BMD-related support to those 
who do (termed “Non-BMD States,” such as Canada, Estonia, Finland, etc.). The 
definition of “support to BMD operations” is a complex issue, which will be more fully 
explored later in this chapter under the section on IV “Contribution Requirements.” 
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  Within my theory, I propose that these three types of states then use the eleven 
IVs, or BMD-policy-related factors, to aid in their decision-making to join a coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD. Within NIMBLE TITAN, which is described in detail in the next 
section, it has been frequently observed that, in addition to national or regional 
perspectives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or State Department and Ministry or 
Department of Defense personnel view and value each of these IVs differently; therefore 
I assume that senior diplomats and senior military officers will weight these factors 
differently when making recommendations to their national leaders. So, we must 
determine the relational values of these factors as seen through the diplomatic and 
military filters as well to answer my research question and sub-questions. 
Due to their subject matter, I further break the eleven BMD policy issue IVs into 
three groups: those issues which are adversary-centric, those issues which are internal 
between members of the coalition or alliance, and those which are external and relevant 
to the coalition’s relationships with third parties. In the third section, below, in which I 
explain the IVs in detail, I start first with a directional hypothesis, give a summary of 
what this means to the military professionals that plan and use BMD, and then provide a 
detailed explanation of what makes the issue a political concern. This gives me 11 
hypotheses to test in Chapter Four. 
 
Theory, Part 2 - How the Variables Were Created 
I have worked in missile defense plans and policy at United States Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) since 2004. In 2005, USSTRATCOM began hosting and  
conducting a series of two-year campaigns of multinational missile defense policy 
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experimentation known as “NIMBLE TITAN” (NT). I have been involved in all seven 
two-year campaigns of NT and this has placed me in an interesting position to see the 
confluence of military and political science first-hand. “NIMBLE TITAN is an 
unclassified, multinational, missile defense series of experiments executed within an 
integrated air and missile defense context. The campaign focuses on regional and global 
challenges through cooperatively developed concepts, objectives, and analysis…Through 
NIMBLE TITAN nations explore potential policies and operational constructs that will 
need to be in place in the future to facilitate cooperative missile defense. It serves as a 
forum for multinational collaboration that facilitates the exchange of views and 
experimentation to expand international relationships and enhances regional missile 
defense, and strengthens deterrence. Multinational participants from Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs jointly shape objectives, concept design, data collection and 
analysis. The experiment involves mock air and missile threats from fictitious countries 
in a scenario based 10 years in the future.” (U.S. Army Press Release 2017)   
      Today, NIMBLE TITAN 2018 (NT’18) has grown from a U.S.-only event before 
2004 to one including participants from 24 states and four multinational organizations 
from North America, Europe (both NATO and non-NATO), the Arabian Gulf, and the 
Asia-Pacific regions. NATO (as an organization) is also a participant, although only 15 of 
the 29 NATO nations are NT participants.  
 The strength of NT is that it brings together MD experts from the Ministries or 
Departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs or State from participating nations and 
allows them to collectively learn about and explore BMD and BMD policy issues in an 
unclassified and non-attributional forum, using unclassified (but very realistic) political-
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military scenarios set ten years in the future with air- and missile-armed adversaries 
around the world. It fosters sharing of experience and fresh thinking between newer and 
more experienced states. It allows states which are considering acquisition of BMD 
capabilities to explore options, while also allowing states that cannot to understand how 
they can contribute to collective action. It provides a recurrent, concentrated forum of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs experts in air and missile defense operations and policy 
from around the world to gather and network, and is a ripe environment for exploration, 
especially in many areas in which there are no extant national or multinational policies. 
For my purposes, NT is ideally designed to help better understand which factors are 
likely to lead states to cooperate, and which will fragment alliances and coalitions.   
 In order to experiment on which missile defense policy issues are compelling 
enough for national political leadership to base their decisions to join in collective action 
which uses BMD, NT uses a “vignette game treatment” approach similar to that used by 
survey-based experimental political scientists. “The goal of vignette treatments is to 
evaluate what difference it makes when the actual object of study or judgment, or the 
context in which that object appears, is systematically changed in some way.” (Mutz 
2011, 54) In many ways, NT is the equivalent to a strategic-national, policy-military 
“Model UN,” in that participants play the roles of heads of state or government and 
ministers or secretaries of state or foreign affairs and defense, as well as senior military 
leadership. Very complex, vignette-based scenarios use a combination of television and 
print media, intelligence reports, political statements, and air and missile defense 
computer simulations to create situations which stimulate dialogue and actions relative to 
specific MD-policy issues under investigation. These situational vignettes are designed to 
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test or explore objectives the participants collectively agreed they wish to explore at the 
beginning of each campaign. A specified tenet of NT is “Objectives drive everything.”  
 This forum has provided some very tangible outputs which have supported 
decisions by several of the participants to acquire air and missile defenses, support real-
world air and MD operations, shape operational concepts and doctrine, and develop 
strategic communications and declaratory policy. These activities ultimately support the 
U.S. goals of assuring our partners and allies and deterring potential adversaries through 
strengthening collective action. (U.S. Army Press Release 2017)   
 Lieutenant James Dickinson, Commander of USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional 
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in his April 2018 testimony before 
the House Armed Services Committee, described NT thus: “Another venue aimed at 
promoting increased cooperation is the NIMBLE TITAN campaign, a biennial series of 
multinational missile defense experiments. NIMBLE TITAN brings together policy and 
military subject matter experts from allies and partner nations to explore collaborative 
missile defense, synchronize policy and military initiatives, and identify potential future 
concepts. Today, ministries of foreign affairs and defense representatives from 24 
nations, NATO, three additional multinational organizations, as well as DoD, OSD, Joint 
Staff, Combatant Commands, and MDA convene quarterly to exchange views and 
insights, experimenting collectively with policy and operational concepts. The NIMBLE 
TITAN campaign provides a unique forum to advance U.S. missile defense policies and 
Combatant Commanders’ regional security objectives. As the free world’s premier 
strategic military and policy focused missile defense event, this campaign provides 
participating nations with critical opportunities for multinational and cross-regional 
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discussions. The 28 member nations and international organizations work collectively to 
produce practical missile defense concepts and solutions to policy-military challenges; 
many of which influence and inform real-world missile defense policies and 
multinational planning. The NIMBLE TITAN 2018 campaign…addressed IAMD, 
deterrence and de-escalation, left-of-launch actions, passive defense, advanced 
technologies, interoperability, regional defense planning, alliance and coalition cohesion, 
and harmonized strategic messaging—challenges of concern to all participants. NIMBLE 
TITAN has been a gateway for the U.S. to establish crucial relationships with allies and 
partners. It also informs the missile defense policies of the participating nations and 
international organizations. Events like NIMBLE TITAN foster greater confidence in 
combined missile defenses and provide a means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, 
integration, interoperability, and burden sharing with our allies and partners.” (U.S. 
Congress 2018, 19-20)  
 So, what does this have to do with the development of my theoretical framework 
and, in particular my IVs and associated hypotheses? The simple answer is that they have 
been derived from the aggregation of lessons learned from 21 separate sets of NT 
experimentation events conducted between 2010 and 2018.  
 I have been the Wargame Control Group director for five campaigns of NT, from 
NT 2010 to the present, in which I have lead a multinational team of missile defense 
experts and war-gamers to design and execute the scenario aspects of the experiments 
themselves to meet participant national or organizational objectives. I have also worked 
very closely with our multinational analysis team, who watches everything and captures 
substantive lessons learned as well as data to assess how well we met these objectives.  
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 From my perspective, NT has two main strengths which have led to its continued 
growth and expansion. The first is that each two-year campaign builds on the last, so that 
it continues to become more nuanced and “graduate-level,” while also adding complexity 
as new nations and multinational organizations join. Secondly, and more important to this 
work, the summary of the major policy “lessons learned” are codified in a “living” 
document that is known as the “NIMBLE TITAN Implementing Instrument” (NTII). The 
NTII has captured the summary of MD-policy-related ideas and concepts that are 
generally accepted by all, or it highlights the differences that are clearly understood 
between nations; it serves as a “primer” to ensure that new players do not continue to re-
visit the more basic concepts or issues which have been previously explored, but are able 
to move onto more advanced experimentation. I presented my dissertation prospectus to 
the NT Steering Committee, which is comprised of the leads from each participating 
nation or organization, in February 2015 and gained their agreement to use material from 
the NTII to help shape my research, and to conduct participant interviews (see the 
Research Methodology Qualitative section, below.) I offered to provide a copy of my 
dissertation to any interested members, which could be used for subsequent member-
checking in any follow-on works. 
 Ultimately and over time, a number of BMD-related policy issues in NT events, 
which have been captured in the NTII, have arisen that are significant and recurrent, 
regardless of how we refine the experimentation, or how we change the scenarios or 
players. I have distilled these down into eleven sets of topical issue areas, which were 
then reinforced by the literature discussed in Chapter Two.  As will be discussed in more 
detail in the subsequent Research Methodology section, the NIMBLE TITAN Design, 
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Analysis and Report Team (DART), which has a number of Operational Research and 
Systems Analysts (ORSAs), has observed, captured and metricized qualitative data 
throughout 21 separate experiments during the last ten years. They used meta-data (such 
as topical word-counts) to show recurrence of which issues were of significance to the 
players. Their associated findings and after action review reports continued to highlight 
the same eleven significant topic areas that are important to the relatively small number 
of states which are actively interested in BMD matters today. I distilled and generalized 
these topic areas into eleven IVs and their associated hypotheses that form the core of the 
theory framework underpinning this work, which we now explain in detail. 
 
Theory, Part 3 - The Hypotheses and Variables Explained 
 The principle phenomenon we want to discover is which BMD-related policy 
issue(s) is or are most likely to increase “the likelihood of a state joining a multinational 
military coalition/alliance that uses BMD.” As stated above, the likelihood of this action 
occurring is our DV, and our shorthand for this will be “PJoining.” 
 The eleven policy variables derived as described above form our IVs, and each 
IV, when related to PJoining, forms a working hypothesis. In general terms the subordinate 
hypotheses follow the structure: “As X increases (or decreases), PJoining increases.”   
 As a reminder, I define “BMD-related policy issues,” as “Those issues involving 
the use, or potential use, of BMD. This includes both discussions between national 
political and military leadership, and between nations involved in collective political-
military action. These issues may require national or multinational decision or 
agreement.”  
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 Of note, many of these policy issues are bounded by either technical or military 
procedural factors. This chapter assumes a reader somewhat familiar with BMD, but I 
have included a short primer on the technical and procedural underpinnings of the 11 
variables at Appendix B. 
 The eleven IVs and their associated hypotheses are logically grouped into 
“Adversary-Centric,” “Coalition Internal,” and “Coalition External/Third Party” IVs and 
we start first by explaining the Adversary-centric BMD-related policy issues. 
 
Adversary-Centric IVs: The first two IVs derived from NT experimentation findings, 
“Threat Perception” and “Security Dilemma,” are relational issues between the country 
which is considering joining a military coalition or alliance which uses BMD and a 
potential adversary that uses missiles. While relational, they are also perceptual variables, 
rather than concrete and quantifiable ones, in that they both include the perceived 
relationship between the joining state and their potential adversary.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (“Threat Perception”): The greater the perception of threat from a 
potential BM-equipped adversary, the more the likelihood of a state joining a 
multinational military coalition or alliance which uses BMD increases. 
 Our first IV will be termed “Threat Perception,” so Hypothesis 1 can be 
abbreviated to “As Threat Perception increases, PJoining increases.”  There are two 
assumptions underpinning H1: 1) the political situation is such that the state considering 
PJoining feels potentially threatened by the adversary (i.e. the adversary has possible 
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intent); and, 2) the state is within range of the adversary’s missiles (i.e. the adversary has 
existing capability).   
 Military Implications:  At first blush, this seems the most obvious reason to form 
a military coalition. If there is no threat, there is probably no reason to form a military 
coalition at all. But in reality, this is not a binary “yes-no” issue. Military intelligence 
professionals break perception of the threat down into two main elements: “capability” 
and “intent,” and both of these look at the current situation and attempt to make 
predictions regarding future technology development and evolution of intent, which leads 
to questions such as: “Does a potential adversary have the capability to inflict damage?” 
“When will he gain such capabilities and capacities?” “If so, do they have the intent or 
will to do so?” “Under what circumstances?” “Is current hostile intent by a potential 
adversary situational in nature, and hence limited in duration, or more constant and 
generalized?” (Handberg 2002, 173) 
From the perspective of military planners dealing with adversary missile threats, 
“capability” translates mainly to quantifiable and technical factors such as missile range, 
accuracy, and payloads. Questions asked include: Can the adversary reach us? Do things 
we hold important fall within the “range rings” of his arsenal (i.e., rings on a map 
showing the arc of his maximum range)?  How accurate are his missiles?  What type(s) of 
payloads do his missiles carry (e.g., conventional high explosive warheads, or nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction)? Do they carry single or multiple 
warheads? How many launchers or launch sites do they have (which dictates the largest 
number of simultaneous launches they can conduct)? (Handberg 2002, 188; U.S. 
Department of Defense 2017, III-3) 
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In a collective sense, however, just because a coalition or alliance partner falls 
within the “range rings” of a potential adversary does not mean that partner is actually at 
risk. This is where a more subjective assessment of the adversary’s intent must be 
applied. An example of this would be a North Korean ICBM which can range Europe and 
Australia as well as the United States. In this case do NATO nations or Australians 
believe there is any probability that North Korea is likely to use such a weapon on them?  
While capability usually has a technical answer, intent is always situationally-dependent, 
and generally based on the political situation between the two nations. (Handberg 2002, 
173) Sometimes, the technical capability gives impetus to concerns regarding intent, as 
seen by recent articles in Australia concerning China’s growing abilities in the South 
China Sea. (Layton 2018) 
Political Implications: Threat perception manifests itself as a political element 
affecting coalition or alliance formation when it becomes a “common threat perception.” 
While intelligence on a potential adversary’s capabilities may be shared and agreed to 
between multiple national intelligence apparatuses, the source of most friction comes 
from the ability to gain consensus on intent. (Jervis 1978, 175) The question becomes, 
“while we may all be within his range rings, does he really intend to attack all of us, or 
just some of us?”  
Amongst already-established military alliances or coalitions, there may also be 
stressors which cause the formulation of a common threat perception to be challenging to 
alliance or coalition solidarity. Due to proximity of threats some states may perceive 
themselves at risk while others are not, and additionally states within a coalition or 
alliance may have different levels of risk acceptance. (Albero, et al. 2017, 9) A current 
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example of this is within NATO; Iranian missiles today can range into Turkey and most 
of the Balkan states, but cannot yet reach Western Europe; this could make collective 
action by all 29 NATO nations based on a common threat perception of Iran challenging 
politically. During deliberations on NATO missile defense, this was further complicated 
when Turkey insisted on not even naming their neighbor Iran as an adversary for which 
the system was oriented. (Kay 2012, 45)  
In addition to this “some are in range, some are out” phenomenon, gaining 
consensus on subjective adversary intent within a larger number of states is logically 
more challenging than between members of a smaller coalition just due to group 
dynamics. Without a shared perception of intent, it becomes more difficult to determine 
collective responses to the threat, and this can cause a lot of stress on building, as well as 
maintaining, a coalition or alliance. (He, 2012)  
  
Hypothesis 2 (“Security Dilemma”): As adversary concerns with friendly 
coalition/alliance military buildup increase, adversary tensions and pressure on the state 
not to join increase, and the likelihood of that state joining a multinational military 
coalition or alliance that uses BMD decreases. 
 As was described in Chapter Two, a derivative of the classic “Security Dilemma,” 
as laid out by John Herz (1951) and Robert Jervis (1978), exists for BMD. In this view, 
acquisition of BMD may make the potential adversary feel insecure in his ability to use 
his offensive forces to settle a dispute, and hence feel the need to further his offensive 
capabilities to offset the BMD, thus creating an arms race. IV #2 is therefore simplified 
as “Security Dilemma,” so Hypothesis 2 is simplified to “As Security Dilemma pressure 
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increases, PJoining decreases.” Assumptions here include: 1) the state must have an 
independent means of settling the dispute with the potential adversary (i.e., from the rest 
of the coalition or alliance); and, 2) there cannot be prior political commitments to the 
coalition or alliance which can overcome adversary pressure not to join.  
Military Implications: In missile defense terms, the classic “security dilemma” 
takes on an interesting twist. In a “normal” situation, an adversary might see the buildup 
of friendly military forces as a preparation for hostilities, and subsequently feel the need 
to increase their own military preparations. This could be a rapid escalation, such as the 
beginning of World War I, or a slower, incremental development of systems such as what 
occurred during the inter-war Anglo-German naval arms races, or during the Cold War 
between the strategic arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
However, it can be argued that active missile defense systems are purely 
defensive capabilities, and hence cannot be used to harm an adversary. They are rather 
positioned to deter the adversary from throwing the first punch, or to at least mitigate the 
effects should he do so. (Roberts 2014, 22) So how could missile defenses possibly create 
a security dilemma? 
The most common rationale given is that an effective BMD capability can reduce 
or minimize an adversary’s offensive forces; in recent history, this has generally been 
focused on the strategic stability of nuclear arsenals. “Strategic calculations are 
complicated and the security dilemma is exacerbated because other nuclear powers view 
the shield as designed to negate their own deterrent, thus increasing the risk of a surprise 
first strike.” (Steff 2013, 118) This then compels the potential adversary to either commit 
to attacking earlier than they would wish, to be able to overwhelm the defending nation 
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before the defenders can strike back, or improve their missile arsenal, whether in sheer 
numbers, multiple warheads, counter-BMD decoys, and so on, with intent to overwhelm 
the defenders’ BMD systems at a later date. This same logic could be applied to 
conventional missiles, although the argument is weaker due to much larger numbers of 
conventionally-armed BMs. 
Political Implications: Aside from the obvious need for political control or 
influence over friendly or adversary reactions to an escalating “security dilemma” 
situation, a state that is contemplating joining a coalition or alliance which uses BMD 
may receive pressure from an adversary or major third party to stay out of the collective 
organization lest they become, “guilty by association.” Such a state may see the benefit of 
staying out of a ballistic-missile-armed adversary’s crosshairs and decide not to join, 
purely as a means of self-protection.  
Two current examples of this phenomenon include the U.S. deployments of Aegis 
Ashore batteries to Poland and Romania to defend against Iranian missile threats to 
Europe, and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) to defend the ROK against North Korean missile attacks. Interestingly 
enough, the “security dilemma” pressure did not originate with the Iranians and North 
Koreans, but rather with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 
respectively.   
“From the beginning, Russia has been highly critical about what it sees as a U.S. 
incursion in its backyard. Despite U.S. assurances that missile defense interceptors could 
not affect Russian ICBMs (either in caliber or in quantity), eyebrows were raised in 
Moscow about why the U.S. wanted to put so much money into a questionable 
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technology against an even more questionable Iranian threat.” (Samson 2010, 58) Since 
the announcement by the U.S. of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in the 
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Russia has maintained a steady drum-beat that the 
two Aegis Ashore sites in Europe are there purely to offset their strategic nuclear arsenal, 
despite repeated assurances by the U.S. and NATO to the contrary, and despite several 
attempts to show the Russians these sites have very limited numbers of interceptors 
which are not designed to be effective against Russian ICBMs heading north over the 
poles toward the United States. (Burns 2010, 146-147) Some believe this insistence is 
more for domestic justification than actual concerns with a threat to Russia’s strategic 
arsenal. (Lilly 2015)  
Russia has also continued to demand legal guarantees that the U.S. will not use 
the European missile defense system against them, which the U.S. has continued to 
categorically reject, citing they would not accept constraints on their UN Charter Article 
51 right of self-defense. (Rose 2015) “The Russian attack on U.S missile defense is based 
upon lies and hypocrisy. Russia is attacking the U.S. for doing what Russia is actually 
doing and seeks a veto over U.S. defense decisions.” (Schneider 2018, 7) “Russian 
theatrics regarding missile defense and strategic parity fails simple numerical analysis.  
Even after New START Treaty levels are met, Russia could possess more than 1,500 
nuclear warheads on top of approximately 330 ballistic missiles. When compared to the 
44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) currently planned, it follows that for every GBI that 
is launched, at least seven ICBMs will hit their target even in the most fortuitous of 
circumstances…the Russians clearly retain the ability to strike large swaths of the U.S. 
with resounding force.” (Neal 2014) The 2018 NATO Summit Declaration sums up this 
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issue: “NATO BMD is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s 
strategic deterrence. NATO BMD is intended to defend against potential threats 
emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times 
that the BMD system is not capable against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent and there 
is no intention to redesign this system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, 
Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable 
and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject 
to Alliance agreement, NATO remains open to discussion.” (NATO 2018 (2), para 41) 
The Russians have also attempted to isolate individual NATO partners to apply 
pressure on the North Atlantic Council to reverse the EPAA deployments. The U.K.’s 
Director General for Security Policy Peter Watkins (2016) said, “We’ve seen heightened 
tensions, coupled with irresponsible and unacceptable Russian threats to targeted Allies 
because of their support for NATO’s ballistic missile defence system.” Interestingly 
enough, Russia has also directed pressure at Japan. “Japan denied Russian claims that its 
plan to buy a U.S.-developed ballistic missile-defense system posed any threat to the 
region…Russia has ‘very deep concern’ that Japan and Korea may host elements of the 
U.S. global missile-defense system that’s being deployed under the ‘pretext of threats’ 
from North Korea, Lavrov said after the talks with Kono. The U.S. system is encircling 
Russia, and it’s unacceptable to militarize the region as a response to the Korean crisis, 
which can only be resolved in a ‘transparent’ way, he said.” (Reynold 2017) 
Since the joint announcement by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. 
regarding the deployment of the THAAD battery, China has maintained a steady pressure 
campaign on the ROK to dissuade this deployment, which has included financial and 
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political sanctions. When discussing UN Security Council Resolution 2270 against North 
Korean nuclear and missile tests, the Chinese ambassador stated, “China opposes the 
deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system on the 
Korean peninsula because such an action harms the strategic security interests of China 
and other countries of the region, goes against the goal of maintaining peace, security and 
stability of the peninsula and will seriously undermine the efforts of the international 
community to find a political solution to the question of the Korean peninsula.” (UN 
Security Council 2016)   
Despite American and Korean assurances that the THAAD is a purely defensive 
system, capable of only covering the Korean peninsula, the Chinese continued to reiterate 
concerns that this system can both see into China with its radar, and that its interceptors 
could indeed offset Chinese ICBM deterrent forces heading toward the U.S., for which 
they are technically incapable. (Taylor 2017) In both cases above, the Russians and 
Chinese have used these deployments as justification for the open modernization of their 
strategic nuclear forces. (Burns 2010, 151) 
Krepon (2003, 142), Basrur (2006), mann (2007), and Jaspal (2014) extend the 
implications of the BMD “security dilemma” one step further, into a kind of causal 
“chain reaction.” They all claim that Chinese modernization of their strategic missile 
forces is a compensating reaction to the development and deployment of credible BMD 
by both Japan and the U.S.; this Chinese modernization and expansion, in turn, has driven 
India’s modernization of their arsenal, as well as their own development of indigenous 
BMD capability, to maintain their minimal deterrence capability. Ultimately, Indian 
modernization forced Pakistan to expand and modernize its strategic nuclear forces. In 
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effect, they believe we have seen unintended second- and third-order effects in South 
Asia, initiated by deployment of BMD in the northern Asia-Pacific and North America.  
 This issue extends to Iran, as well, who maintains the need for their ballistic 
missile arsenal to offset the armaments of the other Gulf States. “From Tehran’s 
perspective, Washington’s policy of arming its allies has threatened its security interests, 
not to mention its deterrent power. Seen within this context, Iran’s effort to develop a 
nuclear arsenal is a rational response to a security dilemma. Suffering from extreme 
sanctions that eroded the economy and put the very legitimacy of the regime in peril, 
Iran’s leaders decided to sign the JCPOA. With the nuclear option gone, at least for the 
duration of the accord, the importance of ballistic missiles for defense and power 
projection has increased.” (Rezaei 2017) 
 Because we are interested in whether a state will or will not join a BMD-using 
coalition or alliance, we cannot discount the effect such strong third party responses, 
statements and actions may have domestically. Such messaging could have a significant 
impact on internal public opinion, which, in turn, is a potential driver of political 
decision-making.   
 
Internal Coalition-Centric IVs: We turn now to those factors derived from NT 
experimentation findings that are internal to the coalition, and which exist between some 
or all coalition partners.  
Hypothesis 3 (“Contribution Requirements”): As national military force contribution 
and commitment requirements for coalition membership are made less restrictive, the 
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likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD 
increases. 
 Our third IV is termed “Contribution Requirements,” so Hypothesis #3 is 
simplified to “As Contribution Requirements are made less restrictive, PJoining increases.”  
Assumptions include: 1) there will be some “price of admission” into the coalition 
wherein the other states will impose some requirement for national contribution of 
capabilities to collective military operations; 2) these national contributions and/or 
commitments will guarantee collective defense of the giving state; and, 3) these national 
contributions may or may not have to be in the form of BMD weapon systems, but could 
also be economic or political support, use of territory for basing or overflight, or 
contribution of other military capabilities which complement BMD, such as air defenses, 
offensive strike aircraft, intelligence gathering capabilities, and so on. 
Military Implications: This is the classic “price of admission” issue of collective 
action. On one hand, all participants in a military coalition or alliance are expected to 
provide something to the collective, whether forces, capabilities, or support, yet it is 
unrealistic for the coalition or alliance to assume that nations of varying sizes, with 
varying gross domestic products (GDPs) and military technology levels or capabilities, 
will be able to contribute an equal amount of forces or capabilities to the collective and 
still maintain a capability for self-defense at home. (Sandler & Hartley 2001, 871) 
Marton and Hynek (2012) propose that the two key variables which dictate the level of 
contributions a state will make include the degree of dependence on the alliance and 
degree of “threat balancing” (or threat perception).  
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Although there is no hard and fast rule, it is generally expected by the other 
nations in a coalition or alliance that joiners will contribute what they can, within reason. 
Of course, those who do not, for whatever reasons, may be considered “free riders,” 
which may incur enormous political pressure from other coalition or alliance members. 
(Olson 1965; Olson & Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990) Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) 
observed that democracies tend to “cycle” their requirements over time with changes in 
administration, and hence tend to adhere more reliably to their commitments only if they 
are formally codified, as was the case with the pressure applied by President Trump in 
2017 and 2018 on NATO member nations to live up to, and possibly increase, their 
agreed 2% GDP minimum contributions for collective defense. (Banks 2018) “The issue 
of burden sharing is now again at the top of NATO’s agenda, despite the Allies’ 
commitments on increased defence spending made at the 2014 Wales Summit and the 
reiteration of these commitments at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. As in the past, the debate 
is mainly driven by the United States, which continues to provide the bulk of defence 
spending among NATO member states.” (Kalnins 2017, 1) 
In BMD terms, the “price of admission” can, at times, be unclear. Some nations 
are looking at acquiring a limited BMD capability for almost political reasons. An 
Australian report states, “The other potential value of Australian BMD is its value to our 
alliance relationship with the US and our deepening security relationship with Asian 
partners—especially Japan…the key consideration isn’t so much whether we’d benefit 
directly from an investment in BMD, but whether or not other countries (especially the 
US) would, and the extent to which they’d value our contribution…In short, it could 
make a broader contribution towards supporting a US presence in the western 
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Pacific…The capability would be more of a strategic enabler than an operational one.” 
(Davies & Lyon 2014, 13) “When it comes to the defense of Europe against ballistic 
missiles, policymakers here are aware of the fact that with EPAA (European Phased 
Adaptive Approach) the U.S. Navy is shouldering the majority of the burden. The 
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark are currently investigating ways in which their naval 
ships could make a contribution to NATO BMD.” (De Jonge 2013, 5)  
Does admission to a military coalition or alliance that requires BMD for military 
success mean that each member must bring their own BMD? While seemingly 
reasonable, in practice this is not realistic. The NATO alliance is instructive in this 
regard; the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit statement tells us: “NATO BMD is based on 
voluntary national contributions, mainly US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets 
in Romania, Turkey, Spain, and Poland.  Additional voluntary national contributions will 
provide robustness.” (NATO 2018 (2), para 38)   
Of the 29 member nations in NATO, only nine currently possess an active BMD 
capability of their own, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. So, what mitigates the potential of “free-
riding” for NATO’s other 20 members? Simply put, and as we stated above in the 
discussion on “pillars” of IAMD, the BMD mission does not rely purely on active 
defensive capabilities. Members may not be able to afford active BMD forces, but they 
may be able to provide supporting sensors such as radars, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, or offensive strike forces such as fighters, bombers, or 
long range artillery. Many NATO states today also support indirectly, through access to 
basing rights in closer proximity to the adversary, logistics support (fuel, ammunition, 
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medical supplies, spare parts, etc.) or they may provide much needed political or 
economic support. To military planners, these things alone may be critically necessary 
and hence worth the “price of admission.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (2), III-43) 
“Another factor that complicates any assessment of what constitutes a “fair” contribution 
to the Alliance is the difficulty or ‘rating’ the military (and other) capabilities that nations 
provide for Alliance efforts. In practice, numerous analyses have demonstrated that the 
diverse capabilities of the national armed forces cannot be objectively compared. Even 
within categories – land, sea, air and space – comparisons are subjective, and questions of 
readiness and operability must also be addressed.” (Kalnins 2017, 8-9) 
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose (2015) highlighted how this 
spectrum of contributions applies in NATO: “Voluntary national contributions are the 
foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies 
can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area. First, Allies can 
acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control 
capabilities. Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a 
key ballistic missile defense capability. Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s (BMD) 
capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and 
Spain have agreed to do. In all of these approaches, however, the most critical 
requirement is NATO interoperability. Yes, acquiring a (BMD) capability is, of course, 
good in and of itself.  But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its 
value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.” In 
fact, Turkey’s proposed acquisition of Russian S-400 interceptors met with resistance 
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from the rest of NATO principally due to this interoperability issue. (Gumrukcu & 
Toksabay 2017) 
Political Implications: In the most general of terms, the decision by a state to join 
a military coalition or alliance is a political decision. The terms and agreements of 
membership, as well as requirements levied on each member state, are politically agreed, 
albeit with recommendations from the militaries of the member states. 
Although politically-derived, it is important to note that several other factors 
which we will discuss in later sections are heavily influenced by the agreements made 
during such “price of admission” discussions. Do the contributions made by the joining 
state entitle it to a significant role in the command and control structures and authorities 
of the coalition? Are their contributions worth full information and intelligence sharing 
by larger and more capable members? Do these contributions allow the states a 
significant say in prioritization of defensive coverage or in decision-making about when 
to initiate offensive operations, etc.? The collective coalition political leadership must 
decide whether a joining state has met the minimum contribution requirements to warrant 
full-, partial-, or no coalition BMD defensive coverage of their deployed forces or home 
territories if they have no BMD capabilities of their own.  
As an example of a recently completed agreement of this nature, NATO’s 
Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, stated that, “Our missile defence programme 
represents a long-term investment against a long-term threat. Our goal is to achieve full 
coverage and protection for NATO’s European Allies [italics mine] against ballistic 
missile attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.” (Stoltenberg 2016) Even though he 
cites the United States as the main contributor of forces to this “core NATO mission,” he 
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mentions the contributions of both Poland and Romania in providing the basing sites and 
support for two U.S.-contributed Aegis Ashore missile defense batteries, highlighting the 
unequal contributions of three states in providing for the homeland defense of the other 
26 alliance states against BM threats from the Middle East. (Stoltenberg 2016) 
 
Hypothesis 4 (“Loss of Autonomy”): As the possible loss of national autonomy for 
military decision-making and command and control of its forces increases, the likelihood 
of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD decreases. 
 IV #4 will be termed, “Loss of Autonomy,” and Hypothesis 4 is abbreviated to, 
“As Loss of Autonomy increases, PJoining decreases.” Assumptions underlying this 
include: 1) states wish to maintain national command over their forces within a 
multinational coalition or alliance military structure; 2) the proposal is that the state must 
transfer its forces under the command of military leadership from another coalition or 
alliance state, and, 3) there are no pre-existing arrangements between the state and the 
coalition or alliance for transfer of national forces subordinate to the collective military 
structure.  
Military Implications: In simple terms, this boils down to, “which nation is in 
command of the military operation?” In any military coalition or alliance, the command 
and control (C2) structure is most effective when it follows the principle of war known as 
“unity of command;” in other words, “The operation of all forces under a single 
responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces 
in pursuit of a common purpose.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2016, 252) Although, 
there is no real rule governing it, a general principle has historically been that the nation 
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which provides the most forces and capabilities for C2 to the coalition tends to be the one 
who provides the General or Admiral in charge of the collective military operation, 
although individual national, parallel chains of command that are only integrated at the 
top are not unknown. (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (2), Chapter II)    
As a historical example of this, the United States did not subordinate all of its 
forces under any allied leaders during World Wars I and II, Korea, or Vietnam, but 
retained the senior commander positions for itself. Despite subordination of U.S. troops 
under local NATO alliance military leaders in Afghanistan, the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR), or NATO’s supreme military leader, has been an 
American since NATO’s inception. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018) However, 
many smaller countries frequently contribute troops to coalition, alliance, or UN missions 
without assuming the mantle of leadership themselves. 
Militarily, this possible “loss of autonomy” manifests itself most significantly as 
troops of country A, B, and C having to take orders from a General or Admiral from 
country D. Of course, part of the dialogue which comes with joining a collective military 
body consists of just how much command authority a nation is willing to impart to 
coalition C2 and how much it retains for itself. For instance, a nation may be willing to 
allow the coalition to give mission orders to its units (termed “operational control,” or 
“OPCON,” by NATO and the U.S.), but will not allow reorganization of its units, 
leadership changes within them, or military justice for misbehaviors by unit members, 
without national political consent (which is variously termed “operational command,” or 
OPCOM” by NATO, or “combatant command,” or “COCOM” authority by the United 
States.) (Young 2002, 41) In BMD terms, this means a BMD-providing nation may have 
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to subordinate its active BMD capabilities under the leadership of another nation, who 
will get to decide its best employment for collective defense.  
Political Implications: “The extent of the MNFC’s (Multinational Force 
Commander’s) command authority is determined by the participating nations or 
elements.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (2), II-3) Although this division of 
command authority may be normal, not every coalition or alliance military leader may 
have full discretion over the operations of other national troops under his or her 
command. Many nations may place caveats, or “red cards,” on the limits to which they 
will allow their troops to be used by collective military leadership. (Saideman & 
Auerswald 2012) “In either case, from the perspective of a coalition or allied commander, 
political oversight becomes the province of multinational discussions and decisions, 
while at the same time recognizing the continued existence of national authorities.” 
(Young 2003, 113)   
Such caveats are indeed imposed by the owning nation’s political authority, but 
not all such limitations may be willful. Some may be based on constitutional or legal 
restrictions within the joining nation itself. An example is Japan’s Constitution Article 9, 
which, through constitutional interpretations by the Diet, made collective military action 
illegal; prior to September 2015, Japanese troops were not allowed to contribute to the 
defense of other coalition troops, making cooperation with other forces during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan challenging. Japan has recently been working on a 
Diet reinterpretation of Article 9 to remove such restrictions. (Yoshida 2018)   
Such political caveats can include either restraints (“requirements placed on the 
command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of 
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action”) or constraints (“requirements placed on the command by a higher command that 
dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action.”) (U.S. Department of Defense 
2016, 46 and 204) In the case of BMD, this may place restraints or constraints on use of 
BMD capabilities to defend coalition deployed forces or home territories from enemy 
missile attack. Such caveats, in turn, may result in a less-than-optimal defense design if 
political restrictions on where BMD forces may be deployed or employed are imposed on 
coalition or alliance military leadership. An example might be if a nation subordinates a 
BMD unit under a coalition but requires a certain percentage of its interceptors to remain 
in reserve, to be used only for the defense of the owning nation. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (“Structures and Authorities”): As collective BMD command and control 
structures and engagement authorities are made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state 
joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 As an inverse to IV #4, IV #5 will be termed “Structures and Authorities,” so 
Hypothesis 5 becomes, “As Structures and Authorities are made more inclusive, PJoining 
increases.”  We assume that: 1) the coalition will establish a single military command 
and control (C2) structure; 2) coalition military forces will be subordinated to this single 
C2 structure; and, 3) each nation may impose specific limitations or restrictions (i.e. 
legal, constitutional, or political “red lines”) on the use of their military forces which 
must be taken into consideration by the coalition military leadership. 
Military Implications: The loss of autonomy discussion above focused on overall 
command of the coalition force. This issue differs slightly in that it asks for membership 
by coalition military leaders in collective BMD C2 structures; although a coalition 
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military leader may not be in overall charge of the operation, he or she may be placed in a 
key lesser command or staff position within the operational headquarters of the BMD C2 
structure and will be in position to influence subsequent planning and execution of BMD 
operations. (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, Chapter II)  
At times, the provision of a C2 structure may be the only capability the coalition 
or alliance will collectively fund, requiring all other military forces to come from national 
contributions. “NATO BMD Initial Operational Capability was declared in 2016 and the 
next major milestone is the completion of the core element of the NATO BMD 
Command and Control, the only component eligible for common funding.”  (NATO 2018 
(2), para 39) 
One of the more important authorities granted within BMD C2 structures is 
known as “engagement authority” (EA). This is the authority granted from political 
authorities to senior military leadership which permits the military to engage inbound 
missiles. This authority can sometimes be further delegated to subordinate commanders. 
According to Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (2017, V-11, 
GL-11), “The Air and Missile Defense (AMD) element with engagement authority makes 
the decision whether to employ weapons against a particular air or missile threat.” 
Ultimately, the EA authorizes the launch of interceptors to engage inbound missiles. 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-11, GL-11)  
The United States also uses a comparable authority to EA known as Weapons 
Release Authority (WRA) for the defense of the U.S. homeland by its strategic BMD 
system. The DoD Dictionary defines “WRA” as, “The authority originating from the 
President to engage or direct engagement of ballistic missile threats using ground-based 
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interceptors of the ground-based midcourse defense.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2016, 
258) Although WRA is the same term used for the authorization by the President for use 
of nuclear weapons, it essentially has the same practical effect as EA when used for the 
ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system.  
Political Implications: Politically, autonomy is a two-way street; a nation may be 
willing to give up some degree of autonomy as a quid pro quo for additional defensive 
support, but countries that rely more heavily on other nations for defense may also seek 
greater autonomy, in order to be less reliant on larger partners.  Such was the case with 
Japan, who began acquiring indigenous BMD capability to both increase their own 
security as well as to be less reliant on U.S. capabilities. (Swaine et al. 2001, xvii; Trexel 
2013, 26)  
As in the designation of overall command by the coalition body politic, the 
decisions to allow key subordinate leadership placement by officers from joining nations 
can also be political. “Combat in general and coalition operations in special are inherently 
uncertain affairs. Granting considerable discretion to military commanders, also at 
subordinate levels, is therefore a central requirement for success in military coalition 
operations.” (Pilster 2011, 56) Even if specific officers are not negotiated separately by 
name, the political implementing instrument for a coalition or alliance may include 
percentages of ranks of officers from each state for inclusion in the C2 structure.  
Although it may sound purely military, the delegation of EA is a highly political 
decision, especially before conflict begins. An accidental launch of a BMD interceptor, or 
even an unannounced test launch, may actually precipitate a crisis or accelerate escalating 
tensions; interceptors may be detected on radar by a potential adversary or major third 
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party and perceived as an offensive ballistic missile attack. (Bunn 2004, 5) The 
delegation of EA or WRA by political leadership to a military commander is a tricky 
matter, and is a balancing act between granting military commanders the ability to launch 
when they need to, while withholding it when they do not. Once enemy missiles are 
flying and interceptor decision-to-launch times are measured in minutes or even seconds, 
it may be too late to go back and ask for EA or WRA delegation. The military 
commander needs to know when to get EA or WRA as a crisis escalates, and conflict 
appears imminent, if it is not already pre-delegated in peacetime.  
Political leadership need to be educated on the potential issues surrounding BMD 
so they are comfortable delegating EA or WRA in a timely fashion. (Bunn 2004, 3) The 
political decision to delegate EA to coalition military leadership before the actual start of 
conflict becomes even more challenging when multiple national leaders with potentially 
varying threat perceptions are involved. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (“Information Sharing”): As multinational information sharing, 
information disclosure, and shared early warning increase, the likelihood of a state 
joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 “Information Sharing,” is the shorthand for IV #6, so Hypothesis 6 can be 
abbreviated to, “As Information Sharing increases, PJoining increases.”  Our assumptions 
for #6 include: 1) all coalition states recognize the value and efficiency gained in sharing 
information amongst each other; 2) information disclosure processes within the coalition 
will be streamlined to ensure more rapid exchange of information before and during a 
potential conflict; and, 3) “Shared Early Warning” which consists of the real-time 
 
71 
provision of warning of adversary missile launches using satellite, ground, and maritime-
based sensors, will be provided between all members of the coalition. This is done to 
warn civil defense as well as military air defense and BMD forces of an inbound attack. 
Military Implications: Information sharing between partners and allies is an 
imperative to the performance of effective military operations. Such information includes 
intelligence on the adversary or significant third parties, but also includes information on 
friendly military capabilities and plans, intentions, and goals. It may also be highly 
technical in nature, such as linking data exchange systems, including BMD sensors and 
C2 systems, together for networked operations. It is hard to conduct effective military 
planning and execute operations without the widest possible dissemination of information 
amongst allies and coalition partners. Real-time or near-real-time data and information 
exchange may be critical in the very short timelines associated with BMD operations. 
Interceptors may be wasted by one partner shooting at the same targets as another partner 
in circumstances where a “common operational picture” (or “COP”) is unavailable, or, 
worse, both may assume the other is shooting at an inbound threat an neither does so, 
thus allowing a “leaker” (or un-intercepted missile) through to strike its intended target. 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-9)   
But most nations do not give away their military secrets or intelligence without 
some form of information disclosure process. Such processes range from very simple and 
rapid in smaller countries, to extremely complex and cumbersome, as in the case of the 
United States, which has a large number of laws and policies governing information 
disclosure. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Technology Security 
Administration 2018) In the U.S., “The National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1) is the policy 
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that governs the disclosure of United States Classified Military Information (CMI) to 
foreign governments and international organizations. It stems from National Security 
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119. The Secretaries of State and Defense, consulting 
as appropriate with other Department and Agency heads, are jointly assigned the 
responsibility for implementing NSDM 119. NDP-1, a limited distribution classified 
document, is the interagency document which implements this policy.” (Center for 
Development of Security Excellence 2018, 5) 
In BMD terms one very specific, yet critical form of information sharing is known 
as “shared early warning” (or “SEW”). Missile warning systems are comprised of space-
based and/or surface-based sensors that detect, track, and report on missile launches, their 
trajectories, and predicted impact points. “Missile warning supports the warning mission 
executed by North American Aerospace Defense Command to notify national leaders of a 
missile attack against North America, as well as attacks against multinational partners 
(via shared early warning [SEW]) in other geographic regions. It also includes 
notification to geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), multi-national partners, and 
forward-deployed personnel of missile attack, and the assessment of a missile attack if 
the applicable CCMD or multinational partner is unable to do so.” (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2018, II-6)  
Early warning coming from these networks is used to alert defenses, warn 
populations to take cover, and prepare consequence management and civil defense 
agencies for post-attack recovery efforts. Not every nation can afford an early warning 
system, though, and one of the benefits of alliance or coalition membership is for smaller 
member states to get SEW data and warning from larger, more capable members like the 
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United States. “The SEWS system provides uninterrupted reporting on potential 
adversarial ballistic missile launches, providing information to U.S. allies with a bilateral 
agreement in place regarding defense. SEWS serves nine partner nations, providing early 
warning of possible strikes so that countermeasures can be prepared…‘We’re working 
hard to provide the combatant commands and partner nations with as many extra seconds 
as possible so they can begin countermeasures, warn their populations, and protect 
themselves.’” (Browne 2017) 
Simple warning of attack is relatively benign, but more detailed SEW data which 
could be used to engage threat missiles cooperatively requires a higher level of fidelity on 
the sources of the data themselves, which may be highly classified. Hence, larger states 
that provide SEW to other coalition or alliance members may need to weigh the benefits 
of providing full data (versus just warning of attack) over the potential for classified 
information leaks by the joining state. 
Political Implications: In many ways, information sharing is simply a trust issue 
between states. It is natural for the default setting of disclosure of classified military 
information to be “need to know,” but effective collective action should be based on a 
policy of “need to share.” (Best 2011, 2) In negotiations for a state to join a coalition or 
alliance, the degree and quality of information sharing and SEW that other members are 
willing to provide must be determined, and the joining state must also determine what it 
is willing to provide to the collective. For effective collective BMD operations, this must 
be done by the diplomatic professionals from State Departments or Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs early in coalition-building to maximize military utility, based on best information 
available to all parties, later. 
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Hypothesis 7 (“Plan Development”): As collective defense prioritization, level of 
protection guidance, and defensive plans development is made more inclusive, the 
likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance which uses 
BMD increases. 
 Independent Variable 7 will be shortened to “Plan Development,” so Hypothesis 
7 can be abbreviated to “As Plan Development is made more inclusive, PJoining increases.” 
This assumes: 1) coalition or alliance military planners will take political guidance and 
centrally develop a BMD defensive plan which prioritizes what gets defended, and to 
what level of protection. Such planning will dictate where BMD forces are placed, what 
they will defend, for how long, and how many interceptors BMD forces must be prepared 
to fire per inbound threat ballistic missile; and, 2) the coalition national political leaders 
will collectively approve such prioritization guidance and planning.  
Military Implications: Today, most Western militaries use a very similar process 
for missile defense prioritization, based loosely on a system developed in World War II 
for air defense and aerial attack target planning. In situations where not everything can be 
protected, the military commander must prioritize which of his critical assets will be 
defended by active BMD forces, and accept risk or rely on passive defense for those 
which cannot. U.S. military doctrine, generally adopted in some variant for BMD 
planning, uses what is called “CVT” (or sometimes “CVRT”) analysis, which stands for 
“Criticality, Vulnerability, (Recuperability), and Threat.” First, military planners will 
rank-order the criticality of a particular site, asset, or unit to the successful completion of 
the overall mission. This may result in what is called a “Critical Asset List” (or “CAL”). 
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This list is then modified once they look at how vulnerable the particular assets are to 
attack, how easily they can recover from a successful enemy attack, and whether they are 
in range of each different type of enemy air and missile threat. This final list is sometimes 
known as the “Prioritized Critical Asset List” or “PCAL,” and it is used to determine 
placement of BMD assets and air defense protection. The final list of CAL items that are 
actually defended is known as the “Defended Asset List” or “DAL.” (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2017, V-20) 
The process described above assumes that the military commander “owns” 
everything within a given “area of operations” (or “AO”) and can make value judgments 
on what he needs to protect in order to complete his military mission. It works well in 
situations where a military coalition deploys to a distant war zone in which only 
combatants are at risk of attack. It also works best with point defense BMD systems that 
can individually only defend a small area such as a port, and airfield or a single city; in 
this case, placement of systems in close proximity to prioritized critical assets is 
imperative.   
But longer-ranged ballistic missiles complicate this prioritization problem. There 
are very few places in the world where only active combatants will exist; in most places, 
what is one nation’s “AO” will be another nation’s “homeland.” “For Japan…TMD 
(Theater Missile Defense) projects are the equivalent to NMD (National Missile Defense) 
efforts by the United States.” (Handberg 2002, 193) Long-range ballistic missiles, 
especially those of intermediate- or intercontinental ranges, may actually reach far 
beyond the military’s theater of operations to “homelands” far away.  
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In the case of “homeland” missile defense (or as NATO terms it, “territorial 
defense,” or “BMD”) (NATO 2018 (1)) it may be problematic for the military 
commander to rank-order the defense of cities and critical infrastructures within nations 
outside the immediate combat zone. Is Paris more important than London? Is Butte, 
Montana more important than Akron, Ohio? It may be difficult for political leadership to 
allow a military commander to make such value judgments, instead directing the 
commander to protect everything, or simply directing him or her to protect the maximum 
population possible. (Bunn 2004, 2) “But cost-exchange considerations are not the only 
ones that bear on the decision whether to deploy defenses. One must also decide if the 
targets are worth defending, and whether there is indeed a threat. Placing a monetary 
value on the loss of a city and its population is clearly a formidable, some might argue, 
impossible, task; it is clearly easier to make judgments about the worth of missile silos or 
other military targets.” (Rathjens & Ruina 1985, 249) 
This is where “level of protection” (LoP) guidance comes in. “Firing doctrine 
should address the level of protection required for the asset under attack, interceptor salvo 
sizes per engagement, coordinated fires among and across (missile defense) layers, and 
(interceptor) inventory management,” (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-14) In 
effect, the military commander must determine to what probability percentage level an 
asset must be defended; the higher the percentage, the more interceptors that must be 
fired per inbound threat missile to achieve it. In a perfect world, everything would be 
defended to the highest possible probability of engagement success (Pes), but in reality, 
doing so would severely limit the duration of time that the defense can be sustained 
before running out of interceptors.   
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LoP guidance is used by both point- and area-defense BMD systems in a very 
practical way that translates at the tactical level to “shot doctrine.” It is especially 
important for area weapon systems, such as THAAD, Aegis SM-3, and GBIs which may 
cover an extremely large number of valuable assets, or in the case of homeland or 
territorial defense, an entire nation. In such a case, rather than the need to prioritize what 
to defend within that huge area (since everything can be defended, but only against so 
many missiles) determining LoP gives the commander a better sense of how long he 
needs to defend, as well as providing area BMD systems their pre-planned shot doctrine. 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-8) In essence, degree of area covered, duration of 
time to be defended, and LoP are all intertwined variables in the commander’s calculus. 
Defensive plans development is the action undertaken by the coalition or alliance 
military commander’s staff to take the overall contingency or operations plans, develop 
the prioritization of critical assets and determine the LoP requirements both discussed 
above, and then translate them into an actual, detailed “defense design” plans that 
includes placement of defensive forces, rules of engagement, airspace control measures 
and procedures to prevent fratricide with friendly aircraft and missiles, and the requisite 
battle management and C2 of defensive forces. (U.S. Department of Defense 2017. 
Chapters 3 and 5)  
Political Implications: At first blush, these items seem to be purely military 
decisions or activities, but in reality they are not. In fact, defense prioritization and 
protection guidance can be some of the most contentious political decisions with which 
alliance or coalition national political leaders may wrestle.  
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In a multinational coalition or alliance, it is only natural that each nation would 
want the maximum amount of protection from missile attack for their forward-deployed 
military forces as well as their homelands or territories. As providers of high demand 
capabilities, nations which provide BMD capabilities may be in the best position to make 
decisions on what they will be willing to defend, but alliance or coalition cohesion may 
be in jeopardy if such providing states are unwilling to share some defensive systems to 
those also, or most, at risk. Logically, when a coalition is forming during the early stages 
of a crisis, it is most likely that such negotiations between partners will have to be made 
quickly in order to deploy, and prepare to employ, BMD forces for collective defense.  
As was the case in both Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91 and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003, quid pro quos from smaller states for basing, access, and support may 
include a promise of BMD coverage from their larger brethren.    
With the basic decision made over whether partners with BMD will or will not 
defend non-BMD-owning partners, the hard work of prioritization begins. “Collective 
action theory suggests that overconsumption of limited resources may be at least 
somewhat discouraged by making particular actors exclusively responsible for managing 
specific geographic areas.” (Lepgold 1998, 98) If the decision is purely one in which the 
coalition or alliance military commander only has to defend military assets and military-
supporting infrastructure, he or she can make this decision based on the recommendations 
of the coalition military staff. (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-8)   
But how do political leaders decide priorities for homeland or territorial defense 
outside the immediate combat theater? If multiple homeland or national territories are at 
risk, the commander may get more political guidance than he or she wants regarding the 
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placement and use of collective BMD forces; such political guidance may impact optimal 
placement of these assets to achieve the military mission. The more nations involved in 
this prioritization discussion, the more complicated they may become, and such dialogues 
may escalate beyond coalition or alliance military leadership to ones between national 
political leaders. (Fergusson 2013, 31)   
Even if area-defense BMD systems are available, everyone’s homeland can be 
covered equally, and priorities for which population centers are most important has been 
decided, these discussions must then translate into politically-acceptable LoP guidance 
for the military commander, and he or she needs to ensure the collective political 
leadership understands the trade-space between Pes and LoP versus defense duration. If 
the LoP is too high, any additional time that missile defenses could provide political 
leadership to make decisions about when they must commence offensive operations 
against the adversary diminishes. Yet, the potential consequences of potentially 
successful missile attacks on citizenry in their home countries are not something a 
national political leader can ignore either, which complicates this calculus. “BMD at both 
the national and theater levels becomes critical for calming or reducing popular fear.” 
(Handberg 2002, 133) 
Once these key decisions are agreed-to by collective political leadership, defense 
design planning can be completed by the combined coalition or alliance military staff. In 
practice, though, changes in the situation will likely warrant re-planning, so there will 
likely be back-and-forth iterations between military and political leadership as the crisis 
evolves. (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (2), III-1)   
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Hypothesis 8 (“Posture Decisions”): As collective decision-making regarding posturing 
of forces (including the military need for deployment vs. the political need for deterrence 
& de-escalation) is made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a multinational 
military coalition or alliance which uses BMD increases. 
 The eighth IV will be abbreviated as “Posture Decisions,” so Hypothesis 8 can be 
shortened to “As Posture Decisions are made more inclusive, PJoining increases.”  My 
assumptions of antecedent conditions for this IV include: 1) nations in the coalition or 
alliance may collectively or independently work on political measures to de-escalate the 
crisis with the BM-equipped adversary, or to deter his attack; 2) some nations in the 
coalition or alliance may need to deploy forces into the “theater” to prepare for conflict, 
while other states may comprise this “theater” and already have their forces in place; 3) 
decisions regarding posturing of forces may be made by the coalition or alliance military 
structure or could be made by member nations independently; and, 4) movement of 
additional forces into the “theater” from outside will be visible and seen by the potential 
adversary, which could in turn escalate the situation.   
Military Implications: As a crisis unfolds, the alliance or coalition military 
leadership will feel increasingly pressured to be prepared for the conflict. This is 
especially true if parts of the collective military forces need to deploy from their home 
stations to a potential conflict zone far away; such deployments take time and are 
logistically intensive, and troops may need preparation, area-specific training and 
additional equipment that is region-specific, also taking additional time and effort. 
(Military.com 2018)   
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In many instances, the coalition or alliance military may wish to deter a conflict 
through a show of force, in which case, rapid deployments and demonstration exercises 
will stress this need to deploy and posture quickly. “(I)n future crises, Washington will 
convey political resolve to come to the aid of threatened allies by deploying theater 
missile defenses. Regional diplomacy in the future without theater missile defenses will 
be like music without instruments.” (Krepon 2003, 55) But such actions may also foster a 
“Guns of August” type escalation, wherein the adversary sees this buildup and feels they 
need to be just as ready, hence increasing their own force posture along the borders, in 
the air and at sea. In such cases, the military leaders of both sides may pressure their 
civilian political leadership for increasingly more aggressive posturing as a means of 
“preparing for the inevitable,” and such preparations, viewed through the lens of the other 
side, may exacerbate the conflict. (Tuchman 1962; Levy 1986)   
Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, all U.S.-led military 
operations against ballistic missile armed adversaries have required early and rapid 
deployment of air defense and BMD forces in order to protect the air- and sea-ports of 
debarkation in the theater of operations so that additional forces could be brought in, to 
prepare for operations, and to protect major logistics and supply hubs in the theater. 
Today, the idea that an adversary can use air and missile forces, in addition to other 
forces, to deny or degrade a force-projecting military from successfully getting into the 
theater, or inhibit their freedom of action once there, has been termed “anti-access/area-
denial” (or “A2/AD”.) “The idea is to keep us out of [an opponent’s] neighborhood and 
prevent us from coming to the assistance of our allies.” (Steven Weinberg, in Dudley 
2003, 72) This U.S.-military-coined idea has rapidly spread to other Western militaries. 
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“Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a term that has grown in the vernacular of many 
NATO Nations in recent years. The concept of A2/AD is not viewed in the same manner 
by every nation…Furthermore, there is not currently an accepted NATO definition of the 
term. Some refer to A2/AD as ‘that family of military capabilities’ used to prevent or 
constrain the deployment of opposing forces into a given theatre of operations and reduce 
their freedom of manoeuvre once in a theatre.” (Perkins, 2018, 53) “(A)nti-access (A2) 
seeks to prevent or disrupt the deployment of forces into a theater of operations; area-
denial (AD) seeks to prevent and inhibit the freedom of action of forces within the theater 
of operations…A2/AD encompass all domains of military operations—air, land, sea, 
cyber, and space—and includes a diverse set of military capabilities including 
conventional precision-guided weapon systems, such as medium- and short-range 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, rockets and artillery, as well as 
integrated air-defense systems.” (Hicks, et al. 2016, 34) “Even in situations in which the 
United States is the dominant military power, reentering a contested or defended region is 
generally far harder than maintaining one’s strong position next to capable allies within 
it…This is particularly the case in today’s unfolding military-technological era, an age in 
which anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems are giving an entrenched power new 
advantages against an opponent attempting to penetrate its defense umbrella.” (Colby & 
Thomas 2016) 
Maritime and ground-based BMD forces can be a significant counter to these 
facets of an adversary’s A2/AD strategy, and will need to be deployed early to allow 
uninterrupted force flow into theater. A missile-armed adversary who wants to prevent 
this will likely escalate his air and missile force postures commensurately, and this, then, 
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becomes the “Guns of August” parallel in BMD terms. Yet BMD forces in such 
situations must be ready to “Fight tonight” once they are on the ground to be effective, 
and this requires their immediate positioning and posturing for operations, possibly 
before other troops arrive. “Also, pursuit of TMD (theater missile defense) becomes 
central to any overseas deployment of U.S. forces…No administration could deploy 
troops without some semblance of TMD protection, that is, if it wished to survive 
politically.” (Handberg 2002, 136)   
Political Implications: If the situation were such that both sides saw conflict as 
inevitable and did not want to try to resolve it beforehand, then deployment and posturing 
of forces to prepare for conflict would purely be a military issue; this is rarely the case, 
however. Historically, most political leadership will work hard all the way up to conflict 
initiation to either de-escalate or deter the conflict. This is usually done through intensive 
diplomatic efforts and negotiations in which both sides attempt to come to a common 
settlement.    
Such a settlement may require assurances that one or both side’s military or 
militaries will back down. This may come in conflict with military deployment and 
posturing to prepare for conflict should these negotiations fail. In most nations where 
civilian control of the military exists, this can manifest itself through several iterations of 
conflicting political guidance to military leadership, or guidance which may be both 
costly and risky to implement should conflict break out despite diplomatic efforts to halt 
it. This can force the belligerents farther up the “escalation ladder” inadvertently. (Kahn 
1965)   
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This becomes more complicated when the conflict is between groups of nations, 
rather than in a dyadic conflict. Agreement on de-escalatory negotiations must be made 
within the coalition or alliance as well as with the adversary. If such cannot be done, or is 
not desired, agreement must be made within coalitions and alliances on deterrent 
activities; nothing can unravel deterrence of an adversary faster than a visible seam in 
credibility between coalition or alliance members which can be exploited by the 
adversary. (NATO Review 2016.)   
As discussed during the “Threat Perception” section, differences between 
coalition or alliance members in the threat situation may drive unilateral, rather than 
collective, military actions. A state closer to the adversary may see the situation as having 
escalated farther than a state which is proximally more distant. A closer state may see 
itself as potentially affected by more of the adversary’s arsenal, and hence may wish to 
increase its military preparations. Conversely, a nation that has to deploy its military into 
theater against an adversary that is believed to use an A2/AD strategy may feel the need 
to accelerate its activities in preparation, while the host nation may not see the situation 
as so dire. This disparity of view may affect the efficacy of an air defense or missile 
defense operation through host nation demands or prohibitions on IAMD military 
preparatory activities. Just as with deterrence actions, an adversary that sees a visible 
difference between deployment and posturing actions between coalition or alliance 
nations may be able to exploit this disparity either politically or militarily; incoherent 
actions of a coalition may also be misinterpreted by the adversary, resulting in 
unanticipated, unintended, or undesirable actions by the adversary.  
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Hypothesis 9 (“Offensive Decisions”): As collective decision-making regarding the 
timing of, triggers for, authorities required for, and legitimacy of, offensive operations is 
made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 Independent Variable #9 is renamed “Offensive Decisions,” so Hypothesis 9 can 
be shortened to “As Offensive Decisions are made more inclusive, PJoining increases.”  
Assumptions for IV #9 include: 1) BMD forces are inadequate to defend everything, so 
offensive strikes on the adversary’s ballistic missile forces are likely to be required to 
compensate for defensive shortfalls; 2) the decision to commence offensive strike 
operations against the adversary’s missiles may be required prior to the formal 
commencement of hostilities; 3) coalition nations may have differing views on what 
provides legitimacy to authorize offensive strike operations (e.g. some states require a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, while others 
may feel the situation meets the “clear and present danger” criteria for anticipatory self-
defense outlined under the Caroline Incident (Arend 2003; Grimal 2014)); and 4) 
coalition nations may collectively decide when to begin offensive operations, or may feel 
the need to begin unilaterally. Such unilateral decision-making may stress the political 
cohesion of the coalition.  
Military Implications: As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, most 
military missile defense doctrines acknowledge “attack operations” or offensive strikes to 
destroy missiles, their launchers, associated C2 systems, and support equipment before 
they are employed. This is necessary to “thin the herd”; if every interceptor had a 100% 
Pes then defenders would only need as many interceptors as the attacker has missiles. 
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However, this is generally not the case, so reducing the threat missile inventory means 
more interceptors available per remaining missile. In many ways, the most effective 
missile defense is a good offense. This is doctrinally known as “attack operations,” or 
“offensive counter air operations,” by the U.S. military and NATO (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2017, IV-9) but it is also known colloquially by DoD senior leaders since 2015 
as “left of launch,” while active defense to shoot down threats or activities to mitigate 
their consequences being known as “right of launch.” (Freedberg 2015) 
Part of the pressure on military leaders to launch offensive operations early, 
possibly before the initiation of hostilities, is to destroy as many of the enemy’s missiles 
as possible before they are launched. Targeting missiles becomes much more challenging 
once they leave their peacetime garrisons and disperse to “hide sites.” “Hunting ballistic-
missile launchers would be one of the U.S. military’s most important tasks were 
hostilities on the Korean peninsula to erupt…But tracking the launchers from the air and 
with special operations units on the ground will be an extremely difficult task — with a 
poor track record. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it’s possible the United States’ 
“Scud hunt” scored hits on Saddam Hussein’s ballistic-missile (TELs)…Post-war 
assessments discovered that most of Saddam’s TELs came out of the war intact…U.S. 
aerial (ISR) has certainly improved in the 27 years since the Gulf War. But Saddam’s 
ballistic missile arsenal only numbered some 400 missiles in 1991 with a few dozen 
TELs. North Korea could possibly possess more than 1,000 ballistic missiles …North 
Korea has also had decades to study U.S. air campaigns elsewhere in the world, and has 
extensive mountains and tunnels to hide its missiles...” (Beckhusen 2018) 
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The planning, coordination and execution of offensive and defense operations is a 
military C2 activity. It is critical to the conduct of successful IAMD operations to ensure 
integration of both types of operations, so that the strengths of the offense offset the 
weaknesses of the defense, and vice versa. (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (1), 3) 
Once hostilities commence, civilian leadership generally delegate the authority to 
conduct attack operations to the operational military commander within the context of 
approved war plans. (Kohn 1997) 
Political Implications: Prior to the formal commencement of hostilities, though, 
the situation gets a lot murkier. The military commander may feel the need to start 
striking missile threats before they can deploy or launch in order to maximize his defense 
and protect forces moving into theater, yet political leadership may be trying to stop the 
conflict from breaking out using other elements of national power. The adversary may 
feel compelled to “use-or-lose” his most high-value missiles, including those equipped 
with WMD, so may initiate the conflict by firing these early, or first, to get the most 
utility from their effects. If friendly military leaders see the adversary posturing for just 
such an eventuality, this may spur them on further to pressure their political leaders to 
initiate hostilities to preclude this. “The decision whether to attack an enemy who is 
planning aggression may make the difference between military victory or defeat. It may 
save, or cost, untold lives. In some situations it could determine whether a nation survives 
or is destroyed.” (Dershowitz 2007, 59) 
International law, based on the concept of “Just War,” generally aggregates all 
these pre-conflict activities in Jus ad Bellum, while actions after conflict has begun are 
considered Jus in Bello. (Johnson, in Abrams 1998, 288) Jus in Bello includes 
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International Humanitarian Law, the Law of Armed Conflict (known colloquially as “the 
Geneva Conventions”), Rules of Engagement imposed by nations on their military forces, 
Disarmament Law, and other areas under international law which may come into effect 
during a missile conflict such as Space law and Human Rights laws. (International 
Committee of the Red Cross 2010; Mangas & Festa 2016; United Nations Office on 
Outer Space Affairs 2018; Weapons Law Encyclopedia 2013)  
We are here most interested in Jus ad Bellum. First is the universally accepted, 
but rare case under UN Charter Chapter VII, Article 42 that enables the UN Security 
Council, via resolution, to authorize use of force by “any means necessary.” The second 
condition is the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense after armed attack, 
in accordance with the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51. (Richter 2003, 56) “While 
the most minimal concept of the right of active defense would limit the defender’s action 
to that alone, just war tradition goes further…use of force in defense against unjust attack 
is not only a right but an obligation.” (Johnson, in Abrams 1998, 294) 
The remaining areas under which use of force is internationally legitimate are less 
concrete, and are divided by the imminence of the threat. The third area is “anticipatory 
self-defense” (based on the generally recognized 1837 Caroline Incident criteria of, “a 
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation”).  (Van de hole 2003, 95-96) In this situation an enemy strike is 
about to happen and there is no recourse but to attack to prevent it; this may be viewed in 
terms of hours or days in advance at most. The last is “preemption.” “Preemptive self-
defense tends to have a longer time horizon. In this case, a state often views an 
opponent’s particular, tangible actions as almost certainly developing into an armed 
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attack against it. While there may be some time before the opponent can launch the 
attack, the opponent’s actions indicate an attack is likely should developments continue.” 
(Potcovaru 2017)  “(D)efence analysts concede that pre-emption carries the risk of 
causing a crisis to escalate quickly by increasing pressure on both sides to act sooner 
rather than later—forcing them…to ‘use it or lose it.’” (Bormann 2008, 139) Pre-emption 
may be seen in terms of weeks or months in advance. A number of states have created an 
additional term for an extreme form of preemption known as “Preventive War,” (defined 
as, “a war initiated to prevent another party from acquiring a capability for attacking,”) 
which is also seen by many nations as illegal, and may be thought of as years in advance 
of a potential threat. (Potcovaru 2017)   
In general, the international community will not condemn use of force for self-
defense after attack or anticipatory self-defense if initiating nations can show justification 
or proof. Many nations, however, view preemption and preventive war as illegal under 
international law, and will not tolerate their use. (Arend 2003) “Those in the international 
community who advocate a restrictive approach in the interpretation of the UN Charter—
and in the exercise of self-defense—argue that reliance upon customary concepts of self-
defense, to include anticipatory self-defense, is inconsistent with the clear language of 
Article 51 and counterproductive to the UN goal of peaceful resolution of disputes and 
protection of international order…In contrast, some States, including the United States, 
argue that an expansive interpretation of the UN Charter is more appropriate, contending 
that the customary law right of self-defense (including anticipatory self-defense) is an 
inherent right of a sovereign State that was not “negotiated” away under the Charter.” 
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(Mangas & Festa. 2016, 4) Figure 3-2, below, depicts a generic view of the use of force 
as seen under international law.   
 
Figure 3-2. Use of Force in International Law 
Where this becomes most complex, however, is in a multinational coalition or 
alliance setting. “In coalition governments, decisions on sending troops into danger are 
made by collective decision makers, requiring compromise…collective entities will 
impose more caveats than will individual decision makers, all else being equal, because 
the more actors that must approve force, the harder it is to get that approval without 
conditions attached.” (Saideman & Auerswald 2012, 68) One or more nations within the 
coalition or alliance may feel strongly that preemptive strike is necessary to eliminate 
threatening missiles before the enemy can launch them, while the other nations may not 
see this as a legal action. Such “left of launch” activities would become even more 
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complicated if cyber-attacks are recommended to political leadership instead of physical 
strikes. (Weichert 2016)  
Initiation of offensive strike has the potential to be an intense stressor on coalition 
or alliance cohesion, and may negatively affect coherent strategic communication to the 
adversary for deterrence or de-escalation, and an adversary may exploit a lack of 
consistent messaging on this to fragment the coalition or alliance. That inclusiveness in 
the decision making for offensive initiation may increase the probability of a state joining 
the coalition or alliance, may, in actuality, be offset by the increased difficulty of 
reaching consensus that a larger number of states may entail. (Buena de Mesquita, et al., 
2003, Ch. 6)   
 
External Third Party-Centric IVs: Our last set of IVs, derived from NT 
experimentation findings, includes factors which apply between the coalition and third 
parties, or how the coalition engages with third parties. In this case we define third parties 
as nations or multinational organizations which are neither a part of the coalition or 
alliance, nor aligned with the potential adversary.    
 
Hypothesis 10 (“Consultation Processes”): As collective consultation processes and 
engagement with third parties (including strategic communication and declaratory 
policy) are made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a multinational military 
coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 Independent Variable #10 will be shortened to “Consultation Processes,” so 
Hypothesis 10 is abbreviated to “As Consultation Processes are made more inclusive, 
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PJoining increases.”  This assumes: 1) a military coalition or alliance’s nations may 
collectively coordinate external consultations, strategic communications, or declaratory 
policies prior to external engagement with third parties, or these nations may 
independently or bi-laterally engage without internal coalition consultation; and, 2) 
coalition or alliance states want to coordinate these endeavors to prevent fratricidal or 
conflicting messaging with third parties or the potential adversary. “Consultation” is here 
defined as “The exchange of views and the conduct of deliberations either amongst the 
authorities of the Participants, or between Participants and Third Parties (including 
potential adversaries), aiming at harmonizing positions and formulating 
recommendations on issues of common concern.” I define “Strategic Communications” 
as “All actions and activities participants conduct to send persuasive messages to various 
desired audiences, through the most suitable communication channel, at the appropriate 
time, to contribute to an overarching strategy.” Lastly, we define “Declaratory Policy” as 
“Information transmitted via diplomatic and/or public channels containing and/or 
describing the intentions or possible actions of the Participants in order to influence the 
behavior of adversaries, neutrals, or potential supporters.” (United States Strategic 
Command 2018, 60-64
2
) 
Military Implications: On the surface, this appears to be a purely political issue.  
The military, however, may be constrained or restrained in their activities based on 
agreements made by coalition or alliance political leadership with third party political 
leaders. In addition, policy makers may wish to use the military to signal intent.  
Although not universally defined, “strategic communication” (SC) is a term used in 
political-military circles to mean "coordinated actions, messages, images, and other forms 
                                                          
2
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of signaling or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences 
in support of national objectives.” (Paul 2011, 3)  In this regard, policy makers consider 
many military activities, with or without overt messaging, to be a very visible element of 
SC to third parties or adversaries. The act of deploying or testing missile defense forces 
in and of itself can send a SC message to the rest of the world. (Roberts 2014, 23) 
Political Implications: Consultation processes are the core mechanism through 
which diplomacy operates. Within an alliance or coalition, it is an imperative for success 
that all consultations with third parties or adversaries are coordinated and agreed amongst 
all member nations before engagement with the external parties. This is necessary in 
order to ensure external parties cannot exploit visible seams between messaging by 
different individual friendly states to the detriment of the collective operation. (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2006, 43) 
Coordination of SC was discussed above, and there are times when the states of 
the coalition or alliance may wish to collectively engage with a third party or adversary, 
but sometimes individual nations may have a special bilateral relationship or consultation 
process with that party which will facilitate engagement. In such a case, the lone party 
will need to take a coordinated message forward and bring back negotiation points to the 
rest of the collective; unsanctioned bilateral negotiations may be another stressor of 
coalition or alliance cohesion. This desire for a unitary message was highlighted in the 
2018 NATO Summit Declaration: “We will continue to engage with third states on a 
case-by-case basis to enhance transparency, build mutual confidence, and increase 
ballistic missile defence effectiveness.” (NATO 2018 (2), para 40) 
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Lastly, “declaratory policy” is a very specific form of SC in which a nation or 
alliance overtly declares what it considers a “red line” which cannot be crossed and the 
potential consequences for an adversary crossing it. Although a very old concept, 
practitioners today use the term most frequently in conjunction with nuclear weapons or 
to preclude the use of other weapons of mass destruction. “NATO has always had a 
declaratory policy—defined as a set of public statements about the circumstances in 
which a state or group of states would consider using nuclear weapons. This policy has 
played an important role in communicating both internally and externally how nuclear 
weapons contribute to collective deterrence and defense, as well as in supporting the 
Alliance’s arms control and disarmament commitments.” (Chalmers 2015, 53)  
However, declaratory policy is also growing in current thought in areas such as 
deterrence of attacks in cyberspace or attacks on space-based capabilities. The U.S. 2017 
National Security Strategy states, “Any harmful interference with or an attack upon 
critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest 
will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our 
choosing.” (U.S. Government 2017, 31) Like other forms of SC, declaratory policy can 
become ineffective if the entire coalition or alliance does not agree to its terms before 
public declaration, or does not adhere to its declaration should the adversary cross the 
stated red line.  
Timelines during real-time missile defense operations are extremely short, so 
consultations should occur in advance whenever possible. Collective consultation 
processes with third parties and adversaries are important to assure them of coalition or 
alliance intent when it comes to deploying or employing such defensive forces. 
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Consultations can also assure third parties that coalition or alliance member states intend 
to continue adherence to existing defensive arrangements with these third party states.  
Lastly, to minimize negative political effects once missiles start flying, it is important in 
discussing with potentially affected third parties the possibility for damage arising from 
interceptor debris or missed intercepts and liability, which we discuss in the next section.  
 
Hypothesis 11 (“COE Planning”): As collective planning for Consequences of 
Engagement (COE) (including civil warning, consequence management and liability for 
damages from successful or unsuccessful missile defense intercepts) increases, the 
likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD 
increases. 
 Our last IV is shortened to “COE Planning,” so Hypothesis 11 can be abbreviated 
to “As COE Planning increases, PJoining increases.” I assume: 1) states will wish to take 
all prudent precautions possible in advance of a conflict to minimize COE; and, 2) the 
degree and scope of what defines “prudent precautions” is open to debate. For our 
purposes, COE is defined as “The political-military consequences from all phases of 
BMD operations that could arise because of the launch (or lack of launch) of an 
interceptor. This includes Consequences of Intercept (COI) plus pre-launch activities 
(such as consultation, rules of engagement, intelligence about a potential launch, and 
planning) that could affect policy and possible military response, and the effects from the 
interceptor owing to an unsuccessful intercept.” COI is defined as “The physical hazards 
arising from the intercept of a threat ballistic missile and its effects on the civilian 
population, critical infrastructure, and military capabilities.” Consequence Management 
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is defined for our purposes as, “Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, 
restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of intercept, engagement or that 
of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation.” (United States 
Strategic Command 2018, 60-64
3
) 
Military Implications: As discussed earlier, COE considerations are an important 
part of tactical IAMD planning and operations, but most military professionals believe 
that the consequences of not engaging inbound threat missiles far outweigh the potential 
costs of doing so. “Despite the effects of missed and successful intercepts, which may 
affect third party nations as well as the combatant states, defense effectiveness should 
take primacy over debris mitigation, as the consequences of not intercepting will likely 
outweigh debris damage.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, III-26) Military planners 
should consider aspects of COE during defence design planning to mitigate the effects of 
BMD actions before they occur. In principle, however, avoidance of losses from a 
successful threat ballistic missile attack will generally take priority over debris mitigation 
if a conflict between the two occurs.  
Many professionals believe that missed intercept or post-intercept debris will be 
negligible, or burn up on reentry. However, military planners must consider the down-
range locations of friendly urban areas or critical infrastructure when placing launchers, 
because the booster stages used to launch the interceptor will fall to the ground after 
separation and may remain somewhat intact. On larger multi-stage interceptors such as 
GBIs, the remnants of these boosters could be substantial, with potential to cause damage 
on impact; in the case of the Alaska- and California-based GBIs, their likely impact 
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points are in broad ocean areas and are expected to cause negligible damage. (U.S. 
Missile Defense Agency 2003, es-18)  
Simple physics dictates COE, so to do any kind of predictive analysis to mitigate 
COE several variables must be known in advance. These include: 1) the threat missile’s 
launch and aim points; 2) its trajectory type (e.g. whether a standard ballistic arc, a 
minimum energy depressed trajectory, or a lofted trajectory); 3) the launch location, type 
and speed of the interceptor; 4) where in the threat missile’s flight and at what angle the 
intercept takes place; how accurate the intercept was in hitting the reentry vehicle; and, 5) 
whether the kill vehicle actually hit or missed the threat reentry vehicle. Predictive 
analysis, which may be used to decide when to fire or not fire an interceptor to minimize 
COE, is problematic if the adversary is able to move his missiles, pick his targets and 
trajectory types, and if the friendly missile defense launcher is also moving as in the case 
of maritime interceptors like Aegis SM-3. (Diehl 2004, 19) Not knowing all these 
variables make coalition demands to minimize COE through advance pre-planning 
challenging. 
Because the military have space- and surface-based sensors actively looking for 
threat missiles, they will generally know well in advance of any Civil Defense or Civil 
Warning architecture that a missile attack is in progress, or that missile defense 
operations are in progress. Governments use these systems to alert the civil populace of 
an inbound threat and to recommend they seek shelter until the attack is over. Some Civil 
Warning systems are electronically tied to military missile warning systems, such as was 
demonstrated during the false alerts in Hawaii and Japan in January 2018. (Frankel & 
Wang 2018; De Freytas-Tamura 2018) 
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Responsibility for consequence management after a missile attack may also reside 
with the military, especially in cases where the adversary employed nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons. The military may have the only national capabilities available to 
handle WMD use, either on the battlefield or domestically. Planning for military support 
to civil authorities for domestic clean-up actions should be in place before an attack, to 
maximize life-saving capabilities and minimize time wasted in establishing authorities 
and responsibilities during a crisis. “Response actions to the collateral effects of MD 
employment may include responding to personal injury; property loss; terrestrial cleanup 
resulting from MD engagements; high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP); and/or 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) debris. The coordination of 
information between organizations planning MD and potential first responders is 
essential.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, III-26) 
Political Implications: As discussed in the previous section, collective strategic 
communication with third parties is important, especially regarding COE. Third parties 
may attempt to impose restraints or constraints on coalition or alliance missile defenses 
that may be challenging to enact without degrading the defensive effectiveness, so 
collective policy makers may need to engage with third party states to reduce these 
limiting demands. While few will argue the right of individual or collective self-defense 
as granted in the UN Charter, it is in the best interests of the coalition or alliance to 
resolve COE issues in advance to maintain good relations with uninvolved neighbors. 
“What will be the reaction of a State not involved in the conflict, when NATO intercepts 
ballistic missiles above their territory? When defending NATO territory against any 
attack, it is very likely that 3rd States (neutral or non-allied) will be involved; either by 
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observing an interceptor track launched into their direction, by witnessing an intercept in 
the non-national space overhead their territory or even an infliction by debris caused by 
the intercept. How will that be appreciated?” (Golsch 2015, 2)  “If Pyongyang fires a 
missile at the United States, its most-likely trajectory would take it over the North Pole. 
A U.S. attempt to shoot down that missile would probably occur within Russian radar 
space — and possibly over Russia itself.  ‘It’s something we’re aware of,’ Gen. Lori 
Robinson, who leads both U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command, or NORAD, said Wednesday. ‘It’s something we work our way 
through.’” (Tucker 2017) 
Possibly the largest element of remaining a good neighbor is in discussing 
liability from damages to third parties that may arise from successful or failed intercepts. 
What makes this somewhat challenging is there is little legal precedent for liability of 
missile or interceptor damage in international law. The closest analog is Protocol V of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons, which states that the government controlling an 
area that contains explosive remnants of war is responsible for clearing such munitions. 
However, that government may ask for technical or financial assistance from others, 
including any party responsible for putting the munitions in place originally, to complete 
the task. (Arms Control Association 2017)  
This liability discussion also may need to happen between members of the 
coalition or alliance as well. A state that deploys BMD forces into a partner nation to 
assist in its defense will want to make liability clear in Status of Forces Agreements 
(SOFAs) or other bilateral agreements in advance, if possible. Of course, COE liability 
would not be an issue if the missile-armed adversary did not use his missiles to begin 
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with, thus obviating the need to use BMD interceptors. It would be logical for most 
collective military arrangements to assign liability for such damages to the adversary who 
provoked the self-defense response, even if post-bellum. (May & Forcehimes 2012, 
Chapter 9) 
 
Research Methodology - How I Test My Hypotheses and Why 
 To answer my research questions, I used a two-stage case-study-based qualitative 
research design.  My principle rationale for using this approach was to develop more 
effective and refined conclusions by using the results of the first qualitative theory 
generation phase to inform and shape the later, qualitative data collection phase, and by 
using the second stage qualitative findings to explain the results of the initial qualitative 
experimentation research. “A hallmark of a good qualitative case study is that it presents 
an in-depth understanding of the case. In order to accomplish this, the researcher collects 
many forms of qualitative data, ranging from interviews, to observations, to documents, 
to audiovisual materials. Relying on one source of data is typically not enough to develop 
this in-depth understanding…Case studies often end with conclusions formed by the 
researcher about the overall meaning derived from the case(s).” (Creswell 2013, 98-99) 
  
 To reiterate, my dependent variable (DV) is the decision by a state to join a 
coalition or alliance that uses BMD; the by-products of this decision in the real world are 
to expand international relationships, develop regional layered missile defenses, and 
strengthen deterrence for participating nations and organizations.   
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 In simplest terms, the first qualitative theory generation phase was a pilot study 
comprised of a series of complex vignette-based situational experimentation events, each 
building on the last over time, used to distill and generalize the issues from which I 
derived my theory framework. The subsequent qualitative data collection phase was done 
initially to test my eleven hypotheses, but ultimately resulted in a broader final causal 
model than initially envisaged at the start of this effort. This looked at the process 
concepts derived from these experimentation events as they are experienced and 
understood by a common group of policy practitioners from 18 of the 24 participant 
nations from around the world, and included a philosophical discussion of the value of 
these concepts (Creswell 2013, 78-79). Figure 3-3 below outlines the overall structure of 
this study. 
 
Figure 3-3. Study Design 
 
The Qualitative Theory Generation Phase 
 To determine my IVs and develop my theory structure, I began with extensive 
qualitative foundation work done in 21 sets of vignette-driven political-military 
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experimentation events with up to 24 nations
4
 over ten years throughout five two-year 
campaigns of the USSTRATCOM-sponsored NIMBLE TITAN BMD political-military 
wargame series. NIMBLE TITAN 2010 (NT’10) had four sets of experimentation events 
with nine participating nations, NT’12 had four events with 14 nations, NT’14 had five 
events with 22 nations, NT’16 had four events with 24 nations, and NT’18 had four 
events with 24 nations.  
 A “normal” NT experimentation event places the participants into a multinational 
social and military simulation, in which they play the roles of heads of state or 
government and ministers or secretaries of state or foreign affairs and defense, as well as 
senior military leadership. Very complex, vignette-based scenarios use a combination of 
various stimuli, discussed below, to create situations which stimulate dialogue and 
actions relative to specific MD-policy issues under investigation. The results of their 
actions are acted upon by both adversaries and third party states, portrayed by national 
subject matter expert role-players who provide as realistic as possible reactions.  These 
situational vignettes are designed to test or explore specific objectives the participants 
collectively agreed they wish to explore at the beginning of each campaign. A 
multinational Design, Analysis, and Reporting Team (DART) has observers in every 
national cell that are from the participant state, or are at least fluent in the language 
spoken by participants, to capture and report on all actions. At the end of each event, the 
DART provides a quick look analysis, followed up by a formal written report, which is 
provided to all participants. The DART also compiles a formal campaign level report at 
the end of each two-year cycle. 
                                                          
4
 Note that due to the non-attributional nature of NT and the political sensitivity of BMD in some nations, 
I cannot disclose exactly which nations are participants. 
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 In the design and execution phases of each of the 21 experimentation events, as 
the lead of the NIMBLE TITAN Wargame Control Group, I worked with DART to take 
research questions for each experiment and translate them into scenarios and vignettes 
that would stimulate the players to address, discuss, or play out and create all of the event 
stimuli used to do so, including intelligence reports, television news videos, interactive 
dynamic or static military air and missile defense simulation tools that emulated military 
actions, adversary or neutral third party role-player engagements, UN Security Council 
Resolution texts, Hague Code of Conduct announcements, Notices to Airmen and 
Mariners, etc.   
 During the execution of each experimentation event, my Wargame Control Group 
team provided these vignette stimuli to the players in a logical sequence within a broader 
and generally escalating geopolitical scenario. While DART analysts captured the raw 
dialogue and decision making of the players, we in Wargame Control would assess the 
actions of the players, determine how the adversary or affected neutral third parties would 
react to these player actions, rapidly create additional stimuli for the players so they could 
see the consequences of their actions. These cycles of player-adversary action and 
reaction would continue throughout each five to ten day experiment.  
 Once I introduced a vignette-based stimuli to the players, the national DART 
analysts, following the activities of the players from their country in their native language 
and providing not just translation but also some insight into the cultural aspects of player 
reactions, would observe the reaction and activities of the players and submit an 
“observation” using an online collaboration tool. The DART core team consolidated 
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inputs from all of the national DART analysts throughout an event for further distillation 
and synthesis into “Findings.”  
 The simplest unit of data, the “observation” may be something as simple as a 
DART analyst’s input that “The United States national cell met with (country X) and 
sought their support for (a specific action) against (adversary); during this discussion, 
they addressed (X, Y, and Z ideas/topics/concepts/proposed actions). Both sides agreed to 
do A, B, and C for (reasons/rationale).” The DART core team would take hundreds or 
even thousands of national observations and aggregate and synthesize them into more 
generalizable and topical “Findings,” for use in the after action reports and formal written 
reports after the event. Some of these findings were heavily conditional, in that they only 
apply in certain regions, countries, or under certain situational conditions, while others 
are more generalizable and hence relevant for a broader audience under broader 
situations. The latter category is the most important as key findings for experimentation. 
 Where the players discovered workable solutions to the challenges they faced, the 
DART core team would also capture and present “Recommendations” as an adjunct to 
the “Findings.” Again, the more generalizable the recommendation, the more valuable 
and significant it became in formal reporting. 
 In this form of experimentation, findings and recommendations about a specific 
research question may completely answer the question, but more often they lead to 
refinement of exploration of specific elements of findings and recommendations in more 
depth or in a different way to ascertain greater generalizability in future experimentation 
events.  
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 In summary, I designed and executed the 21 experimentation events discussed in 
my design diagram from which the DART captured the outputs. DART reported their 
findings and conclusions in the individual event after action reviews that were conducted 
with the players at the end of each event, the individual campaign after action reviews 
that were conducted at the end of each two-year cycle, the 21 formal written reports 
covering each event, and the final formal written reports for the five two-year campaigns 
covered during my first, Qualitative Theory Generation Phase. 
 At the end of the theory generation phase, conducted outside of NIMBLE TITAN 
during the development of my dissertation, I combed through all the after action reviews 
and formal reports of the findings created by DART, coupled with my memories of the 
actions taken by the players over the course of hundreds of vignettes during the 
individual experimentation events, and began to group and “bin” these findings into more 
coherent categories. After several iterations of this, I found they generally nested within 
the eleven categories that ultimately formed my IVs. There seemed to me to be enough 
backing in the findings for these eleven IV “bins” to indicate they may be causal in the 
decision to join, whereas there were several other “bins” I discounted because, although 
important in missile defense policy, I knew they were not causal or even related to 
joining (many were simply important during the conduct of cooperative operations in 
conflict, or in post-conflict activities, for example). 
 From the aggregate of lessons learned from these 21 experimentation events, I 
synthesized the eleven BMD-related policy issues that became the basis for my IVs as 
described above. This distillation began in NT 2010, where the idea of writing the NTII, 
described in the second section of this chapter, to capture and build on lessons learned 
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from these experiments came about. In addition to Wargame Control Group director, I 
served as the NIMBLE TITAN Implementing Instrument editor, in which capacity I 
solicited, adjudicated, and incorporated inputs after every event from the national and 
organizational policy leads to keep it up-to-date with the latest thinking and make it 
relevant for upcoming NT experimentation events. As NT campaigns continued to build 
one on the last (see Fig. 3-2 above), inputs from each were also incorporated into the 
NTII.  
 To better describe how this process unfolded I will use a single example of how 
one of the cycles of raw NIMBLE TITAN findings data were generated and how I then 
distilled them into an IV, and ultimately a testable hypothesis. For this we will use my 
IV, “Consequences of Engagement,” described in Theory, Part Three above. In the course 
of presenting players within an experimentation event with specific vignettes and 
observing their reactions, our DART analysts captured the narrative substance of 
numerous instances of discussions related to the political or military implications of COE 
within the given scenario. This raw datum would appear something to the effect of, “The 
U.S. State Department player is discussing possible intercept debris with his Russian 
counterpart.” The DART analysts ascribed a particular set of qualitative coding to these 
discussions to help better define the parameters of the issue. In addition, meta-data was 
extracted from the collaborative data-capture tool used by DART to highlight the number 
of instances of COE-related discussions and associative word-counts and text-relational 
analytics to determine strength of importance of the issues and their relationship to other 
issues. By the end of this experimentation event, enough importance and time had been 
devoted to the COE topic by the players that it became apparent that it warranted 
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discussion in the after-action review (AAR) “hotwash” with the players at the end of the 
event, and was written up into the formal event report afterwards. Two examples of COE-
related AAR discussion topics were, “Some states unilaterally requested in advance, on 
behalf of the Alliance, that third parties allow engagement of incoming missiles to 
mitigate COE issues,” and, “Must we consider ‘reverse COE’ from BMD-capable third 
parties?” 
 Over the course of several experimentation events, and despite different scenarios 
in different parts of the world, against different adversaries, DART continued to observe 
COE-related issue discussions amongst the players and report these in the AARs and 
formal reports. Over time, the findings of the substance and issues surrounding COE 
coalesced into an entire appendix in the NTII on COE. Player states and organizations 
interested in COE submitted objectives at the beginning of several campaigns to explore 
COE issues. In effect, COE had become one of the eleven major categories of BMD-
related policy issues. It is also true to say that in the early campaigns much of this was 
inductive, but over time as topical issues became better understood and specific focus 
was intentionally directed at exploring these topics, this process became more deductive. 
 Because of the frequency and incidence of COE discussions over the last 21 
experimentation events, I knew it was a major issue amongst many of the nations; what I 
was uncertain of was whether it was significant enough to influence a nation’s decision to 
join a BMD-using coalition or alliance, so I analyzed the most critical decision-making 
aspects of COE as captured in the NTII, and derived the description of the IV and its 
associated Hypothesis #10, as described in Theory, Part Three above. This same process 
resulted in the creation of the other ten BMD-related policy IVs. 
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 At the end of my qualitative theory generation phase, eleven distilled and 
generalized MD policy issues were identified through both recurrent findings in NT and 
reinforced by my literature review; these issues appeared to be important to NT 
participant states in their decision-making of whether to join a coalition or alliance that 
has uses BMD.  I used these eleven issues to form the core of my theory (as depicted in 
Figure 3-1). 
 As described in section three above, the eleven IVs and their related hypotheses 
can logically be further grouped into focus areas. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are “threat-centric,” 
in that they focus on the relationship between the potentially joining state and the 
adversary; Hypotheses 3-9 are “coalition or alliance internally-focused,” in that they 
involve relationships between the potentially joining state and the rest of the coalition or 
alliance; and Hypotheses 10 and 11 are “coalition or alliance externally-focused,” in that 
they involve relationships with third party states that are neither adversarial nor part of 
the military coalition or alliance.  
 It is difficult to consider this first phase “Quantitative”; although NT has an 
increasing number of states, up to 24, over the span of 21 experimentation events, each 
with a couple hundred participants, this still comprises a relatively small N; the fact that 
DART, which has a number of Operational Research and Systems Analysts (ORSAs) in 
its core, performed the data capture and has been able to metricize qualitative data and 
use meta-data (such as topical word-counts) to show recurrence of the issues and 
associated findings gives rise to a reasonable confidence that these 11 IVs are significant 
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to the relatively small number of states which are actively interested in BMD matters 
today. 
  In general, the theory generation phase was instrumental in determining, refining 
and distilling the key MD-related policy variables to a testable number, and for general 
theory creation.  I felt that a second qualitative approach would better answer the 
elements of our research questions which are ideational in nature, value-based, and not as 
easily quantifiably empirical. “Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding 
how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what 
meaning they attribute to their experiences.” (Merriam & Tisdale 2016, 6) It is to this 
phase we now turn. 
 
The Qualitative Data Collection Phase 
 As shown in Figure 3-3, theory generation was the final product from the first 
phase, but to determine the valuation and importance of these policy IVs, their placement 
within a theoretical framework, and to test whether there is merit in their related 
hypotheses, I needed to get a sampling of perspectives on these topics from diplomatic 
and military professionals from the four different regions of the world under study.  
 I developed an intensive interview protocol (at Appendix A). After Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approval, the NIMBLE TITAN Steering Committee approved my 
request to interview participants on a voluntary basis. Although not required by IRB, an 
informed consent form was provided to all interviewees.   
 Because most states, including the United States, do not have official national 
policy on many of these matters my stated objective with the interviewees was not to get 
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an official national policy, but, rather, to get the perspectives of a military or diplomatic 
subject matter expert from their nation; in other words, I was looking for “how a military 
officer from Japan,” or “a foreign affairs professional from the Netherlands might view 
these things,” rather than official policy. This was explained to all volunteers as well. 
Also keeping this in mind, the names of all interviewees were kept confidential.    
 My ideal objective was to interview at least one defense and one foreign affairs 
subject matter expert from each of the 24 participant nations, and one from the NATO 
International Military Staff (to gain the perspectives from an extant alliance that went 
through the process of internalizing BMD as a core mission beginning in 2010), for a 
total of 49 planned interviews (as depicted in Figure 3-2).  
 I interviewed volunteer participants on a non-attributional basis on the margins of 
NIMBLE TITAN events, or via separate coordination between November 2016 and April 
2018. I completed 22 interviews, including 17 defense or military personnel from 16 
nations, ranging in rank from Major to Major General. I also completed interviews with 
five foreign affairs or state department personnel from five nations, the senior-most of 
which were a First Secretary and an Ambassador. This resulted in interviews from 17 
nations and NATO. The demographic summary of these interviews is included as 
Appendix C. 
 Each interview lasted roughly 30-45 minutes, and all were conducted in English. 
Interviewed nations included Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Oman, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the NATO International Military 
Staff. The distribution of these interviews is depicted on the map at Figure 3-4 below. 
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Figure 3-4. Interview Distribution (Map courtesy of Geology.com) 
 The interviewees were provided the questions in advance in order to help 
formulate their answers. The interviews were conducted in-person, recorded using an 
audio recording device, and subsequently transcribed into text. Two interviewees, due to 
language barriers, requested to provide written answers instead of verbal interviews; in 
these instances I provided soft copy of the interview protocols for them to complete.   
 Once the interviews were completed, I began qualitative data coding. “The most 
basic definition of qualitative research is that it uses words as data…collected and 
analyzed in all sorts of ways.” (Braun & Clarke 2013, 3)   
  Because the questions in the interviews were organized one per IV, each was a 
discrete discussion topic, so the data were first grouped by question.  These responses 
were also coded by nation, and by “Defense” or “Foreign Affairs,” and also cross-
referenced by regional groupings (Asia-Pacific, NATO- and non-NATO Europe, the 
Arabian Gulf, and North America), and were finally coded into the three tiers of states 
(“BMD States,” “BMD Supporting States,” and “Non-BMD States”) discussed during the 
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Theory section above; the total number of states by type interviewed was nine BMD 
States (12 interviews), four BMD Supporting States (four interviews), and five Non-
BMD States (six interviews), for a total of 22 interviews.   
 This consolidated data was then thematically analyzed to determine patterns or 
commonalities. The first cycle of coding was done using “Concept Coding” to identify 
higher level concepts. “Concept Codes assign macro or meso levels of meaning to 
data…A concept is a word or short phrase that symbolically represents a suggested 
meaning broader than a single item or action—a “bigger picture” beyond the tangible and 
apparent. A concept suggests an idea rather than an object or observable behavior.” Such 
concepts can be nouns or processes. “Concept Codes are appropriate for studies focused 
on theory and theory development. Concept Coding is also an appropriate method when 
the analyst wishes to transcend the local and particular of the study to more abstract or 
generalizable contexts.” (Saldaña 2016, 119-120) In my case, because the IVs are already 
“macro” concepts for which I am interested in understanding the embedded “why’s,” my 
Concept Codes are a level lower, which Saldaña termed “meso” level.  
 Because we were interested in causality (e.g. whether the concept would be a 
causal driver in the decision to join a coalition or alliance), I used “Causation Coding” for 
my second cycle data coding. “The goal is to locate, extract, and/or infer causal beliefs 
from qualitative data…Causation Coding attempts to label the mental models participants 
use to uncover “what people believe about events and their causes”…At its most basic, 
an attribution answers the question “Why?”, though there can be any number of possible 
answers to any “why” question…Causation Coding is appropriate for discerning motives 
(by or toward something or someone), belief systems, worldviews, processes, recent 
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histories, interrelationships, and the complexity of influences and affects (my qualitative 
equivalent for the positivist “cause and effect”) on human actions and phenomena.” 
(Saldaña 2016, 187-188) The model posited by Miles et al. (2014) structures this data 
coding into antecedent or start conditions, mediating variables, and outcomes; this 
mirrors my larger theory structure. 
 To validate my assessments, I asked a co-worker, who is an Operations Research 
and Systems Analyst (ORSA) as well as a BMD policy expert, to review my interview 
data and corroborate an independent assessment of the patterns and themes. 
 Finally, I used the data to take the causal relationships between the IVs and the 
DV, as well as between the IVs, to create a conceptual model.  This model explains not 
just the importance of the variable, but when and where the variable was most important 
for coalition or alliance building and, because many variables were found to contain 
“deal-breakers,” sustainment; in some cases, nations would leave a coalition under 
negative outcomes of some of the IVs. 
 
Summary 
 The 21 experiments in the NIMBLE TITAN wargame campaigns from 2010 
through 2018 formed the core of the Qualitative Theory Generation Phase, and their 
lessons learned, in conjunction with an academic literature review, were used to 
determine, distill, and generalize the policy variables that appear to be significant causal 
factors in the decision making of those states who have already decided to join a coalition 
or alliance which uses missile defense. These NT participant states already within 
multinational military collectives such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the North 
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American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Agreement, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and 
multiple bilateral arrangements, span the gamut from BMD States, BMD Supporting 
States, and Non-BMD States, and yet have opted to participate in NT to better understand 
the issues surrounding air and missile defense policy.    
 Understanding which of these IVs weighed in their previous decision-making and 
why helped frame the theory underpinning this work, and shaped the qualitative phase of 
this work. I sought a deeper understanding of why these variables appear to be important, 
and use of the two stage case-study-based qualitative approach provided the vehicle to do 
so. The results of the second qualitative phase interviews, along with an analysis of trends 
and patterns will be addressed in Chapter Four, while subsequent recommendations for 
policy-makers arising from this analysis will be covered in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 In this chapter I start by describing some generalities or macro-patterns from the 
interview data. I then remind the readers of the eleven IVs and their associated 
hypotheses. In each of the first eleven IV-related sections, I address key themes arising 
from first cycle Concept Coding of the interview responses, many times highlighting 
regional or specific national differences where applicable. The second part of each IV 
section, resulting from second cycle Causation Coding, discusses causal relationships of 
the IV, both with the DV, “the decision to join a coalition or alliance which uses BMD,” 
and with other IVs.  
Each of the first eleven IV sections ends with a pie chart showing causal coding 
impacts; during the Causation Coding, these were given a second assessment and 
assigned to one of the following six categories: “Strongly Influences Joining,” “Indirectly 
Influences Joining,” “Only Affects Within the Coalition,” “Indirectly Influences 
Leaving,” “Strongly Influences Leaving,” and “No Effect.” I acknowledge that, with only 
22 interviews, these graphics can, at best, only assist in helping the reader to visualize 
patterns rather than represent statistically-relevant data. I will discuss my criteria for 
determining whether a hypothesis was supported by the data or not, after the eleventh IV 
section. 
A twelfth section addresses other potentially impactful factors outside my IVs 
which interviewees felt affected joining such a coalition, while the thirteenth section 
addresses the penultimate interview question, “Which of the BMD-related policy topics 
we have discussed do you think is most important and why?”  
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 In the final section, I introduce and describe a conceptual causal model to help 
understand the interrelationships of these IVs that were created, as described in Chapter 
Three. This final model is used in Chapter Five to develop recommendations to policy-
makers and areas for further research to complete the dissertation.     
  
A Few Notes about the Interviews: Before I start the individual IV discussions, I first 
want to highlight a couple systematic observations which arose from the interviews.  One 
administrative note is that, throughout this chapter, I frequently use national or 
organizational names, such as “Australia” or “NATO” as shorthand to represent “the 
Australia or NATO interviewee” to save space and repetition; it is important for the 
reader to understand that by using such monikers I am not referring to any official 
national policy, but rather the views of the military or diplomatic professionals from the 
states interviewed. 
 Of the 18 nations (if we include NATO as a “nation”) interviewed, 16 answered 
the questions generally within the spirit for which they were intended. This “spirit” could 
best be summarized as, “Does or would this factor affect your nation’s decision to join a 
coalition or not?” The fact that most of the European states interviewed (except Sweden) 
are already in the NATO alliance, the Gulf States are all members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, while Canada and the U.S. are members of the bi-national North 
American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Agreement required the majority of 
interviewees to split their answers between their existing coalitions or alliances and a 
fictional new coalition, but this did not detract from the richness of the answers. Almost 
all NATO-member European states split most of their answers into how the IV would 
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affect the territorial, or homeland, defense mission, and how it would affect that of an 
“out-of-area” deployed force coalition operation in another region. Only Japan and 
Australia today operate within purely bi-lateral relationships, both with the U.S., within 
their region today; this is also true of Canada in North America, but Canada is also a 
member of NATO. This essentially gave us one region with a strong extant alliance 
(Europe), one with a politically strong, but militarily less unified multinational coalition 
(the Gulf), and two regions which operate principally through relatively permanent 
bilateral arrangements (the Asia-Pacific and North America). 
 There were two outliers to following the “spirit” of the questions, though. The 
NATO respondent, a long-serving representative of an already existing alliance which 
adopted BMD as a core mission at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, recommended 
modification of the questions. Since NATO is unlikely to join another coalition that uses 
BMD independently, but that which operates through political unity of the 29 member 
states, the questions were re-worded to something like, “How does or did (the IV) affect 
consensus building and cooperation within the NATO alliance regarding BMD?” This 
gave a richer look at the historical aspects of the development of Alliance BMD 
cooperation and revealed many stressors within the Alliance today. 
 The other outlier was the United States. The American respondents struggled to 
imagine a situation in which the United States would join a coalition formed by others 
and for which they would have to decide whether to join or not based on the IV factors. 
Instead, they answered universally from the mindset that the U.S. would likely be the 
state leading the coalition development effort. They tended to answer the questions from 
the perspective of how they felt the IVs would affect other nations joining a U.S.-led 
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BMD-using coalition, and these interviewees tended to use detailed recent historical 
cases to back up their answers. Because the United States is also active in all four 
regions, they too split their responses between homeland defense and cooperative defense 
of deployed forces, partners and allies in the other three regions. 
 One last, but significant, note comes from a careful examination of Appendix C, 
which shows that I interviewed Defense personnel from four of the five states from which 
I interviewed Foreign Affairs professionals; I was unable to obtain a Defense interview 
from Oman. In general, I found there was little daylight between the answers of the 
Defense and Foreign Affairs respondents from the same states. As a reminder, although it 
was not one of my central research questions, one of my elements of analysis was to 
determine if Defense and Foreign Affairs professionals would have different views of the 
impact of the IVs. Although four dyads is too small an N for conclusive proof, it appears, 
superficially, that national perspectives were more important than those separating the 
cultures of soldier from diplomat within the same state, superficially negating 
Oosterbeek’s dictum, “When the within country differences are of the same magnitude as 
the between country differences, it obviously becomes less sensible to attribute 
differences between subject pools to cultural differences.” (Oosterbeek, et al. 2004, 172) 
 
The Adversary-Centric IVs Detailed: We start first with the two IVs which are directly 
related to the adversary:  
Hypothesis 1 (“Threat Perception”): The greater the perception of threat from a 
potential BM-equipped adversary, the more the likelihood of a state joining a 
multinational military coalition or alliance which uses BMD increases. 
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 Asia-Pacific Themes: The perspectives of Australia and Japan both rest on the 
fact that their existing regional alliances, both with the U.S., pre-date ballistic missile 
threats within the region. In both cases, their relationships with the great power is central 
to their planning and military budgetary programming. For Japan, missile threats to their 
homeland are generally synonymous with threats to their deployed forces since they 
rarely deploy troops outside of their immediate area due to legislative interpretations of 
Article 9 of their Constitution, which precludes collective military operations beyond 
those of the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. (Asia for Educators 2009) Australia is the 
exact opposite; they divide threat perception into missile threats to their homeland, which 
they see today as unlikely albeit growing, and those to their deployed forces frequently 
deployed in coalition operations around the world. In such cases, geographic proximity of 
these missile threats and their qualitative and quantitative “overmatch,” or ability to 
exceed defensive capabilities, weigh heavily in Australia’s threat perception calculus.  
 European Themes: Almost all Europeans interviewed felt that perception of the 
threat was a fundamental driver to any collective action, whether within the NATO 
alliance or in an external coalition. They generally divided their answers between threats 
to NATO territory and threats to deployed forces in out-of-area NATO-led or coalition 
missions, such as Afghanistan. Four of the states used a variation of the phrase, “If there 
is no threat, there is no reason for a coalition.”  
 NATO’s perspective on consensus building, which had to occur between the 2010 
Lisbon Summit adoption of the mission and the 2012 Chicago Summit declaration of an 
“interim operational capability” (or “IOC”) for territorial defense of Alliance homelands, 
was instructive. Although not all states felt threatened by missile threats from the 
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southeast, the NATO principle of indivisibility of Alliance security forced the Allies to 
build a type of “lowest common denominator” consensus on a common threat perception 
that drove all subsequent actions to get to declaration of IOC. Recent Russian 
misbehavior is forcing the Alliance to re-look this threat assessment, and this narrative 
was reinforced in the 2018 Brussels Summit Statement. (NATO 2018 (2), para 6) 
 All four of the BMD-equipped European states (Germany, France, Italy, and the 
Netherlands) have “theater BMD” capabilities, such as PATRIOT or the French SAMP/T 
systems capable of protecting deployed forces against shorter-ranged missile threats, 
while only the United States provides territorial defense of NATO homelands from Aegis 
Ashore sites in Romania and Poland and Aegis warships afloat. All four mentioned the 
importance of threat perception as a principle driver in joining a coalition; the French 
Foreign Affairs respondent said it best: “It’s essential, because the analysis of the threat 
and the strategic environment analysis is at the basis of any decision, so it drives all the 
big important decisions, whether to join a coalition or whether to implement a policy or 
to build alliances.” Italy and Germany both iterated the importance of the perception of 
domestic civil populace as a key element in governmental decisions; Italy used civilian 
insecurities over terrorism driving government support for coalitions as an analogy. 
 Amongst the BMD-Supporter states (Romania, the United Kingdom, and Turkey) 
and the Non-BMD states (Denmark, Estonia, and Sweden) there was quite a bit of 
commonality in answers. Several noted that the lack of BMD, whether due to expense of 
such systems or small national budgets, would likely drive a state to group with one that 
has BMD; as summarized by the British Defense expert, “…from the UK’s perspective 
then, clearly a ballistic missile armed opponent would be a key driver for us entering into 
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a coalition…if we were gonna enter into operations against somebody who is armed with 
ballistic missiles, at the moment with our existing capabilities…we would be driven into 
working in a coalition because we simply don’t have capabilities to tackle those threats.”  
Romania and Turkey both linked the importance of threat perception to geographic 
proximity to the adversary and ability to defend against their missiles. The non-BMD 
states of Denmark and Estonia also reinforced NATO’s “indivisibility of security” policy, 
in that, although the likelihood of a missile attack may be less on a smaller NATO state, 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states that, “An attack on one is an attack on all,” 
(NATO 2018 (3)) and that the smaller states are fully committed to this prospect. 
Denmark made the point that this adds a political element to common threat perception 
which is important to understand; even without a direct national threat, a threat to the 
Alliance must be considered a national threat, which takes “national” threat perceptions 
and turns them into a collective “NATO threat perception.” 
 Gulf Themes: All three Gulf States saw threat perception as a key driver in 
coalition formation. Kuwait mentioned the importance of forming a coalition based on a 
common threat perception as a deterrent to the potential adversary. Article 10 of Oman’s 
constitution calls for peaceful settlement of disputes whenever possible (Constitute 
Project 2011, 4), so their policy limits joining a coalition only as a last resort against an 
imminent threat. 
 North American Themes: Two American quotes sum up the perspective: “I 
think threat perception is probably kind of the key element. If the threat isn’t perceived, 
then I don’t think there would be a reason to necessarily do a coalition…” and, “It’s very 
circumstance-dependent, but certainly I think a threat would be a kind of a necessary and 
 
122 
least sufficient condition (italics mine) to undergo a BMD posture, whether it was 
unilaterally by the United States or in some type of coalition arrangement.”   
 An interesting side note on common threat perception came from the relatively 
BMD-rich U.S. Defense: “So, sometimes I think our perception of the threat…we are 
overly sensitive to the perception of the threat when the allies who we are supporting, 
these are on their front doorstep, and we got to realize these threats are real to these folks 
and make sure that the threat perception, that we take it as real as the allies do. When we 
are protecting their country, we sometimes take a look at the airbases that we are 
protecting or something and not realize that we are an asset in a country against a threat 
that that particular country takes very, very seriously.” Canada mirrored the Italian and 
German concerns that popular civil perception of the threat is a significant factor in 
government decisions to act militarily. 
 Causality: Almost across the board, the interviewees cited threat perception as 
the raison d'être for collective military action, or at the very least a principle driver for 
coalition formation. As stated by the U.S. State Department interviewee, shared threat 
perception appears to be the “necessary and least sufficient condition” for coalition 
formation. In the case of states already in extant alliances, some mentioned this as the 
main reason to stay in the alliance or coalition. Items cited as strengthening the causality 
of threat perception included geographic proximity to the missile-armed adversary, as 
well as the relative strength of the adversary’s missile capabilities vis-à-vis friendly 
defensive capabilities (“overmatch” in the words of the Australian respondent). Clear 
attribution of the intent of the threat is also a sub-element of threat perception, as is a split 
in threats to the homeland and civil populace versus threats to deployed forces in a distant 
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military theater. Lastly, shared collective threat perception is an important element of the 
causality of this in coalition or alliance formation; if states do not agree on the capability 
and intent of the adversary they are less likely to join, or support, collective action. 
 In terms of linkages to other IVs, threat perception was stated by respondents to 
be a driver for “Contribution Requirements,” “Posture Decisions,” “Structures and 
Authorities,” and “Offensive Decisions,” and linked indirectly to “Consultation 
Processes,” and “Security Dilemma.” These linkages will be discussed in more detail 
during each of those IV sections. 
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported by the majority of the 
respondents; threat perception was cited as the “most important” IV by six of the 22 
interviewees. The impacts of threat perception discussed above support the “collective 
action” literature as discussed in Chapter 2 (especially Schelling 1966, Waltz 1979, 
Morgenthau & Thompson 1985, Walt 1988, and Benson 2011.) See Figure 4-1 below. 
 
Figure 4-1. Threat Perception Data 
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Hypothesis 2 (“Security Dilemma”): As adversary concerns with friendly coalition or 
alliance military buildup increase, adversary tensions and pressure on the state not to 
join increase, and the likelihood of that state joining a multinational military coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD decreases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan felt that such third party or adversary concerns 
should be acknowledged but since BMD is purely defensive, these concerns would not 
impact the self-defense of Japan. This narrative is reinforced by current Japanese 
handling of Russian rhetoric claiming Japanese BMD is “destabilizing” the region. 
(Plopsky 2018) They were the first state to also mention there would be no need for BMD 
if adversaries did not threaten use of BMs, hence BMD brings balance back into the 
equation rather than increases instability as claimed by “Security Dilemma” proponents. 
Australia, on the other hand, is more sensitive to such negative perceptions; stating their 
government would “have pause for thought” if the reaction of a potential adversary 
increased the threat to Australia. But they felt this would be a minor issue at best, since 
missile threats could be balanced in perspective with other types of threats the adversary 
may bring to bear that could also be offset by coalition membership. 
 European Themes: In general, most of the European states did not see the 
“Security Dilemma” as an issue in collective action, despite the NATO states living 
through it as manifested by near-continuous Russian rhetoric about U.S. and NATO 
BMD for almost a decade. Like Japan, Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands reinforced 
the purely defensive nature of BMD, while acknowledging that “all new defenses risk 
arms races.” France provided the most thoughtful perspective on this; first, “only a weak 
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state falls prey to this,” and states join coalitions or alliances in order to not be seen as 
weak; second, there is a distinct difference between territorial or homeland defense 
against strategic missile threats which can be seen as offsetting a strategic balance, and 
theater BMD protecting a coalition of deployed forces, which only offsets an adversary’s 
tactical military advantage. Like other European states, France did not feel this would 
alter their resolve to join a coalition or alliance, but that, once established, it was 
important for the collective to engage with third parties and adversaries to reduce 
concerns of strategic instability, minimize potential arms races, and prevent triggering 
negative reactions unnecessarily. The UK reinforced this, stating that engaging and 
educating an adversary or third party is important, but gaining their agreement is not as 
important as understanding their narrative. Italy and Estonia made the point that domestic 
civilian perception of third party concerns cannot be ignored, which creates an obligation 
for governments to educate their populace as necessary. 
 NATO’s perspective is instructional; despite Russian insistence that NATO 
territorial BMD undermines their strategic nuclear deterrent forces, NATO has continued 
with its plans, even at the cost of effectively halting all NATO-Russian cooperation and 
relations. This situation continues and does not appear to be improving; four key 
milestones have served to deepen the rift with Russia, including NATO’s declaration of 
the territorial BMD mission at Lisbon in 2010, declaration of IOC at Chicago in 2012, the 
fielding of the first operational Aegis Ashore site in Romania, and the upcoming fielding 
of the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland in 2019. In each case, increasingly harsh 
rhetoric from Russia has only been offset by Alliance unity and the desire of the Allies to 
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fulfill their commitments; without this, NATO feels Russia would exploit the differences 
between members to break Alliance resolve, which is based on consensus. 
 Turkey made the point that the decision to join a coalition is a sovereign decision 
for which there can be no external vetoes; Estonia agreed but added that a collective 
voice helps override any third party “Security Dilemma” reactions. Lastly, non-aligned 
Sweden provided a slightly different perspective, adding that there seems to be a window 
of time in which a smaller state may be vulnerable to third party or adversary rhetoric, 
between when they decide to join and when the agreement or treaty enters into force.  
 Gulf Themes: Kuwait mentioned that the Gulf States have historically had to 
balance between Russia and the U.S., so balancing such concerns of major third parties 
are important to them. They also felt that BMD “makes you strong enough to talk (to 
missile armed adversaries); without it you cannot talk to anybody at all.” The UAE 
adopted a similar philosophy to that of Japan: BMD is purely defensive and the adversary 
or third party must know it; and that the adversary should acknowledge that their 
offensive missile capabilities are what is driving the need for coalition BMD. Oman 
reiterated their policy of non-interference in other’s internal affairs and that they do not 
tolerate others pressuring their sovereign decisions. 
 North American Themes: The American perspective on the “Security Dilemma” 
aspect of collective BMD mirrors a lot of official U.S. policy: BMD is purely defensive 
and all nations, under the UN Charter have the supreme right to protect themselves. They 
felt that third parties such as Russia and China, claiming that BMD upsets strategic 
stability, are being disingenuous and just trying to “throw sand in the gears.” A U.S. 
respondent acknowledged that the U.S. could probably do better at engaging experts from 
 
127 
third parties again, as we did back in the 1990’s and early 2000’s with the U.S.-Russia 
Missile Defense Exercises as a means of helping tamp down rhetoric. The U.S. also felt 
that the “Security Dilemma” would not influence their formation of a coalition, and that 
they are prepared to go unilaterally if it impacted others. Canada, like France, reflected 
that this issue only really matters when strategic BMD of the homeland is the issue, and 
that context (NORAD, NATO, or a new coalition) matters in Canadian decision making. 
 Causality: Almost universally, the respondents did not feel that the “Security 
Dilemma” reaction of third party or adversary pressure would not affect their decision to 
join an alliance or coalition. In terms of linkages to other IVs, several noted that the 
“Security Dilemma” is in many ways a by-product of “Threat Perception,” because the 
requirement for a BMD coalition would be unnecessary if the adversary did not develop 
and field threatening missiles to begin with. Many felt the “Security Dilemma” could be 
mitigated through established coalition or alliance “Consultation Processes,” in which 
engagement and education of third parties could occur, and “Posture Decisions,” in which 
deployment of forces could help message coalition intent.  
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 2 was not supported; the respondents generally 
felt the defensive nature of BMD rendered the normal security dilemma concerns of 
offensive arms races and strategic stability as either not impactful upon or only mildly 
impacting decision-making for joining collective action. See Figure 4-2 below. 
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Figure 4-2. Security Dilemma Data 
 
The Coalition-Internal IVs Detailed: We move next to those variables which focus on 
internal relations between states within a coalition or alliance: 
Hypothesis 3 (“Contribution Requirements”): As national military force contribution 
and commitment requirements for coalition membership are made less restrictive, the 
likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD 
increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan stated they would accept any cost short of the loss of 
life of citizenry or soldiers. Australia took the more pragmatic view that there are 
differences between coalitions, as temporary costs, and alliances, as permanent ones; yet 
Australia felt that alliance costs had, for them, been the backbone (or “central enabler”) 
of meeting coalition requirements in the past. Australia also felt that there could be a 
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military cost threshold that is too high, but such a threshold would generally be a 
requirement to exceed Australia’s capabilities; they added that, given potentially 
excessive threat missile capabilities, paying this cost may still provide no guarantee of 
BMD protection by others. 
 European Themes: Most of the NATO nations generally acknowledged the 
“price of admission” principle as inherent in alliance membership, and that there should 
be an obvious national expectation to pay some price. NATO uses a “Voluntary National 
Contributions” (VNC) target-setting planning process whereby states pledge forces which 
NATO planners then factor into military operational planning. Some states, such as 
Germany essentially commit all of their forces as VNCs and hence would operate only 
within a NATO-coalition context, while others retain forces for national use outside of 
VNCs. France made the points that such “price of admission” can be financial, military or 
political (especially in terms of autonomy) and that cost is a significant consideration in 
the budget-constrained environments most states operate within. France also stated there 
are explicit, openly stated costs, such as specified military forces, and implicit costs such 
as incremental loss of national political or military control over their forces, which is very 
important to France. They also mentioned a less important “technical cost” in that only 
some states have high-end and very expensive military technology that must be used 
properly. 
 NATO added that, in the BMD core mission, it was a big decision for the Allies to 
commit to use “Common Funded Arrangements,” or contributed and pooled money from 
all the Allies into a central fund, to develop the Alliance BMD Command and Control 
(C2) system, while actual BMD sensors and forces would come from VNCs. NATO 
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stated that while only the U.S. today provides VNCs for territorial or homeland defense, 
other states have shorter-ranged and deployable theater BMD (TBMD) forces; apparently 
TBMD contributions have been the subject of difficult discussions without a clear and 
agreed threat perception as to where and under what conditions they would be used. 
Lastly, the NATO respondent acknowledged that “real burden-sharing” with all allies 
paying their fair share today is not real; although all allies agreed to pay 2% of the GDP 
for common defense, “How that is going to be translated in reality is something we will 
have to assess in a couple years’ time, to see really whether they manage to get there.” 
 The BMD-Supporting European states took a slightly different view; they also 
viewed a bifurcation between the territorial or homeland mission, in which they really 
only provide common funding and political support, and the out-of-area deployed force 
operation, in which they may contribute other types of forces. The U.K. mentioned that 
they must look at novel and synergistic uses for non-BMD capabilities to work with 
BMD forces, such as non-BMD warships providing air defense of BMD-capable 
warships to free them up to focus on that mission in an environment where air threats 
may be prevalent; in other words, “Where can we best fit in to support the overall 
mission?” Romania stated, “The fulfilment of the commitments, including all possible 
options (such as offensive operations), stands for the spirit of an alliance.” Turkey made 
the point that “price of admission” is subjective and means different things to different 
states but that what matters is that the national assessment of a “gain-loss balance” is of 
essence; losses, in terms of the price of commitments, would have to exceed the potential 
gains of collective action before it would ever be a factor in the decision to join.  
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 The non-BMD European states continued and extended this thread; Denmark and 
Estonia both acknowledge that small countries pay as best they can, but sometimes even 
small military contributions provide “flags,” or a visible show of political support, that 
can be important to the legitimacy and credibility of collective action. Estonia noted that, 
while security is expensive, nations must pay for it, and that if a state joins a security 
arrangement with others its commitments must be taken seriously; costs, burdens, and 
risks must all be shared and faced in unison. Ultimately, Estonia stated, the “price of 
admission” is actually an “investment in security.”  
 Like other states, Sweden also felt there is a difference between a temporary 
coalition and a more-permanent alliance in terms of costs. Like Turkey, they also focused 
on the gain-loss balance as important to this decision. Lastly, Sweden mentioned that 
geography itself is a “good” which can be paid; access to territories and basing rights is 
itself advantageous under the right circumstances. 
 Gulf Themes: Like other regions, this did not seem to be a significant factor in 
the decision to join for the Gulf States. Kuwait discussed how its constitution constrained 
it from contributing offensive forces for missions outside the Gulf Cooperation Council 
territory, and this would be too high a cost politically.  The UAE, like Japan, felt that the 
potential loss of life makes all prices for coalition membership worth paying, while Oman 
felt that if the cause was just, such cause justifies the price. 
 North American Themes: In keeping with the general U.S. view that they would 
lead most coalition formation, they saw the “price of admission” as a two-way street, in 
which others may also place demands on the U.S. for their commitment to support a 
U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. Defense respondent mentioned such quid pro quos in which 
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allies or partners ask to share munitions, or for the U.S. to deploy defensive systems such 
as PATRIOT into their territory in exchange for basing or logistics support. The 
challenge with PATRIOT, as a “reverse price of admission,” is that everyone wants it and 
it is a high-demand but low-density capability; once it is deployed to one coalition-
joining state, others may demand it as well. In general, the U.S. felt that such “price of 
admission” costs apply more to their partners than to the U.S. since they are generally the 
ones who define the mission and are looking for others to join. They mentioned that it 
was conceivable there could be a situation where others asked the U.S. to participate in 
which U.S. national interests were really not at stake; in such a circumstance, this 
“reverse price of admission” would be accepted only if a common threat perception was 
developed. Canada again stated that context matters; in a NORAD or NATO situation, 
costs are formalized and accepted, whereas in a more ad hoc coalition operation in which 
demands on Canada exceeded their capabilities, they would likely not show up. 
 Causality: In general terms most of the respondents did not see “Contribution 
Requirements” as a driver in decision-making to join a coalition or alliance; if anything, 
they generally all saw it as expected and implicit in collective action membership. The 
only real exceptions to this were three states that provided the caveat that a logical 
threshold would be a demand for more capabilities than the state could provide without 
additional procurement. Only two respondents mentioned it as “most important” in 
decision-making: the Netherlands mentioned it as the lesser of two issues (the main one 
being loss of political autonomy), while the U.S. State representative put it in context of 
the “reverse price of admission” of whether what other partners bring to the coalition is 
worth the cost of acting multilaterally rather than unilaterally. 
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 In terms of linkages to other IVs, there was repeated mention that “Threat 
Perception” would drive what contributions would need to be required and made. Several 
mentioned the actual financial and technical cost of capabilities being a factor in what 
could be contributed. 
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the narratives. Many 
states mentioned that the “price of admission” would likely be determined and paid after 
the political decision to join had been made, and that it was implicit in coalition 
membership. See Figure 4-3 below. 
 
Figure 4-3. Contribution Requirements Data 
 
Hypothesis 4 (“Loss of Autonomy”): As the possible loss of national autonomy for 
military decision-making and command and control of its forces increases, the likelihood 
of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD decreases. 
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 Asia-Pacific Themes: Both Asia-Pacific states answered this purely from the 
perspective of loss of military authority; in Japan’s case, they stated they must maintain 
BMD Engagement Authority for missile attacks on their own nation, but they could 
otherwise potentially subordinate their forces in other areas. Australia reiterated their 
history of working under multinational coalitions, but stated they would likely always 
retain some national caveats, or “red-lines” and would always push for a senior military 
officer in the coalition command structure to exercise them if required. 
 European Themes: When asked about “autonomy” many of the European states 
made a clear distinction between the loss of political autonomy and subordination of 
military forces under another nation’s command within a coalition or alliance. BMD-
equipped Germany made the point that defensive positioning of their defensive forces 
was not really seen as a loss of autonomy but that initiation of preemptive offensive strike 
would be seen as a red-card for them. France made the insightful statement that “strategic 
independence and joining a coalition are not mutually exclusive,” citing their long history 
of political autonomy even when working within a NATO military context. In NATO, 
collective political control has always been a condition of the NATO BMD operation; 
because BMD must be planned so far in advance of its use, collective political decisions 
are taken, but then actual translation of this guidance into practice relies on established 
NATO C2 structures and leadership. The Netherlands made the point that political 
control is maintained by political approval of collective plans, including the operational 
plan,  mission, rules of engagement (or “ROE”), and the defense design for the use of 
national air and missile defense forces. All of the NATO BMD-equipped states 
mentioned being comfortable delegating operational control (OPCON) of their TBMD 
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forces to Alliance military leadership, but that they rarely, if ever, would delegate 
operational command (OPCOM, or as the U.S. terms it, Combatant Command, or 
COCOM) authority (as discussed in Chapter 3.) Italy saw this as something done after the 
decision to join was made, and that it was really subordinate to “Threat Perception” in 
terms of importance. 
 NATO felt that, in general, the Allies are all comfortable with the agreed-to 
framework C2 documents and structures, and mentioned that the U.S., as the biggest 
contributor of forces to NATO, has “dual-hatted” senior military leaders (e.g. the 
Commander of U.S. European Command is dual-hatted as NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander-Europe). He mentioned that it is understood by the Allies that the U.S. may 
feel the need to undertake unilateral action, and that this will require hard discussions 
within NATO if the other states feel they are being forced to accept collective 
responsibility for such action. Lastly, he mentioned that some of the most difficult 
discussions, politically, for implementing NATO BMD revolved around establishing 
clear and agreed rules of engagement (ROE). 
 Within the European BMD-Supporting states, the U.K. mentioned the expectation 
that subordination of military forces is an expected consequence, like “Contribution 
Requirements,” of joining something bigger, and that the loss of military autonomy is 
normal business for U.K., although it has also been in reverse, with the U.K. in control in 
places like Afghanistan. Ultimately, they felt it was best to concede control to those in 
better condition, or with better capability, to C2 them, while maintaining that national 
requirements and priorities must be respected by the collective military C2. The U.K. 
mentioned that, as a practical matter, many caveats or “red-cards” actually get woven into 
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ROE, which is how caveats are actually implemented. Romania reiterated many of the 
ideas stated by France, that political control is maintained through agreement on how 
delegated military forces would be used, and politically controlled by ROE. Turkey made 
the separate point that the loss of political autonomy and “automaticity” of decision 
making is seen as very negative; in this case political decisions imposed by others as 
“automatic” are very bad, and if seen early on in coalition formation could not help but 
detract from a desire to join. But Turkey did also state that short BMD engagement 
timelines, in terms of minutes to decide to shoot down an inbound missile, mean that 
some loss of political autonomy and delegation of national authority is required. 
 The smaller, non-BMD European states again had a slightly different perspective; 
Denmark mentioned it is hard for a small country to put demands on its larger partners, 
so they tend to accept loss of autonomy when their forces are deployed. Estonia felt that, 
as a non-BMD state they really had not lost any autonomy, and if anything they had 
gained more control over decision-making on the use of NATO BMD and TBMD 
through political consensus in NATO. As the only former Soviet state interviewed, 
Estonia made the historically ironic statement that they had previously lost more 
autonomy when outside the NATO alliance than they ever have within it. Sweden felt 
that the type of nation and its internal politics would matter in such a decision; Sweden 
lost some autonomy in joining the EU, but its people are comfortable with that. How 
much political or military autonomy Sweden would give away would likely be based on 
its “Threat Perception.” 
 Gulf Themes: One interesting point that came out from Kuwait was the idea that 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are all “cousins,” and that “one cannot go 
 
137 
against one’s blood.” They felt if the coalition would require them to go against GCC 
policies, they could not join, because this would force them to go against the “will of the 
people.” The UAE saw some loss of military autonomy done for a better or higher cause 
as acceptable, as the benefit of BMD outweigh the negatives, but did see it as possibly 
constraining some flexibility. Oman saw any loss of autonomy as a red-line, while 
acknowledging they could work within a joint C2 structure, without total subordination. 
 North American Themes: The U.S. Defense respondent stated that a coalition 
must have single military chain of command, and that their experience had been that 
many other nations have been willing to cede autonomy of who is in charge; any 
negativity associated with this is generally mitigated through giving equal seats at the 
planning table; in his experience he had seen no real issues with this while working with 
Japan, the ROK or the GCC allies. The U.S. State respondent felt that when in a coalition 
or alliance a state is giving up some autonomy as compared to acting unilaterally, in 
which case the state has more freedom of action; he felt this to be situationally-dependent 
and that the U.S. would weigh the “cost-benefit of how much freedom of action would be 
surrendered to a coalition.” Canada felt that it “would want to maintain its autonomy in 
any arrangement it has, and the balance is trying to find out, in giving the operational 
commanders the authority to do the things they need to.” 
 Causality: There generally seemed to be a split in this IV.  Loss of military 
autonomy, in subordinating a nation’s forces under another nation’s control within a 
collective C2 structure, was seen as acceptable and normal by most states, as long as they 
retained the ability to use “red-cards” or caveats. Loss of political control or even the hint 
that a state may have to give up some political autonomy was seen as either a red-line, or 
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significantly unacceptable by many of the states who discussed the demarcation between 
political and military autonomy; retaining political control was seen as the only reason 
why loss of military autonomy could be acceptable. Six respondents cited “Loss of 
(Political) Autonomy” as the “most important” factor affecting their decision to join; four 
of the six mentioned if they found that they were losing political autonomy after joining, 
this would be a major factor in a decision to leave the coalition as well. As will be 
discussed in subsequent sections, “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” appears as a significant 
factor in the following IVs: “Structures and Authorities,” “Plan Development,” “Posture 
Decisions,” “Offensive Decisions,” and “Consultation Processes.” 
 Hypothesis Support: The narrative data showed a split relationship; although the 
hypothesis was not originally designed this way, the potential loss of political autonomy 
would be a major factor in the decision to join a BMD-using coalition, while loss of 
military autonomy seemed to have little impact. See Figure 4-4.  
 
Figure 4-4. Loss of Autonomy Data 
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Hypothesis 5 (“Structures and Authorities”): As collective BMD command and control 
structures and engagement authorities are made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state 
joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan made the point that if given a substantial say they 
could join a coalition with a country with which they have a close relationship, but, due 
to interpretations of Article 9 of their constitution, “It will not be permitted to defend the 
other country unless the result of armed attack against the country threatens Japan’s 
survival and poses a clear danger.” Diametrically opposite, Australia felt there would be 
little hesitation to join politically, whereas their military may be more measured in their 
approach to join just because, as a state that is just now starting to acquire IAMD 
capabilities of its own, they do not understand BMD C2 and EA as well. 
 European Themes: BMD-equipped European states found this to be important 
both before joining and within the coalition; Germany stated that if they would have no 
say in participating in C2 they would not join because this is effectively related to loss of 
political, as well as military, control; they felt you join a military coalition with a clear 
intent to participate within a specific politically-agreed C2 structure. They also felt that 
engagement authority (EA) is a political decision, but that there is no problem delegating 
it down to lower level military commanders once it is agreed; this follows the general 
military principle of “centralized planning, decentralized execution.”  
France felt there were three elements to the issue: the ability to impact, influence, 
or be in charge of, the coalition C2 structure. Maintaining political autonomy and 
oversight of the coalition structure would remove any real concerns; the nation placed in 
charge cannot be random, but must have the experience, capacity, and technical 
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experience to be in charge of C2. For those countries not in charge, red cards for both 
TBMD and BMD must be retained to ensure political control is maintained; in most cases 
the short time lines associated with missile defense operations mean delegation is 
required, thus ROE must be put in place as an additional means of political oversight. 
The Netherlands seconded the idea that political control dictates ROE, but felt it was less 
important in C2 structures, which are really just implementation of an agreement, and 
that “execution is left to the professionals.” Italy felt having a say in C2 may solidify a 
nation’s role in the coalition because, affectively, a country that feels valued for its 
resource and political contributions is more likely to actively support coalition operations. 
 NATO, viewing this question through the lens of consensus-building and 
consensus maintenance, tied this back to the disparate threat perceptions nations have; in 
this case, closer proximity to the threat means a greater desire for more protection. This 
forced long NATO discussions that ultimately resulted in consensus on the territorial 
defense design and the associated prioritized defended assets/areas list (PDAAL). 
Apparently this was challenging because, “Every single nation has its own methodology 
for prioritizing; it doesn’t always match NATO’s prioritization process.” He also 
highlighted that, “…the prioritization issue is something that has been imported from 
other mission areas, like TBMD, where it is dead easy to conduct prioritization because it 
is part of the military assessment, and the military commander is ready to lose one or the 
other assets, while he would still be in a position to continue his mission although in a 
degraded mode; but that doesn’t really apply to BMD when you protect population and 
territories. I mean is capital city of Country A more important than another one? We are 
not talking about military assets here, we are talking about populations, we are talking 
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about capital cities, we are talking about national interests.” This is an element of 
“Structures and Authorities” because if consensus cannot be gained on what to defend, 
setting up a structure and granting it requisite authorities to do so is more challenging. 
NATO also mentioned that a less-than-perfect and total defensive shield means that the 
structures and authorities must also have oversight of alternative military approaches 
such as pre-launch offensive strike on adversary missiles. 
Amongst the BMD-Supporting European states, the UK felt the key phrase in the 
question was “substantial say”; the amount of C2 a nation should expect to be involved in 
is related to the amount of capabilities brought. Having a “substantial say” in the level of 
protection for very high value assets like aircraft carriers is important, but if a state only 
provides a small number of personnel to the coalition, they do not have as substantial a 
requirement for C2. Turkey brought up similar points, stating there is a difference 
between a “substantial say” and “one country-one vote”; some countries are better able to 
perform C2 than others, but the real crux of the issue is collective decision-making and 
political sovereignty because, as far as C2 structures and authorities are concerned, 
consensus is what is most desired. Romania said this is not an issue within NATO since 
all states already have a say, but it is preferable to have for an ad hoc coalition. 
Amongst the non-BMD European states, there were mixed reactions. Denmark 
felt clearly-defined C2 is a requirement before their Parliament would provide support for 
contributing forces, and that they must have at least a small presence in the C2 
architecture to ensure national rules and caveats are followed. Estonia stated they are a 
small country without much C2, so this issue is not significant in decision-making; even 
without such capability, Estonia still supports NATO BMD C2 and decision-making in 
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Brussels. The Swedish respondent was somewhat taken aback by the question, and had 
assumed all coalition or alliance states have an equal say, but did not have experience in 
this since Sweden is not a member of the NATO Alliance. 
 Gulf Themes: Kuwait saw collective C2 as important for shared situational 
awareness, and sharing experiences and lessons learned from other countries, but felt that 
having no say at all in C2 would be a showstopper; nations must always have the ability 
to say something when they feel they must regarding self-defense and collective self-
defense missions. Kuwait mentioned that having no say is what happened in 2003 when 
Kuwait was weaker in BMD capability and experience, in which they let the U.S. lead the 
entire effort. The UAE felt that this is really less of an issue in terms of joining a 
coalition, but what is more important is to have a collective defense capability, while 
having engagement authority is less important as long as defenses are emplaced properly. 
Oman felt “it would be important,” but did not further amplify its reasoning. 
 North American Themes: From the Americans’ experiences, “Structures” has 
not been much of an issue, since U.S. doctrinal C2 structures (particularly that BMD falls 
under the command of the Joint Functional Air Component Commander (JFACC) within 
a region) have been used, and the allies generally followed the U.S. doctrinal lead; 
fortunately the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) Board in the JFACC 
allows partners equal voices in planning, although acknowledging that whoever chairs the 
JTAMD Board has the final say. Regarding “Authorities,” they felt EA is not an issue for 
regional deployed force defense, since it is a local authority versus ballistic missiles, 
while the JFACC holds EA for aircraft threats. The U.S. generally wants maximum 
control of C2 since they usually provide the most advanced C2 capabilities; because US 
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contributions in C2 are so dominant, in most instances they set terms for others’ 
participation, and again, ceding “Structures and Authorities” to others would be 
conditional on how much freedom of action the U.S. would be willing to forego for 
coalition support. Canada followed the U.K. line of thinking that how much this would 
matter depends on how many contributions Canada provides the coalition. As to Canada 
ceding “Structures and Authorities” to others, “If we were relying on others to defend our 
nation’s interests in that geographical area of operations, I think it would be easier to gain 
agreement from our political masters.” 
 Causality:  Overall, there were only a few respondents who felt this was a 
significant driver in joining the coalition; demographically, these tended to be more 
junior military officers. Most of the more experience political and military respondents 
saw this as a by-product of political control, or “Loss of (Political) Autonomy.” 
“Structures and Authorities” was seen as a significant decision in early agreement and 
standing up of a military coalition, but would not, by itself, be a driver. Those, like some 
of the European states, who saw it as a politically-aligned decision stated that as long as 
each state maintained caveats, or red-cards, actual say in C2 “Structure and Authorities” 
was less important in the decision to join. Several states felt the establishment of C2 
“Structures and Authorities” was something that generally was done after the coalition 
was stood up. Only three respondents felt a clearly defined C2 structure and authorities 
was an advance requirement for government approval of joining. 
 As a separate causal chain, three respondents mentioned they felt “Threat 
Perception” drove “Contribution Requirements” which in turn drove “Structures and 
Authorities.” This would make this IV something that would only appear once other 
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factors had driven a state to join. Only one respondents, U.S. Defense, cited an indirect 
variant of this IV as “most important” in the final question, and he felt “establishment, 
formulation, and maturation of relationships” within the coalition was the most important 
element of coalition formation.  
 Hypothesis Support:  Hypothesis 5 was not supported, with only weak and 
indirect support for this IV as an element of “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” being causal. 
See Figure 4-5 below. 
 
Figure 4-5. Structures and Authorities Data 
 
Hypothesis 6 (“Information Sharing”): As multinational information sharing, 
information disclosure, and shared early warning increase, the likelihood of a state 
joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
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 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan focused their answer on shared early warning 
(SEW), which they feel is essential for BMD, and which the U.S. provides them because 
they have no organic space-based missile warning. Australia looked broader at their 
many existing information sharing relationships such as “Five Eyes” (that includes the 
U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K.) from which to build for coalition 
operations; they feel their broad range of existing information sharing agreements would 
allow most arrangements, but at a minimum, “if not being able to share directly with all 
partners, to be able to share with a particular partner who is then responsible to share 
more widely with all other partners in the coalition.” Their main concern would not be 
strategic information sharing but rather tactical sharing of data between weapon systems 
of different nations, which is something to be resolved within the coalition.  
 European Themes: European state answers encompassed the gamut of sub-
topics, including intelligence sharing, technical information and data exchange, and 
SEW. The BMD-equipped states tended to be more pragmatic; Germany made the point 
that states should always ask for it all, but understand other nations’ disclosure 
restrictions, and that states must also be realistic and clear about what information they 
actually need. One German respondent made mention that information inaccuracy could 
be a potential cause for a state to leave the coalition, especially if “you have the feeling 
that there is wrong information shared among the coalition.” France did not see it as a 
deal-breaker, but highlighted the difference between strategic intelligence, critical to 
common “Threat Perception” development, and operational-level information shared 
within a coalition during operations, such as SEW which the U.S. generally shares with 
most of its partners already. Italy mentioned states must understand the difference 
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between ideal and pragmatic realism in that it is imperative to share as much as possible 
but understand there will always be some “red-tape” on intelligence and information 
sharing, so didn’t see this as a “no-go factor.” Italy added that nondisclosure policies are 
reciprocal in that every country has some things they cannot or just do not wish to share, 
and everyone understands this. 
 NATO saw this as absolutely critical to consensus building because NATO relies 
on national intelligence, and when complete information is unavailable Alliance countries 
are hesitant to take decisions; once information becomes available, decisions are easier to 
achieve. The Netherlands saw this as foundational also, “because BMD is a system-of-
systems mission where, if every part is there and connected, we might be able to set up a 
layered defense which provides the necessary time for politicians to decide on how to 
proceed in a situation, or provide real protection.” This could impact coalition missile 
defense operations, as multi-mission assets such as BMD-capable war ships may get used 
somewhere else if information is not available to use their BMD systems optimally. 
 BMD-supporting states provided a mixed set of answers; the UK stated they are 
historically strong in information acquisition but also work hard to protect national 
information and intelligence assets, so with whom and why you are sharing are important 
disclosure considerations. Collective defense requires sharing, but sensibly, to protect 
national sources; it is not a binary “all shared or all not shared” situation in coalition 
warfare. Romania mirrored NATO’s position that information sharing processes are at 
the core of the alliance, and that decisions can only be made with shared information on 
the threat situation, which leads to reciprocal trust and confidence amongst members. 
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Turkey saw all of these as subsets of BMD C2 structure and operations, and not as 
separate issues that would be considerations for joining a coalition. 
 Amongst the non-BMD Europeans, Denmark did not see this as a driver at all, 
stating, “NATO, for example, isn’t that good at sharing intelligence among Alliance 
members, yet we still have a strong alliance.” Estonia sees information sharing for BMD 
operations as paramount, and felt that countries closer to the potential adversaries 
geographically may have better ability to detect threats for the rest of the coalition. 
Sweden felt overall effectiveness would be impacted without sharing; “So, I don’t think it 
will be a substantial issue, but I think it will be a prerequisite (italics mine) for entering a 
coalition or an alliance to have a say in information sharing,” because coalitions are 
based on trust between partners. 
 Gulf Themes: Generally, the Gulf States all saw this as an integral element 
within an existing coalition more so than a reason to join or not. Kuwait made the very 
pragmatic statement that since they rely on the coalition, why wouldn’t they share with 
others? They acknowledged there are challenges of technical interoperability between 
weapon systems of different states, stating that the desired goal of a Gulf “Common Air 
Picture” is difficult because there are Gulf States the U.S. does not have foreign 
disclosure arrangements with, confirming the view that the U.S. is central to a “hub and 
spokes” information sharing arrangement in the Gulf. (Rose 2015 (2)) The UAE also 
reiterated the reciprocal and necessary nature of coalition information sharing, adding 
that transparency and credibility of the information are quite important to coalition 
sustainment. Oman saw this as important and something they practice with their allies. 
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 North American Themes: The U.S. Defense respondent agreed this is one of 
biggest negotiating points in coalition operations, and that the “art” of information 
sharing is in “how much.” “You know…foreign disclosure, we kind of have our rules, 
but what do you do to make sure that the ally is happy, that he’s getting what he needs, 
but you are not breaking any of the rules?” He felt that, at the end of the day, trust in 
people is more important that trust in technical interoperability. The U.S. State 
representative, taking a more Realist view, said, “I think the U.S. traditionally has put a 
premium on acting with coalitions, whether it is a formal alliance or so-called ‘coalitions 
of the willing.’ And obviously in that situation, as I have said, you cede some freedom of 
action; apart from that actual freedom of action, this would be a case of ceding or sharing 
more information and more of the common operational picture than maybe we would 
otherwise.” Canada felt this would be a significant reason to leave a coalition, especially 
if lives were lost or security interests were threatened and Canada found out important 
information to prevent it wasn’t shared. 
 Causality: Only three respondents felt this was a strong influence on joining, 
while several others mentioned it as indirectly impacting this decision. In both of these 
categories, the text of the narratives indicated that “Information Sharing” was causal in 
joining principally because military intelligence sharing was the critical link in creating a 
common “Threat Perception,” and not that “Information Sharing” by itself was decisive. 
Most saw it as integral and very important to an established coalition, but something that 
could be worked on once a state had joined. Two respondents directly mentioned that 
“bad” information sharing would be a reason for their state to leave a coalition; one felt 
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very strongly on this, while the other felt it was a significant consideration. Only two 
nations mentioned this as their “most important” factor in the final question. 
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 6 was not supported, with only weak and 
indirect support for the military intelligence sharing portion of the IV as feeding into 
“Threat Perception” being indirectly causal. See Figure 4-6 below. 
 
Figure 4-6. Information Sharing Data 
 
Hypothesis 7 (“Plan Development”): As collective defense prioritization, level of 
protection guidance, and defensive plans development is made more inclusive, the 
likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance which uses 
BMD increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan felt strongly about this; “If we have no say in these 
things, we will not join a military coalition or alliance. If we have opportunities 
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institutionally to coordinate about these, we can join it.” Australia split their response into 
military and political answers, stating politically they would want people in place to 
support formulation of these products, but militarily may not have enough skilled people 
to actually do so, although this may change in the next five years. Australia also noted 
they have been learning from watching the Republic of Korea on the need to discuss 
priority of protection with their political establishment; determining prioritization of 
protecting military assets, population centers, and critical infrastructure could shape their 
future planning and acquisition strategies. 
 European Themes: The BMD-equipped states all made a distinction on the 
importance of this between territorial BMD and TBMD of deployed military forces in a 
distant theater. Germany felt prioritization for homeland or territorial defense is a 
national issue; creating a set of prioritization standards that applies to all states equally is 
just not possible. They felt it was more important to have say-so in homeland or territorial 
plans development. France saw this IV as an element of BMD C2 “Structures and 
Authorities,” and that all political control must be integrated during planning. They stated 
that prioritization is critical for TBMD at the tactical level, so that point defense systems 
know what to defend. “I would just add that concerning prioritization is one of the most 
difficult tasks to do in a coalition. Because how do you prioritize the prioritized goals or 
objectives of different nations? So I think from past experience it has proven to be quite 
tough.” France also parsed “Plans Development” into strategic and tactical levels, stating 
that strategically, a coalition or alliance must maintain ambiguity about its priorities in 
territorial BMD, especially with its adversary, but tactically, TBMD prioritization is just 
a task for military planners. Italy felt nations must be realistic and honest enough to know 
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national interests will play into prioritization, but that the ideal for a coalition is to 
harmonize multinational priorities with all national ones; it is more important that 
national interests are not compromised than included, though, in multinational 
prioritization. The Netherlands repeated this split between TBMD and territorial BMD; 
BMD requires prioritization and Level of Protection (LoP) guidance based on strategic 
principles, not individual nations’ constitutional requirements, while the standardized 
NATO process for TBMD defense design planning is well understood. 
 With implementation of the three-phased European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA) for territorial BMD (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, 24), NATO worked 
around the challenge of gaining complete prioritization consensus by looking at current 
available defenses and future BMD increments and compared them to growing 
increments of the Middle Eastern missile threats. They found that the Lisbon Summit 
goal of “Full Coverage and Protection” is difficult to achieve even if all allies contributed 
defenses due to number of threat missiles. “Full coverage and protection” is now better 
understood as a high-level political goal, and not a specified and unachievable LoP. 
NATO better understands they must live with what they can physically protect with 
BMD systems and what they can prioritize within the threatened zone; they also better 
understand that BMD is not the only answer or response to the missile problem but is a 
“niche” capability that can buy NATO political leaders time to initiate full air, land and 
sea military operations. 
 Among BMD-supporting states, the UK also split their answer between TBMD 
and territorial BMD; “So, I think we would be much more interested in having a say in 
defensive prioritization and level of protection guidance if we were talking about civilian 
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personnel and national infrastructure.” They would not seek LoP greater than that of 
partners and allies but would seek adequate protection to be equally established, within 
reason. Romania felt that since no state can have enough BMD to protect itself, it must be 
part of a collective, and thus the decision to join should not be influenced by a 
prioritization planning process. Turkey felt prioritization and plans processes were tied to 
“Threat Perceptions” and were just efforts to address missile threats. 
 Amongst the non-BMD European states, Denmark also split this into two; they 
felt they really had no role in NATO territorial BMD, acknowledging they really aren’t in 
range of threat missiles yet either, but when it came to TBMD for out-of-sector missions, 
they must first ensure Danish units are protected to gain Parliamentary support for the 
operation. Estonia admitted that national self-interest is a primary goal and that their 
population is the first priority, but they want all allies protected equally. Sweden, with 
little experience in coalition matters, assumed “Plan Development” was integral to 
coalition or alliance membership. 
 Gulf Themes: Unlike Europe, the immediate proximity of a major missile-armed 
adversary means the Gulf States do not acknowledge a separation of territorial BMD and 
TBMD; for them the two are the same, and both equate to “homeland defense;” their 
answers consistently reflected this. The importance of this IV varied between the three 
interviewed states, however. For Kuwait, the Defended Asset List (DAL) must address 
national priorities as well as military assets, thus highlighting the overlap of the two 
missions; they mentioned the US may see their deployed offensive strike assets as having 
a higher priority than self-defense, but because Kuwait is small and purely defensive they 
have a different priority, their population. If a coalition tried to impose a different priority 
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that would not include their population, they would find it difficult to join it. The UAE 
understands there may not be enough BMD to cover everything but felt if their high value 
assets were protected then there would be no problem; but if their prioritized DAL was 
not met, then it might not be worth joining. Oman felt as long as such “Plan 
Development” did not either conflict with their strong national policy to de-escalate or to 
defend themselves, or did not raise tension in a crisis unnecessarily it was not an issue. 
 North American Themes: Similar to their answers on “Structures and 
Authorities,” the U.S. saw this as integral to existing C2 processes, reiterating that the 
doctrinal JTAMD Board is used to work out issues of prioritization during planning. 
There may be political issues introduced of which the U.S. was unaware, but normally 
approval is easy because it was worked up the chain. Canada stated this would be a “deal-
breaker” if they found their national interests were not being addressed, and could cause 
them to consider leaving a coalition. 
 Causality: Only two countries, Japan and Kuwait felt if they had no say in Plans 
Development they would not join. Only Canada mentioned this as being a possible reason 
to leave the coalition. The remainder of states either did not see this as an issue impacting 
their decision to join a coalition or alliance, or as something that was part of the inner 
workings of the coalition once established. Of note, having a say in territorial or 
homeland BMD planning was referenced in the narrative as a heavily political element, 
indirectly supporting the “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” IV, whereas TBMD planning 
was essentially seen as a tactical task that was a sub-element or a function of C2 in the 
“Structures and Authorities” IV. No one mentioned this as their “most important” factor. 
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 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 7 was generally unsupported. See Figure 4-7 
below. 
 
Figure 4-7. Plan Development Data 
 
Hypothesis 8 (“Posture Decisions”): As collective decision-making regarding posturing 
of forces (including the military need for deployment versus the political need for 
deterrence and de-escalation) is made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a 
multinational military coalition or alliance which uses BMD increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japanese and Australian answers to this question generally 
paralleled those of the last question. From BMD-owning Japan: “If we have no say in 
these things, especially deployments or movements of our country’s troops, we will not 
join a military coalition or alliance. If we have opportunities institutionally to coordinate 
about these, we can join it.” BMD-supporting Australia felt that, politically, this would be 
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a key element of coalition negotiations, while militarily this would not be a major 
element. Once Australia joined a coalition, their military would provide options regarding 
military force posturing to political leadership as required. 
 European Themes: The answers between the three types of European states did 
not differ significantly on this topic. Amongst the BMD-owning states, Germany felt as 
long as political control was maintained, it was no problem but if the military became too 
free, it could create escalatory problems that could even result in Germany leaving a 
coalition. They acknowledged there is a balancing act between the military desire to 
posture for readiness in peacetime versus the political need to deter or deescalate in crisis, 
which may change over time; both German respondents felt as long as states retained the 
process in which the military provides advice to political decision makers on potentially 
escalatory posturing this would remain manageable. France split this into territorial 
BMD, in which they saw no issue in posturing at all since these are permanent assets 
under NATO political control deployed in peacetime, and TBMD, for which posturing 
assets in NATO Europe could be seen as very sensitive and escalatory; such posturing 
would require discussions on strategic balance vis-à-vis major third parties such as 
Russia. Once a deliberate decision to deploy forces is made, France felt it was no longer 
an issue of de-escalation, and that posturing is part of strategic communication to the 
adversary and will require deliberate and agreed-to messaging. Italy said they are always 
concerned with intended and unintended deterrent and escalatory effects, and 
Parliamentary and media scrutiny is increasing in these matters; if coalition action was 
seen as too escalatory or provocative, it could force Italy out of the coalition.  The 
Netherlands felt “At the end of the day, the (military) instrument stays an instrument of 
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the politicians, so a decision-making role of them in the posture discussion is essential.  
Although from the penultimate level up to the level where it is actually war, that could be 
an operational commander’s decision, but up to the actual deployment of forces and 
getting in on station that should be political-controlled.” 
 NATO stated “we always have that opposition between the political side, who 
really wants to, if not de-escalate, try all the political and diplomatic options not to 
escalate prior to any deployment or the use of the assets.  On the other side, the military 
are always constrained by the time they need to prepare, deploy, and get operational 
wherever they have to be ready to face the threat.” In the past, NATO nations have 
deployed Voluntary National Contributions as bilateral national initiatives rather than 
under a NATO order, such as Operation Active Fence in which PATRIOTs from three 
countries were deployed to protect Turkey from SCUD missiles during the Syrian Civil 
War from January 2013-January 2015. (The Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2018) 
Sometimes forces deploy under existing NATO C2 and at other times, as in Active 
Fence, NATO nations must create separate C2 from the existing NATO BMD C2. 
 European BMD-supporting states echoed many of the statements of the BMD-
owning states. The UK seeks to deter or de-escalate as a preference, using diplomacy first 
before employing military forces, and that they would be vocal if posturing could either 
undermine or contribute to deterrence or de-escalation. Romania seconded this, desiring 
de-escalation first, but if that failed, then employing deterrence that could intentionally 
include deploying forces. Turkey felt, “having the ability to affect posturing of forces, 
and also the opportunity to shape the development of the placement of capabilities are 
major drivers that would affect our participation in a coalition.” 
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 Non-BMD Denmark mentioned their politicians do not generally think about 
deterrence but accept mutuality of risk when joining a coalition; “Because we often don’t 
give caveats to (our) contributions, and because it is a small contribution, we are often 
put in under other nations’ command somewhere, so actually the posture is not always 
decided by us, but we are asked, ‘Will you join us, and in that role, and in that area, and 
in that command structure?’” Estonia felt that differences in threat perception and 
geography across the coalition or alliance impacted collective decision making on 
posturing; states must consider threats from other places than just next door, and work 
toward consensus before deciding on force posturing. Sweden made some insightful 
comments; he felt that coalitions posture forces faster than alliances because coalitions 
are more immediate-threat-focused, whereas an alliance like NATO is a more 
deliberative forum that is looking at a longer time frame than just addressing an 
immediate military threat. In effect, “Threat Perception” drives “Posture Decisions.” In 
Sweden’s view, posturing of forces as an issue for joining a coalition really depends on 
what capabilities the nation brings to coalition. 
 Gulf Themes: The Kuwaiti Parliament has a direct say in the posturing of forces; 
shifting the military’s orientation from Iraq toward Iran after the fall of Saddam Hussein 
was a significant political decision. Internal politics and the popularity of Kuwait’s 
Parliament means the government sometimes looks at Parliamentary concerns before 
those of the threat, and this would be hard for the President to override. However, this 
issue does not have much of an effect on the UAE, which seems well synchronized 
between political and military elements; “…military posture is complementary to the 
diplomatic effort.  If you just keep saying, ‘We could do that, don’t do this,’ without 
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credible power, it will definitely lead you to a failure, but if you have credible power with 
a diplomatic effort, then definitely it will bring about a breakthrough on the diplomatic 
issues.” In keeping with Omani national priority for de-escalation, they felt posturing 
forces would have to be carefully managed. 
 North American Themes: From the U.S. perspective, posturing forces is 
dependent on the types of forces; some are offensive, some are defensive, some are 
military enablers, and all have different effects. Also, forward-based forces are already in 
place and defending, so “posture” really equates to less a visible show of force and more 
about tactical readiness, which for BMD forces only impacts individual LoP at each site. 
In some ways, the need to deploy comes back to the “price of admission” into those 
countries discussed earlier. “In the Middle East, we just never had a real challenge with 
posturing (BMD) forces, since we got there first,” meaning the U.S. had BMD forces 
there before the GCC states began acquiring their own BMD. Like several other IVs, this 
would be context-dependent on how much the U.S. wanted to share decision-making with 
partners for increased coalition support versus the freedom of action inherent in unilateral 
action. Canada felt the coalition must balance deployment for a mission against strategic 
stability with the adversary or major third parties, and thus this is an element of 
deterrence and assurance that are implied core missions for the coalition.  
 Causality: Three states felt this was an important element of coalition decision 
making, but for most narratives, the causal linkage was that the “Loss of (Political) 
Autonomy” or political control over potentially escalatory posturing decisions was really 
the issue at hand. Two states mentioned that such loss of political control over escalatory 
posturing decisions could result in their nation choosing to leave a coalition or alliance. 
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Also, “Threat Perception” was seen by several respondents as causal of “Posture 
Decisions.” Only one nation mentioned this as one of their two “most important” 
considerations in the final question. 
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 8 was generally not supported; its weak support 
in positive responses is more indicative of this as an element of “Loss of (Political) 
Autonomy” than an independent driver of joining a coalition. See Figure 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-8. Posture Decisions Data 
 
Hypothesis 9 (“Offensive Decisions”): As collective decision-making regarding the 
timing of, triggers for, authorities required for, and legitimacy of, offensive operations is 
made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD increases. 
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 Asia-Pacific Themes: Again in this IV, Japan and Australia were on opposite 
sides. Japan felt this was less important; as a nation which is constitutionally limited from 
offensive operations outside its own territory, it must rely on allies to do so. Since it 
therefore cannot contribute, it did not see having a say in this as a fair requirement. 
Australia, on the other hand, feels it is very important to retain the ability to influence 
offensive timing, to determine what offensive strikes are used, and to determine impacts 
on escalation or de-escalation of a conflict, at a high political level. Because of the legal 
consequences for the use of force, this would likely be driven to a central Government 
level, as “Australia does not necessarily sign up to an approach of preemption.” 
 European Themes: Two BMD-equipped states, Germany and Italy, felt this issue 
was both important in their decision to join, but specified that it also may be a reason to 
leave a coalition, or at least reduce their support if mismanaged. Like Japan, Germany 
has a self-imposed national policy which precludes offensive strikes outside those 
necessary for self-defense; although this is not a legal constraint, it does mean Germany 
will retain “red-cards” for the coalition use of their offensive forces, and would likely not 
support preemptive strikes. Italy also has “…a very, very close Parliamentary scrutiny 
that has in the past years really been developing because of our constitutional concept, 
which does not, of course, forbid the use of force, but it caveats the use of force within 
the certain well-defined international law legitimacy.” Italy felt that having no say means 
there is no sense in belonging to such a coalition because their government would suffer 
the negative international backlash without a chance to steer the action, and would pay 
the consequences both internally and externally; they felt this could be potentially 
destabilizing to the Italian government. France took a more pragmatic view of this, 
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dividing their answer between the phases of peacetime, crisis, and war; there is no 
offensive strike allowed beyond self-defense in peacetime, and in wartime it is a part of 
operational plans. They felt that the crisis period was the “gray zone,” and offensive 
initiation would have to be case-by-case based on intelligence sharing and the perceived 
imminence of the threat; it would never be an automatic decision for France. The 
Netherlands felt political control should define military triggers, those which are 
automatic versus those requiring further political consultation; just as in BMD, it is up to 
collective political control to allow delegation of offensive authority to those who will 
execute it. He cited the example of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander-Europe 
(SACEUR), who today has some “automatic” military actions that he can initiate on his 
own, but for anything more he must go back to the North Atlantic Council. 
 NATO felt that this “is a difficult nut to crack, mainly because of the legal 
interpretation of the 28 allies. Clearly, if there is one underlining concern for the allies, 
(it) is they want a legitimate framework to act. The other main driver that can cause 
lengthy, endless, and very difficult discussions is how would it be perceived to go 
(offensive) first, and 28 allies have different views on anticipatory self-defense; some 
don’t even have those words in their own dictionaries, some others do and they are 
actually highlighted yellow.” NATO stated discussion of anticipatory self-defense is an 
extremely touchy subject within the Alliance. 
 Amongst the BMD-supporting states, the UK mentioned that, without BMD of 
their own, they tend to bring more offensive forces to the coalition or alliance, so they are 
very attuned to this issue historically. Although offense is not necessarily a last resort in 
their view, the UK needs to be involved in discussions because military force must be 
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underpinned by political messaging. “So, I think we would be disheartened if this sort of 
operation happened without consultation…I can’t honestly see us being in a coalition 
with any of our closest allies in particular where we feel this would happen without us 
being involved.” Romania saw this as more internal; when joining the alliance a nation 
must make commitments to support politically-approved offense. Turkey said this is “one 
of the important benefits of becoming a member of the coalition, because this plays 
directly plays into decision shaping and decision making, and it also increases the 
legitimacy of our actions, and also it increases the strategic weight from our perspective.”   
 The non-BMD states continued this theme. Denmark stated that in NATO, 
discussions of offensive timing and triggers means the Alliance is going to war, but in a 
less formal coalition, caveats would likely be levied to control the use of Danish 
offensive force, because BMD-supporting offensive operations against a major state actor 
could trigger a chain reaction in the region; being very clear politically about the purpose 
of offense is significant. Estonia felt the initiation of offense must have strong legal basis 
and that they joined NATO, as a “trust-based organization,” because they do things 
legally; they would have to trust in their allies not to block an Article V declaration (“an 
attack on one is an attack on all”) should it arise. Sweden felt “it’s not an issue for joining 
a coalition or alliance, but it is more when you are in a coalition or alliance, and then it is 
threat-perception-driven, because you can do a lot, and the most surprising things, as long 
as the threat is high enough.” They felt a coalition facing an imminent threat might be 
more likely to accept risk in international views of legitimacy for offensive operations. 
 Gulf Themes: Both Kuwait and the UAE saw this as an internal coalition 
decision issue but not necessarily a driver for joining. Kuwait discussed how in 2003 they 
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were not part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, yet they allowed offensive 
operations from their territory; there is a difference between the U.S. using Kuwaiti land 
and Kuwait actively conducting unconstitutional offensive operations outside of 
immediate defense of their territory, and those once they are invaded, which their 
constitution does allow. The UAE felt a state can always join a coalition whether the 
joining state “goes offensive or not.” Once within a coalition, any state can reject specific 
actions as illegal, so coalition flexibility is more of an issue from their perspective. Even 
if a state was unable or unwilling to conduct offensive strikes itself, it can contribute 
supporting “enablers” for offense, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
or search and rescue, rather than offensive strike itself. Oman’s non-offensive national 
policy means political control would be paramount; “It would have to be a major event 
where very exhaustive diplomacy had failed, that would trigger us to do so.” 
 North American Themes: Both the U.S. and Canada saw this as principally 
germane to already established coalitions. The U.S. admitted their allies do not always 
get a say in this, and because the US doesn’t limit itself from preemptive strikes, allies 
always want to be informed; due to operational security, the U.S. does not always do such 
a good job doing so. The U.S. did not see this as an issue for joining as much as a 
subsequent request from partners and allies to “Inform us as much as you can.” This is 
because allies may suffer political consequences of U.S. strikes and should know about it. 
Although the U.S. is generally dominant in defining offensive timing and triggers, they 
may be willing to share consultations but not necessarily the decision to initiate offense in 
all cases. Canada felt member states must understand and agree to coalition objectives on 
offensive timing or triggers, so saw this as an established coalition-internal issue. 
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 Causality: The respondents were split with roughly 40% seeing this as either not 
causal, or as an established coalition-internal issue. Many saw it as a decisional sub-
element of C2 within “Structures and Authorities.” Roughly 60% inferred in their 
narratives that this was directly related to “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” as a significant 
political decision. Two states said that “no say” in offensive decisions would, again, be 
an element of “Loss of (Political) Autonomy,” and thus a potential reason to leave a 
coalition. In the final question, three respondents saw this as the “most important” 
element. 
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 9 was not supported as independently causal, 
when considering the majority of respondent rationales for its importance considered it a 
subordinate element of “Loss of (Political) Autonomy.” See Figure 4-9 below. 
 
Figure 4-9. Offensive Decisions Data 
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The External Third Party-Centric IVs Detailed: We round this section off with the 
two remaining IVs that are mainly focused externally on third parties: 
Hypothesis 10 (“Consultation Processes”): As collective consultation processes and 
engagement with third parties (including strategic communication and declaratory 
policy) are made more inclusive, the likelihood of a state joining a multinational military 
coalition or alliance that uses BMD increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Somewhat at odds again across the region, Japan saw this 
as necessary for an established coalition to conduct combined strategic communication 
with third parties or adversaries, but not for coalition formation. Australia, on the other 
hand saw that, “Government would engage to some degree with that, supported by senior 
military personnel, but it would literally have to be the starting point for coalition 
formulation (italics mine) before looking at any of the other things we have discussed.” 
 European Themes: Like the split in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans also saw this as 
either a critical issue for joining a coalition, or something that was only internal to an 
extant coalition; there was very little variation between these two from European 
respondents. Only Italy, Turkey and Sweden felt it was not a factor, although all agreed it 
was something to be desired. Italy stated that states may bring special bilateral experience 
or consultation contacts with third parties or adversaries that could be useful for the 
benefit of a coalition. 
 Amongst European BMD-states, Germany saw this as “mandatory,” while the 
Netherlands felt it was important to be able to steer second- and third-order effects 
collectively, and “having a say in that collective consultation process and engagement 
with third states and the strategic communication is, for me, an essential part in the 
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political control.” France had the most to say on this topic; it would matter to them if 
such an arrangement would preclude an already existing consultation forum of which 
France was part. It is important in peacetime to dialogue with adversaries and allies to 
share experiences and de-escalate tensions, and consultation is important in crisis to 
deconflict messaging and have pre-established contacts to speed up dialogue during 
conflict, and communicate missile or airspace-related issues in order to maintain stability; 
for example, “…let’s say a missile is crossing the sky, the airspace of a hostile country, 
but it is not intended to be directed at this country, it is important to be able to 
communicate that, even though the country in itself won’t take this message into 
consideration or whatever, but the fact that it can be said to de-conflict is an important 
diplomatic element, to protect this stability and de jure peace.” There is a specified task 
agreed within NATO to engage with Russia about their concerns with NATO BMD, 
despite how difficult it may be. Lastly, consultations with neighboring third party states 
are important for tactical de-confliction of airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, 
arranging basing rights, and so on. 
 NATO sees this as a normal process internal to the Alliance, but did discuss 
issues with the collective SC process. “The global alliance messaging is not something 
that is really difficult, because we manage to get a strategic communication policy out, 
we sometimes have issues with the exact wording; some nations are more proactive while 
some others show a little bit more restraint. They fear an unexpected reaction; they fear it 
will be translated in the wrong way. We haven’t been that good in trying to understand 
how our communication is translated on the other side. We don’t have that many 
problems when it comes to national declaratory policy, because it is usually done within 
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the framework of NATO, or at least it is, if not completely aligned with, at least it goes in 
the same direction.”   
 Amongst BMD-supporting European states, similar “either-or” trends were seen 
regarding consultation. From the UK: “In short, we would be very keen to ensure that a 
coalition put together to undertake a particular operation or a particular task, that that 
coalition’s task did not spill over and unnecessarily escalate tensions or cause distrust 
elsewhere, so I think we would seek to be absolutely at the heart of any collective 
consultation processes there.” They also stated there are two elements to collective 
consultation processes: development of the collective narrative to ensure synchronized 
messaging along with actions that support it, and determining who the right interlocutors 
with third parties or adversaries might be to deliver the messages. Romania saw 
coordinated strategic communication as important for established coalitions to de-
escalate crises. Turkey agreed, but did not see it as a driver in joining a BMD coalition; 
“If we are a part of the coalition, then our immediate focus will be on the dynamics 
within the coalition itself; how it functions and how effective it is. Engagement with third 
parties is important, but is not a major element from our perspective. Having an ability to 
engage third parties will not be a major driver for Turkey.” 
 The non-BMD European states principally saw this as an established collective 
issue. Denmark felt that within NATO it is already incorporated but that they should ask 
when entering into a coalition because a BMD coalition is politically sensitive. “But, I 
guess we will again be a little player so it would be others that will run it, but we will 
‘approve’ the setting we will go into.” Estonia saw collective SC as key to deterrence for 
the alliance, and in that regard the message of 28 other nations is more powerful than that 
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of Estonia alone. As a non-NATO state, Sweden was the outlier of the group; “This is 
probably less important, I think, because, as a small country, we have access to different 
layers than the other coalition or alliance members. Of course, we would like to have a 
say in ‘Strat-Comm’ and consultations, but there are other layers like P3 and all these 
different consultation formats. So, I’m not really sure that this affects so much.”   
 Gulf Themes: The three Gulf respondents agreed this is an important element for 
established collectives. The UAE stated: “We do need to synchronize the strategic 
message to our interests and also to our objectives as individuals and a collective, but I do 
not know how much it will be affecting us (in joining). I think it is a bargain point, also, it 
is some sort of… having a common picture, seeing the common picture. If we are able to 
see the same issues, the same problems, then we might have almost the same course of 
action. Probably a different approach, but the end game would be the same.” With their 
long-standing stated political objective of peace, Oman felt, “This is definitely a very 
important and wise approach to de-escalation and avoiding conflict.” 
 North American Themes: The American respondents saw this from the 
perspective of the U.S. building a coalition that others would join. The Defense expert 
felt a collective consultation process within and between the militaries of a coalition is 
“easy,” but that much of the elements of this IV were purely political issues outside 
military decision making lanes, but for which the military must be sensitive. This may 
require the military to assume some risk at the direction of collective political leadership, 
while trying not to put the overall mission itself at risk. Canada felt this was situationally 
dependent and not an independent driver; “Now, with respect to third parties, it would 
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depend on what our interests are with those third parties, and really that will be the 
discriminator between consultations that affect them versus the potential adversary.” 
 Causality: Only Australia and four NATO BMD-states felt this was causal in the 
decision to join, while the majority of the remainder saw this as an internal issue for an 
established coalition or alliance. Several respondents mentioned this as an element of 
political control of the coalition, inferring linkage to “Loss of (Political) Autonomy.” As 
discussed in the “Offensive Decisions” section, there is linkage of the two IVs, as 
“Consultation Processes” would be the vehicle to message intent to adversaries or third 
parties of the collective need for offensive strikes. No one saw this as “most important.” 
 Hypothesis Support: Although deemed an important coalition-internal 
requirement, Hypothesis 10 was not supported. See Figure 4-10 below. 
 
Figure 4-10. Consultation Processes Data 
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Hypothesis 11 (“COE Planning”): As collective planning for Consequences of 
Engagement (COE) (including civil warning, consequence management and liability for 
damages from successful or unsuccessful missile defense intercepts) increases, the 
likelihood of a state joining a multinational military coalition or alliance that uses BMD 
increases. 
 Asia-Pacific Themes: Both Japan and Australia saw this as an issue internal to an 
existing coalition, and not something which would affect joining one. Japan felt sharing 
COE planning is important as a military planning consideration and because allies share 
liabilities with third parties. Australia felt COE is not well understood by their political or 
military leadership because they lack active defense capabilities of their own, so would 
not be an issue; within a coalition COE should be managed by those with BMD 
capabilities unless there is a “direct second-order effect which would cause us to 
potentially want to veto a shot opportunity for whatever reason that might be.” 
 European Themes: Continuing the European views which split territorial BMD 
from deployed military force TBMD, many European states split this into national-level 
civil defense (CD) and consequence management (CM) for their nation versus the more 
tactical military passive defense (PD) and COE associated with deployed force TBMD, 
such as interceptor debris mitigation and liability. In general, they all saw this as an 
existing-alliance issue. As would be expected, the BMD-states had thought more on this 
issue than others. Germany and the Netherlands both felt civil warning is a sovereign 
national responsibility from which the military must provide the warning and 
information, and that CM and liability are legal issues. If there are no technical means or 
tools available to conduct COE planning, and debris damage cannot be mitigated through 
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predictive planning, then CM must be planned to clean up and repair civil and 
infrastructure damage. France felt that, from a diplomatic standpoint, COE information 
must be shared to inform, deconflict and communicate; civil defense and passive defense 
is important to every country, including third parties who may be affected. The 
Netherlands seconded this. Militarily, France felt PD of military forces is just part of 
military planning and is a tactical issue, while PD for territorial BMD is more of a 
strategic issue; coalition states must balance warning populace for protection with the 
possibility of creating damaging public panic, and this balance is only possible by 
national leaders on the basis of accuracy of data received. The most important data for 
civil PD is early warning, assessments of inbound missiles, time to impact, and precision 
of the assessment of the area under attack; the more accurate this information, the smaller 
area and less people who must be warned to take action, and hence the less panic. For this 
reason, France feels getting PD data in NATO battle management, command, control, 
communications and intelligence (BMC3I) systems is important to assist alliance 
members with national CD and CM policies. Italy felt COE planning is militarily 
important but politically unimportant due to a lack of awareness by political leaders. 
 NATO has “been working pretty hard on that; Consequence of Engagement, 
Consequences of Intercept, Consequence of Non-Intercept, and also Consequence of 
Non-engagement; we have an additional acronym in NATO because we see those two 
things as different: Consequence of Non-Intercept, and Consequence of Non-
engagement. At this stage, it remains somehow a blur because we never went into a 
situation where we would have to discuss that.  Nothing ever flew, and NATO never had 
to launch a missile or decide if we would or would not launch one.” This work has been 
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done because many allies are concerned about COE based on densely-populated 
European geography; some non-NATO states are surrounded by NATO states, which 
complicates this and will drive third party consultations. NATO needs to work on a tool 
to provide better COE info, “but most of the procedures have been discussed, and most of 
the ways the Alliance would reach out to those nations have been discussed, to include 
even non-European nations.” NATO has already conducted a number of meetings 
engaging western European and Levant nations on possible COE issues. 
 Of the BMD-supporting states, the U.K. has directed their Missile Defence Centre 
to study upper-tier BMD COE planning and predictive technologies and is possibly one 
of the most advanced in thinking about this within NATO. The U.K. sees COE as part of 
collective strategic dialogue with third parties, although nations should take a strictly 
legalistic view of liability; the U.K. is more concerned about COE undermining alliance 
strategic messaging than actual damages. If the coalition lacked COE planning, “I think 
we would absolutely be one of the ones at the forefront if there was no collective 
planning for COE, we would be seeking to ensure that was rectified and that was. But I 
think as well we would be bringing a sense of rationalism and realism about these things, 
and not necessarily viewing COE is therefore something that prevents employment of 
(BMD) systems…” Small amounts of debris in huge areas must be assessed scientifically 
and practically: “It’s very easy on diagrams to draw a big swathe of territory and say 
‘Well, stuff could come down here.’ Well, stuff might, but it could be three pieces of 
metal that could land anywhere in that, and that doesn’t mean that entire swathe of 
territory is going to be completely obliterated.” Romania felt COE planning is a national 
responsibility done within the collective planning process. Turkey stated that COE and 
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COI are little-researched areas, but that, at the end of the day, “Intercepting an incoming 
missile is better than doing nothing, so I would say those are not major elements from our 
perspective, especially given our geography on this issue—proximity matters.” 
 Amongst the non-BMD European states, Denmark felt COE planning is a given 
as part of BMD mission and planning, “so I think an absence would actually mean we 
won’t join, or at least we will ask for it to be planned. In NATO-wise, it is a part of the 
NATO BMD package, so at the military level it would be a natural thing to follow if you 
are asked to contribute, to ask ‘Why is COE not reflected in the plans?’ To me, it is a 
natural part of the BMD ‘what-do-I-have-to-do list’.” It is a consideration even if there is 
nothing that can be done about it. Estonia agreed with Turkey that we must always 
intercept regardless of the consequences; “The basic point is that the threat coming from 
a successful impact of an adversary missile is by far bigger than any consequence of 
successful interception, unless we know very clearly that the consequences of intercept 
will be very grave or harmful, but that clarity is rarely the case.” They felt COE planning 
is good for preparedness and crisis management, especially chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear (CBRN) risks, and that it is even easier to do within the Alliance. 
Ultimately, “we can say when we do collective ballistic missile defense planning we have 
to do collective consequence planning.” Sweden agreed with this last point; “I think that 
when you join the alliance or coalition that you assume that there is planning for all these 
things. I think the absence of collective planning (for COE) would not be a no-go.” 
 Gulf Themes: Kuwait saw COE planning as a very desirable capability if offered 
by a coalition. Within their nation, the civil crisis management or CD people would look 
at COE differently than the military; “But as the military, I don’t think that is gonna 
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affect, because as a small country we can still manage the civil defense, we can still 
manage the capacities of the gap.” Historically, Kuwait’s population has not been 
targeted, because their adversaries wanted to co-opt the population in order to support the 
adversary. The UAE felt this issue is more politically- than militarily-driven, but it 
wouldn’t impact their desire for collective defense, while Oman was noncommittal on 
this issue. 
 North American Themes: Militarily, the U.S. felt COE has always been a part of 
tactical planning, especially predicting where interceptor rocket booster stages fall. The 
U.S. Defense respondent served in Israel as a PATRIOT commander during Operation 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91, and he said, “My experience in Israel during 
Desert Storm was that they didn’t care…They wanted you to just gun down everything 
that was coming. Tel Aviv was a big city; at that time PAC-2 was just designed to 
deflect, it was not hit-to-kill, so if a missile was coming in on a defended asset, and 
PATRIOT went out there and shot it, and knocked it off that defended asset, but it still 
landed somewhere else in a 40 kilometer by 40 kilometer city of Tel Aviv, the Israelis 
were okay with that. They didn’t make that public a lot.” Later media claims of the 
inefficiency of PATRIOT were incorrect if one looked at the high percentage of the DAL 
actually protected.  The U.S. State respondent felt the U.S. generally wants to de-
emphasize COE, seeing it as an unnecessary impediment to decision making, and should 
remove it as a means of a veto for desired or necessary collective BMD action. Canada 
split their answer between situationally-dependent coalition TBMD and homeland 
defense. Because of the Prime Minister Martin’s 2005 policy to remain outside of U.S. 
homeland BMD, that remains in effect today (Lang & Dallaire 2014, 4), and the 
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confusion this creates in NORAD, which is responsible for the IAMD of North America, 
the respondent felt education and understanding of COE issues could be important in a 
future Canadian decision to become involved with U.S. BMD bilaterally. 
 Causality: Almost half of the respondents saw “COE Planning” as an element 
that is important only within an established coalition or alliance, and then, it was seen by 
several as a sub-element of the “Plan Development” IV, as a part of prudent military 
planning. Only four saw it as indirectly influencing their decision to join, again, 
principally as a sub-set of territorial or homeland defense “Plan Development.” Several 
mentioned its importance in supporting political “Consultation Processes.” Over a third 
saw it as having no impact whatsoever on their decision to join.  
 Hypothesis Support: Hypothesis 11 was not supported. See Figure 4-11. 
 
Figure 4-11. COE Planning Data 
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A Note on Hypothesis Support Assessments: Readers may note that I have included pie 
charts depicting my assessments of respondent narratives; these are simplified in six 
different gradients for ease of portrayal. It is logical to assume that “strongly influences 
joining” and, to a lesser degree, “indirectly influences joining” responses would indicate 
a positive relationship to the DV, and hence would support the hypotheses, whereas the 
remaining four categories do not. In a general sense, this is true. 
 However, I did not use these “votes” as the direct metric for whether a hypothesis 
was supported or not, e.g., a certain number of “votes” meant the hypothesis was 
supported, while below a certain number meant it was not. As an excursion, I applied a 
weighting schema to these “votes” in which a “strongly influences joining” received three 
points, an “indirectly influences joining” response received one point, and the remainder 
received none. The results are depicted below in Table 4-12: 
 
Figure 4-12. “Influences Joining” Excursion Table 
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 While there is temptation to use a numerical cutoff as justification for and 
assessment of hypothesis support, the reality is that the narratives only justified two 
hypotheses as independently strong enough for support (H1 and the modified H4). 
Interestingly enough, these two hypotheses scored highest on the table above.   
Although H5, H7, H8, H9, and H10 all included “votes” for “strongly influences 
joining,” the narrative rationales for these showed a subordinate relationship of these IVs 
to H4 (“Loss of (Political) Autonomy.”) In other words, the reason why the respondents 
felt this issue would strongly influence their decision is because they impacted on their 
political autonomy.  H6 also included a few “strongly influences joining” responses, but, 
again, the rationales indicated that this element was a supporting element to H1 (“Threat 
Perception.”) Without the shared intelligence made possible through information sharing 
practices, a common threat perception was not possible. 
  
Other Issues: During the interview, respondents were asked “Are there any other BMD-
related policy considerations we have not discussed that would weigh significantly in the 
decision by your state to join a military coalition or alliance which considers BMD a 
core mission? If so, why do you consider it or them significant?”  
 The following highlights some of these issues. Of the considerations raised by the 
respondents, none were distinctly unique; as will be shown, all can be seen as elements, 
variants or combinations of the existing IVs. None of them were presented as 
independently causal in the decision to join, despite how the question was phrased; most 
were just nuanced or nationally-specific variants derived from the theorized IV set. 
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 Asia-Pacific Themes: Japan mentioned the challenges which arise from their 
domestic legal restrictions under interpretations of Article 9 of their constitution, which 
make domestic consensus on collective self-defense challenging; this is a variant of “Loss 
of (Political) Autonomy.” Australia is growing more focused on developing a broader 
integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) portfolio than on BMD, and see BMD as just a 
part of IAMD; Australia is interested in developing an ability to make IAMD 
contributions to future coalitions rather than just provide support for BMD. They feel 
IAMD means a broader ability to support other partners with “synergy” missions such as 
cruise missile defense, air defense, or offensive strike capabilities for a military task force 
that is also conducting BMD. This is an element of “Contribution Requirements.” 
 European Themes: In a variant of “Threat Perception” and “Structures and 
Authorities,” France felt that a collective and agreed definition of the threat, one that was 
not enforced by one state, and a coalition political framework agreement that includes 
C2, threat definition, rules for consultations and collective action, etc., are both must-
haves. Both France and the Netherlands felt cost of acquisition of active defenses is a 
significant issue; BMD technology is expensive, and BMD is just a part of a greater mix 
of military capabilities, so economic cost must be factored into any collective BMD 
action. The Netherlands stated that there are possibly some smarter ways of reducing cost 
by sharing pooled resources such as ammunition, maintenance costs, and so on that 
could, “make creating contributions easier than the current acquisition process we do 
with the rest of the materiel.” These cost issues are extensions of “Contribution 
Requirements.” Italy focused on international legitimacy for collective action as a major 
issue. NATO discussed how Alliance documents and policies will have to continue to 
 
179 
evolve as new threat and friendly defensive capabilities emerge; because of these, he felt 
the “Full Coverage and Protection” agreement will have to change and more realistic 
expectations will have to be agreed-to by Alliance members; this is a variation of both 
“Plan Development” and “Structures and Authorities.” 
 The U.K. respondent felt education of Parliament, as the representatives of the 
people, is an important issue; the majority of the U.K. doesn’t think about missile threats, 
so it will become a Governmental responsibility to educate people as the missile threat 
continues to grow. This is an interesting domestic combination of “Threat Perception,” 
and “Consultation Processes.” Turkey made the point that as states begin developing their 
own active defense capabilities, they require coalition support for capability 
development, technical information sharing for interoperability of systems, and solidarity 
of political support by other members. (Author note: this was an interesting political point 
brought up at a time when the U.S. and other NATO states were putting pressure on 
Turkey to acquire BMD systems made by Alliance members, such as PATRIOT, rather 
than buy Russian systems such as the S-400. This is an example of external influences on 
national deliberations of “Contribution Requirements.”) 
 Estonia felt that understanding how BMD contributes to a broader deterrence 
framework against potential adversaries was important for them, which is a combination 
of “Consultation Processes” and “Threat Perception.” Sweden had just completed a 
national security review, and while looking at how they can contribute to a coalition, they 
found that security interests vary globally, and political shifts by other partners can affect 
many of the BMD variables we discussed.  They are trying, as an extension of “Plan 
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Development,” to better understand how prioritization of collective resources by larger 
members may detract from Sweden’s individual national stakes. 
 Gulf Themes: Kuwait brought up a variant of “Contribution Requirements,” that 
would ask, “What type of coalition is it?” Would the coalition be “contributory” to 
Kuwait’s defense or “predatory,” in that it would only take from Kuwait? The main 
question is, “What does the coalition provide us versus require from us?” Like France 
and the Netherlands, the UAE raised economic cost also, stating the cost of having a 
capable offensive capability may be cheaper than the cost of BMD; this is a combination 
of “Contribution Requirements” and “Offensive Decisions.” Oman felt a coalition must 
make sure there is no ‘presumption of escalation’ inherent in their thinking, and that a 
coalition must strive to de-escalate a crisis through effective strategic communication; 
this is a combination of “Consultation Processes” and “Threat Perception.” 
 North American Themes: The U.S. Defense respondent discussed a variant of 
the earlier “Loss of (Military) Autonomy” and “Structures and Authorities” discussions, 
and felt it will be interesting to see what happens in traditionally US-centric C2 situations 
when national control switches over to another nation, such as discussed regarding 
transfer of Combined Forces Command from the U.S. to the Republic of Korea. (Lubold 
& Cheng 2017) “So, the policy consideration for us to think about is: so what happens if 
one day it’s a four-star allied guy who’s now in charge? Because then it wouldn’t just be 
BMD but it would also be offensive counter air and other air assets too.” The U.S. State 
respondent felt it important to look at the effectiveness of BMD in a regional conflict vis-
a-vis major actors like Russia or China, as an extension of “Contribution Requirements,” 
and possibly “Security Dilemma.” Canada felt C2 of the defense of North America is 
 
181 
something they need to look at; what would participating with the U.S. on homeland 
defense really mean for Canada? This comes back to “Structures and Authorities.” 
 
Most Important: The final question asked was, “Which of the BMD-related policy topics 
we have discussed do you think is most important and why?”  
 Outside of Europe, the small number of nations in the other three regions resulted 
in no patterns regionally. The Asia-Pacific, with two states, had two different answers 
(“Threat Perception” and “Contribution Requirements.”)  The Gulf, with three states, had 
three different answers (“Loss of (Political) Autonomy,” “Information Sharing,” and 
“Offensive Decisions.”) North America, with two countries but three respondents, 
resulted in three different answers (“Structures and Authorities,” “Contribution 
Requirements,” and “Threat Perception.”) 
 Only in Europe, with 14 respondents (two of which provided two answers for a 
total of 16), did I observe any patterns; unfortunately, no patterns were observed between 
BMD-owning, BMD-supporting, or non-BMD states. There were five votes for “Loss of 
(Political) Autonomy,” three for “Threat Perception,” two for “Offensive Decisions,” and 
one each for “Offensive Decisions,” “Contribution Requirements,” “Information 
Sharing,” and “Posture Decisions.” Two European answers were categorized as “Other,” 
since they did not neatly aggregate with any IV; Sweden answered, “Well, it’s the 
assumption that if you enter a coalition or alliance, you assume you are an equal partner 
in everything.” Estonia felt, “Doing things collectively; that sends a strong message to 
any potential adversary. If you lack the resources, doing things collectively is the only 
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practical way forward to achieve a certain capability; so to do such a capability 
collectively, that is the key from our perspective.” The data are shown in Figure 4-13. 
 
Figure 4-13. “Most Important Factor” Data 
 
The Final Causal Model, Revealed: 
 As a visual reminder to readers, we began the study using the following theory 
model, described in Chapter 3, repeated below as Figure 4-14: 
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Figure 4-14. Original Theory Model 
 What I discovered, as discussed in the sections above, is that there really were not 
eleven BMD-related policy variables that might influence whether a nation would join a 
coalition or alliance which uses BMD. Ultimately, there were two major factors that 
seemed to do so, but which had important linkages to seven other variables in the pre-
coalition-formation stage. Four of the original IVs were seen as actually more significant 
once a coalition was formed, while five more were sub-sets of one of these four. Lastly, 
five of the original IVs, if mishandled, were cause for a state to leave an established 
coalition; two of these five are really sub-sets of a larger one. All of these are depicted in 
my final causal model shown in Figure 4-15, below: 
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Figure 4-15. Causal Model 
 The model is read chronologically from left to right, with the purple box 
representing the pre-coalition-formation stage in which my original DV, “the Decision to 
Join a Coalition or Alliance which uses BMD” is captured. The middle green box 
represents an established coalition or alliance that uses BMD, while the dark red box on 
the right represents the factors which may result in a decision by a state to leave a BMD-
using coalition or alliance. 
 Starting with the “Decision to Join Coalition” box, the “Information Sharing” IV 
itself is insufficient to cause a state to join; but one element of it, shared intelligence, is a 
critical piece in developing the “Threat Perception,” whether that of an individual state, 
or the collective threat perception of multiple states. “Threat Perception” itself was 
observed as one of the two major factors in the decision to join. Without a threat, there is 
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no need to establish a short-term military coalition or long-term military alliance. One 
spin-off of “Threat Perception” was the IV “Security Dilemma,” which is, in effect, the 
reaction of the adversary or other third parties to the actions taken by the state or coalition 
based on their “Threat Perception.” “Security Dilemma” was not seen as either causal of 
joining or even impactful, but most respondents agreed that the reactions of an adversary 
or major third party like Russia or China must be taken into consideration; most felt this 
would generally be done by an established coalition or alliance via political “Consultation 
Processes,” to ensure the intent of coalition action was clearly understood by outsiders. 
 The six IVs in the bottom half of the “Decision to Join Coalition” box are also 
related. As discussed earlier, the original “Loss of Autonomy” IV was seen by the 
majority of respondents as really two elements; only “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” was 
significant in the decision to join. “Loss of (Military) Autonomy” was not, and will be 
discussed shortly. Where the five IVs below it on the model were discussed as impacting 
the decision to join, it was generally within the context of how each was an element of 
“Loss of (Political) Autonomy.” “Consultation Processes” are viewed as the sovereign 
right of the political leadership of a nation; should the coalition or alliance mandate non-
unilateral consultation, many states would see this as a loss of political autonomy.  
Within “Structures and Authorities” several states mentioned that maintaining political 
control over their forces would be done by retaining “red cards” or caveats on their use; if 
this loss of political control happened, they would not be comfortable joining a coalition. 
Within “Plan Development” most states felt that if they lost political control over the 
planning and defense prioritization that would account for territorial or homeland BMD, 
they would, again, be uncomfortable joining the coalition; this was in contrast to TBMD 
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planning to protect deployed forces, which was seen as a coalition military concern only. 
Loss of political control over elements of “Posture Decisions” and “Offensive 
Decisions,” both seen as potentially politically and militarily escalatory, was also 
mentioned by some as a potential reason to not join, but again, within the context of 
“Loss of (Political) Autonomy.” 
 In short, “Threat Perception” was the main, positive driver in coalition joining, 
while “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” (or “Control”) was the single significant detractor 
that would cause a state not to join. Both of these two major IVs linked to several IVs in 
the next phase of the model. 
 In the central green “In Established Coalition” box are numerous, related factors 
which are seen as mainly only relevant between members of an established and active 
coalition. “Threat Perception” was shown to be the principal driver behind five IVs. 
Nations felt that “Contribution Requirements” would be dictated by the threat; nations 
would provide forces necessary to address the types of threats perceived. “Posture 
Decisions” would be made based on how the intent of the adversary was perceived by the 
coalition or alliance. Engaging with the adversary or third parties would be done via 
“Consultation Processes,” again, based on a desire to de-escalate or deter perceived 
hostile intent by the adversary. Military “Structures and Authorities” would be 
established by political leadership to prepare for a perceived threat. Lastly, as a crisis 
escalated, and adversary preparations for missile use in conflict became perceived, 
“Offensive Decisions” could need to be undertaken based on the imminence of the threat. 
 “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” was seen by many as impacting established 
coalition or alliance cohesion and effectiveness. Political decision making and consensus 
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was seen as important behind “Posture Decisions,” “Consultation Processes,” the 
establishment of the C2 structures and relevant authorities behind “Structures and 
Authorities,” was necessary to direct subordination of national forces under multinational 
control in “Loss of (Military) Autonomy,” and a major prerequisite for “Offensive 
Decisions,” which were seen by several as the decision to “go to war.” 
 Once established as a coalition or alliance, with a set “Structures and Authorities” 
military C2 structure, “Loss of (Military) Autonomy” was observed as a necessary 
element of this C2 structure, in which unity of command and unity of effort are cardinal 
military virtues; after all, someone has to be in charge. “Information Sharing,” “Offensive 
Decisions,” and “Plan Development,” particularly for the TBMD mission to protect 
deployed forces in a military theater, were seen by many as responsibilities of, or 
functions necessary for, an effective C2 structure. “COE Planning” was generally seen as 
a “to-do list” item under “Plan Development,” in that missile defense planning is not 
complete without factoring in COE considerations. Interestingly enough, while 
discussing “Consultation Processes,” many respondents cited the necessity to engage 
with partners and third parties about potential COE and the need for accurate COE data to 
inform these consultations; I reflect this in the model with “COE Planning” also feeding 
into “Consultation Processes” as a related variable. 
 A major, albeit serendipitous, finding from the qualitative analysis was not just 
what would cause a nation to join, but, perhaps more importantly, what would cause a 
nation to leave. This leads us to the right, dark red, “Reasons to Leave Coalition” area of 
the model. I do not show these as linked to IVs within the “In Established Coalition” box 
because in general they are variables which are only applicable if handled badly. 
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 It is no surprise that, since “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” was the largest 
detractor from joining a coalition, it should be the one cited most as a principle reason to 
leave. Should a nation feel they have lost their “say” in political matters, they would be 
highly motivated to pull out of a coalition. A related sub-element of this would be if a 
state had no say in the decision to make “Offensive Decisions” about when and why to 
initiate offensive operations; if this political decision to “go to war” were taken from a 
coalition member, yet that government would be expected to share the consequences, it 
could find the domestic and international pressure too much to bear. On a related note, if 
“Posture Decisions” were taken away from a state by the collective, then the state would 
bear responsibility for any escalatory or provocative actions undertaken by the coalition, 
which could have a similar impact to that of “Offensive Decisions.” I reflect both of these 
as subordinate elements of “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” in the model for these reasons. 
 Although only mentioned a small number of times, the idea that bad “Information 
Sharing” would be a “deal-breaker” for some members has some merit; especially in 
circumstances in which bad or incomplete information provided intentionally would 
result in loss of life or damage of vital interests by the receiving coalition member. 
Lastly, in the discussions on “Plan Development” it was noted by several states that if 
their vital national interests were not taken into account when it came to prioritizing 
territorial or homeland BMD, they would have no good reason to belong to a BMD-using 
coalition or alliance. This last is an important consideration, especially in situations 
where there are inadequate defenses to protect the territories of all coalition members. In 
summary, these five IVs are the ones to which extant coalition political and military 
leaders must pay the most attention to prevent member defection.  
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Conclusion:  
 In this chapter, I examined the data taken from interviews with Defense and 
Foreign Affairs professionals from 17 nations around the world, as well as the NATO 
International Military Staff. I started this analysis with a specific theoretical model 
looking at factors affecting national decision making to join a BMD-using coalition, but, 
through the use of a two-stage qualitative approach, ended it with a different, more 
comprehensive model of BMD coalition member acquisition and retention. 
 My original goal was to determine whether certain IVs were more important to 
different regions of the world, or to Defense professionals versus Foreign Affairs 
professionals. What I observed was that, while there were no discernable patterns of 
variation with such a small-N, there were clearly overarching patterns between the IVs 
that enabled development of the final causal model discussed in the final section.  
 “Threat Perception,” an attractor, and “Loss of (Political) Autonomy,” a 
detractor, were the strongest causal factors in the decision to join. Interestingly enough, 
the regional variation of the strength of “Threat Perception” was directly related to threat 
proximity. Those states right next door to a missile-armed adversary, and within range of 
a greater number of adversary missiles, were those who presented the strongest narratives 
for the need for common threat perception as an impetus for collective action. Those 
farthest away tended to have weaker concern for the need for collective action. This 
generalization is somewhat tempered by the NATO European states’ consistent narrative 
support for Alliance indivisibility of collective action, regardless of adversary or 
proximity, as the basis for the Alliance. Even then, the Eastern European states and 
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Turkey, as closest to Russia and Iran, presented the strongest narrative language favoring 
collective action within the NATO European states. 
 “Loss of (Political) Autonomy,” including having no say in “Offensive 
Decisions” and “Posture Decisions,” were the prime cited reasons for leaving a coalition. 
Badly managed “Information Sharing” and territorial defense “Plan Development” were 
lesser stated reasons to do so. All the other IVs were essentially seen as elements that 
were generally only important to an established coalition or alliance. 
 With this final model in mind, Chapter Five will include some recommendations 
to policy makers that are intent on building and maintaining future military coalitions or 
alliances that use BMD. Lastly, I will conclude the dissertation with some areas for future 
research. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 In this chapter, I first discuss potential lessons that can be derived from the 
analysis to inform policy makers who wish to build and sustain a future military coalition 
or alliance to address a missile-armed adversary. After these recommendations, I discuss 
areas for future research arising from this study before closing with concluding remarks. 
 
Recommendations for Policy Makers: Based on the final causal model in Chapter Four, 
shown again below as Figure 5-1 for reference, I have divided my recommendations for 
policy makers interested in building and sustaining a multinational military coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD into three groups. 
  
Figure 5-1. Final Causal Model 
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 The first group includes those areas that I recommend the coalition-builder “Must 
Do,” in order to successfully achieve that goal. The second group are those that a 
coalition-builder “Must Not Do” should they wish to build and sustain their collective. 
The last are those which the collective political leadership of an established coalition or 
alliance “Should Do” to optimize the success of the multinational BMD mission. 
 “Must-Dos”: 
 The first, and most obvious requirement for a coalition, is the need to develop a 
shared, or common, “Threat Perception.” As discussed earlier, this is the necessary and 
sufficient condition which collective military action requires. In the case of a coalition or 
alliance that uses BMD, such common threat perception must be based on a common 
belief in the capability and intent of a missile-armed potential adversary. Simple 
negotiations to gain consensus on the threat may be inadequate to spur coalition 
formation. It will be necessary for nations wishing to encourage others to join them to 
overcome any political, procedural or legal hurdles to share credible military intelligence 
that highlights potential threats common to all. This must be more than just the 
adversary’s capability; it must especially detail the adversary’s intent vis-à-vis the 
threatened states in order to truly garner support. It is not enough just to say the adversary 
could hurt a potential partner; they have to believe they have incentive to try. Thus, per 
my model, the intelligence element of “Information Sharing” leading to common “Threat 
Perception” that motivates partner nations is an imperative. 
 Secondly, a nation that wishes to create a coalition or alliance must assure 
prospective partners they will maintain political control over critical decision making, 
even if military autonomy and control is subordinated under another nation within the 
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coalition C2 structure. As discussed in my final model, specific BMD-related decisions 
must remain within the purview of individual nations acting within a collective decision-
making apparatus. Nations must feel they retain the right to unilateral “Consultation 
Processes” despite the benefits of collective political engagement. Within “Structures and 
Authorities,” caveats or “red cards” must be retained that enable nations to either 
withhold their national forces from certain unpalatable or illegal (for them) actions, or 
withdraw from the coalition should the situation become politically untenable for 
whatever reason. Having a say in territorial defense prioritization, to ensure absolutely 
critical national assets, population, and infrastructure make the cut within “Plan 
Development” is another major political element; without this “right,” states may not feel 
the cost to join and participate is worth the effort. Lastly, having a political say in the 
nature of, and timing or triggers for, potentially escalatory “Posture Decisions” to deploy 
and posture offensive and defensive forces, as well as “Offensive Decisions,” to initiate 
use of coalition or alliance offensive strikes, are also critical elements that must be 
guaranteed to encourage membership. Taking these “rights” away not only will dissuade 
joining, but will likely encourage defection from the coalition or alliance, as domestic 
and international political costs may be too much for a nation to bear. 
“Must-Not-Dos”: 
 The natural obverse of the above, when it comes to building a BMD-using 
coalition or alliance, would be for the coalition-building nations to restrict critical 
military intelligence via “Information Sharing” mechanisms to prospective partners that 
would inhibit the development of a common “Threat Perception.” Because foreign 
disclosure processes are complex and convoluted in many nations, the natural inclination, 
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especially in time-critical situations, may be to by-pass them and try to build common 
threat perception without adequate shared and agreed intelligence. The risk of this course 
of action is that it may actually slow down coalition or alliance building while the 
builders struggle to convince partners to join without adequate rationale. It will also harm 
international support for the coalition operations, particularly in the form of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions, which will require the presentation of credible 
intelligence. One recommendation is for states to determine and implement expeditious 
foreign information disclosure processes in peacetime based on the presumption of a 
“need to share” rather than the preclusive “need to know” doctrines integral to most 
national intelligence apparatuses. (Best 2011, 2)  
 Conversely, as coalitions and alliances are trust-based organizations, policy 
makers within an existing and operational collective must protect the sanctity of 
“Information Sharing” to sustain this organization of like-minded states. Beyond military 
intelligence information, if nations appear unwilling to share information about friendly 
forces or capabilities necessary for collective military planning and operations, this may 
stress coalition or alliance cohesion and possibly result in fragmentation or even 
defection. At the far end of this spectrum, providing intentionally bad information, or 
intentionally restricting or withholding critical information, may ultimately lead to bad 
decision-making by one or more partner nations and possibly even loss of life or 
destruction of critical property. This may break the trust of these nations should it 
become known that it was done intentionally and could lead to partner defection from the 
alliance or coalition. In the worst case, such intentional internal deception may increase 
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coalition risk as a spurned partner defects, taking what it knows of coalition plans and 
processes with it, potentially to be shared as it sees fit outside the coalition. 
 Possibly a more significant set of “Must-Not-Dos” entail taking any actions that 
would be seen as imposing a “Loss of (Political) Autonomy” on any partners or allies. 
Again, as an obverse of those reasons previously cited, such actions could inhibit the 
desire of a state to join, or force a coalition partner or ally to defect, should they feel they 
are losing their ability to perform obligatory political oversight. As discussed in the 
previous section, care must be taken to ensure states do not believe the collective political 
body is taking away an individual nation’s say in “Posture Decisions” or “Offensive 
Decisions” which they do not agree with, but for which they are politically answerable 
either internationally or domestically.  Lastly, the coalition or alliance must ensure that 
states retain their say in collective territorial defense prioritization within “Plan 
Development,” and if the coalition or alliance military leadership is unable to meet an 
individual nation’s prioritization demands, whether due to a lack of BMD resources or 
the assessed lack of need because there is no agreed threat to them, they must be clear in 
explaining their reasoning to these nations to ensure they do not feel their concerns are 
being ignored.   
 “Should-Dos”: 
 Within my final causal model, many of the IVs discussed throughout this work 
ultimately ended up as processes, policies and procedures used mainly within an extant 
coalition or alliance structure. However, the following are related actions which may, if 
observed being done well from the outside, encourage new members, and internally 
enhance collective cohesion within a BMD-using coalition or alliance. 
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 Clearly there is a strong desire and need for members of a coalition or alliance to 
collectively develop and present common strategic messaging to adversaries and third 
parties via well-defined collective external “Consultation Processes;” these processes 
must not preclude an individual nation’s consultation processes, and in many instances 
may be enhanced by them when a partner nation has an existing relationship or 
engagement mechanism with the adversary or third party. Such strategic communication 
engagement appears to be important, especially when used to preclude a potentially 
escalatory “Security Dilemma” or “Posture Decision” situation with a potential adversary 
through clarifying coalition or alliance intent about the deployment and employment of 
defensive forces. Such processes are also important for engagement with third parties to 
assuage their concerns about COE damages or liability before, during, or after a conflict.   
 In a similar vein, a clearly-defined set of internal coalition or alliance political-
military “Consultation Processes” to get rapid political decisions throughout the entire 
cycle of military planning and execution of operations is also a very attractive element. 
Such deliberate processes as those demonstrated by NATO, from the North Atlantic 
Council down to the Military Committee, International Staff, Defence Policy and 
Planning Committee, and so on, demonstrates a serious organization with commitment 
that may appeal to many external nations. (NATO 2017)  
 Because nations join coalition or alliances with an expectation they will need to 
provide forces or supporting capabilities, having clearly defined roles, responsibilities, 
missions, and authorities for their national “Contribution Requirements” is also 
important. If processes are in place for partner nations to easily understand what part their 
forces play within the military structure and the coalition or alliance mission, these same 
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processes may help a joining nation see, up front, what its contribution requirements will 
likely be and what they can contribute as well. This can be doubly important in the case 
of a BMD-equipped nation wishing to join the coalition or alliance; in such cases 
knowing what or who such states may be required to defend can be used to make cost-
benefit assessments and garner political support at home for joining.   
 Lastly, it is important for the policy-makers within a coalition or alliance to 
establish clearly defined roles, responsibilities, missions, and authorities for their military 
C2 “Structures and Authorities.” In addition to normal military headquarters structures 
for land, air and sea military operations, BMD-using C2 has additional requirements.  
 This C2 structure must include a well-defined, and very inclusive, multinational 
military chain of command to mitigate concerns about “Loss of (Military) Autonomy” by 
allowing for national oversight by senior military personnel within the collective 
structure. The coalition or alliance C2 structure must have streamlined “Information 
Sharing” arrangements to expedite friendly planning and operations, as well as the 
national intelligence necessary to do so. Well-understood, doctrinally rigorous territorial 
and TBMD “Plan Development” processes that allow all partners a seat at the 
prioritization table are an imperative in any BMD-using coalition or alliance.  
 The multinational military C2 structure must also include mechanisms, processes 
and tools for “COE Planning” to support national and collective defensive force 
positioning and COE consultations within and outside of the coalition or alliance. 
Collective development of modeling and simulation tools to perform COE analysis may 
go a long ways to assuaging concerns about liability and damage from debris. Lastly, the 
C2 structure must include military offensive and defensive planners familiar with all 
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adversary and friendly defensive and offensive systems necessary to provide options to 
coalition or alliance military leadership as well as to inform political “Offensive 
Decisions” and their subsequent military implementation. 
 
Areas for Future Research: 
 In the Methods section of Chapter Three, I discussed some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach I adopted for this work. There are really two main categories 
of ways to improve on this work; the first includes methodological expansions or 
improvements of the existing theory, while the second includes expanded research into 
the final causal model. 
 In the first category of improving on the existing theory, the most obvious need is 
for a larger-N in the numbers of interviews. Although I felt the 22 interviews conducted 
gave a reasonable spread of views and provided some saturation in responses, a wider 
array of states and even perspectives per state could augment the veracity of my 
preliminary findings. As stated in Chapter Four, there were really only minor variations 
noted by region; a much larger number of interviews might show a stronger set of 
patterns by region or even by nations within a region.  
 In addition, I was unable to interview as many Foreign Affairs experts as I would 
have liked, which left me Defense-heavy in the perspectives provided. This small-N 
resulted in little observed variation, but future research requires more analysis of a larger 
number of Foreign Affairs perspectives to conclusively rule out patterns or variations in 
the differences of thinking from those of their Defense counterparts. 
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 Lastly, within my basic theory I divided the states into the three strata of “BMD-
Owning,” “BMD Supporting,” and “Non-BMD” states. Future works that expand on this 
basic theory would likely benefit from another level of analysis: cross-referencing by 
regime type. Not all states I interviewed are Western-style democracies, and there may 
also be some variation in perspectives relative to states with more autocratic political 
styles. To determine whether regime type matters in collective action decision-making, 
and whether there are interaction effects between democratic and autocratic regimes 
within the same coalition or alliance would require an additional set of questions that I, 
unfortunately, did not foresee in my original research design. 
 In the second category, future research into my final causal model, I see two areas 
for exploration. The first would be a straight-up testing of the final causal model. Because 
of the complex nature of the interactions between the IVs in the final model, there may be 
at least two candidate methods for such a test. The first method would be to explore one 
or more historical case studies in the growth of BMD-using coalitions or alliances; 
candidate cases could range from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, NATO, 
NORAD, the U.S.-Japan alliance, UN Combined Forces Command in Korea, Operation 
Active Fence in Turkey, or the recent Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates 
operations against Houthi missiles from Yemen. Such case study analysis could look at 
path-dependencies using the causal model created here. The second method could apply 
the more theoretical approach I used in this work of trying to determine desired 
characteristics of an optimal BMD-using coalition or alliance through inductive 
questioning of subject matter experts of various nations and regions. This would require 
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tailoring the questions to look more at the elements of the final causal model instead of 
my original eleven-IV model.  
The advantage of the first method above would be to provide historical support 
for the causal model and its path-dependencies in real-world settings, while its weakness 
would be that it would not necessarily show regional deviation of the importance of the 
different variables in decision-making. The advantage of the second method would be 
that it would allow the researcher to gain a broader set of perspectives on the approach, as 
well as highlighting regional differences, but at the cost of remaining more of a 
theoretical study without historical reinforcement. In a time- and resource-unconstrained 
study, the ideal could be a combination of these two approaches in a more comprehensive 
and integrative methodology. 
 Lastly in the expanded research category, and perhaps of broader interest to both 
military and political science communities, would be to look at whether the final causal 
model for a BMD-using coalition or alliance is generalizable to processes used for non-
BMD-using (or even more general military) coalition or alliance building and 
sustainment. After analyzing the responses from my interviews, I believe most of the 
variables, with modification to genericize them, could be made to stand alone in a non-
BMD multinational collective action context. The main exception is “COE Planning” 
which is a uniquely BMD-related aspect; even this could be rewritten in the context of 
liability for collateral damage resulting from general military operations. However, I do 
not believe this would have much impact on the decision to join as norms for liability 
already have a pretty firm basis in international law, especially within the Law of Armed 
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Conflict (Mangas & Festa 2016, 72, 135, 196, 217, 302), whereas BMD COE is an area 
that does not yet have a developed normative framework.  
 As with the discussion above on options for digging deeper into the causal model 
for a BMD-using coalition, a more “generic coalition or alliance” analysis could use the 
more theoretical inductive subject matter expert questioning qualitative methodology 
such as the one I used, a structured historical case study methodology, or a combination 
of the two. Given the larger number of cases of (non-BMD) military coalitions and 
alliances across history, there may also be more room for quantitative analyses to look at 
the existence and, possibly, level of impact of these rewritten, more generic non-BMD 
IVs in the formulation and sustainment of a wider array of collective military action 
entities. 
  
Conclusion: 
 It is no great military secret that there are increasing numbers, range, accuracy, 
payloads, and complexity of ballistic missiles in a growing number of states around the 
world, coupled with the recently emergent evolution of more advanced missile threats 
such as hypersonic glide vehicles and other maneuvering reentry vehicles, hypersonic 
cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as manned and unmanned 
aerial systems. It is also not a secret that expensive integrated air and missile defense 
capabilities owned by an expanding number of states will find themselves increasingly 
more stressed in the future to defend their deployed forces, homelands, partners and allies 
against this widening array of air and missile threats. (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 
(1), 1-2)  
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For this reason, the last three U.S. administrations have made cooperation in 
BMD a centerpiece of national military policy. President Bush’s December 2002 
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-23 stated, “Because the threats of the 
21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we 
work together to defend against these threats. Missile defense cooperation will be a 
feature of U.S. relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means to build 
new relationships with new friends like Russia. The Department of Defense shall develop 
and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our 
deployed forces, but also friends and allies; the Secretary of Defense shall also structure 
the missile defense program in a manner that encourages industrial participation by 
friends and allies, consistent with overall U.S. national security; and the Secretaries of 
Defense and State shall promote international missile defense cooperation, including 
within bilateral and alliance structures such as NATO, and shall negotiate appropriate 
arrangements for this purpose.” (Federation of American Scientists.org. 2002)  
President Obama’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated, “Another key 
objective is to lead expanded international efforts and cooperation on missile defense. 
The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, 
deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, 
principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks. Toward 
this end, the United States seeks broad-based international cooperation. Strengthening 
cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field robust, pragmatic, and cost-
effective capabilities is an important priority. In Europe, the Administration is committed 
to implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context. 
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In East Asia, the United States is working to improve missile defenses through a series of 
bilateral relationships. The United States is also pursuing strengthened cooperation with a 
number of partners in the Middle East.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, vi) 
Although not yet released at the time of this dissertation, President Trump’s 2018 
Missile Defense Review (MDR) is believed to continue and expand on this theme. At a 
September 2018 conference, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood discussed 
the focus of the draft MDR. “While Rood did not discuss the reasons for the delay of the 
congressionally mandated review, he did say the review has expanded from a focus on 
ballistic missile threats to all missile threats from cruise missiles to hypersonics. The 
review will seek to answer an expansive list of questions from ‘what is that policy 
framework, what are the developments in the international security arena that have led 
us to make alterations to our approach, how are we approaching it in terms of working 
with friends and allies (italics mine), looking at trades across the department for 
competing needs or competing ways to address some of the security concerns that we 
have,’ he said, ‘and in some case they are not competing, they are complementary.’ 
Simply put, the review, he said, will contain the Pentagon’s policy intent going forward 
and its plans.” (Judson 2018) 
Given this increased need for collective action to counter these types of threats, 
and the above stated national policies driving toward greater multinational integration, 
United States Strategic Command, the U.S. Combatant Command responsible for global 
missile defense (U.S. Department of Defense 2018 (2)) established a continuing series of 
campaigns of multinational missile defense policy experimentation known as NIMBLE 
TITAN to work through policy impediments toward collective BMD operations. I have 
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been blessed to have been a part of NIMBLE TITAN since its inception as a 
multinational experiment in 2005; we have grown from one country to 25 from around 
the world, along with four multinational organizations today. This very mature and robust 
campaign of experimentation looks at not just the deterrent aspects of, and operational 
concepts for, collective BMD, but the potential of BMD for assurance of partners and 
allies as well.  It was a deeper understanding of this latter element that drove the research 
in this dissertation; I wanted to know what about BMD would compel friendly nations to 
work together in a BMD-using coalition or alliance, or dissuade them from doing so.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, there just isn’t any real research yet done on this question within 
existing political or military science literature. The assurance and collective action 
motivations of BMD became the lacunae I wanted to fill. 
As described in Chapter 3, my first step was to use the NIMBLE TITAN 
experiments themselves as the initial theory generation phase of an extended two-stage 
case-study-based qualitative research design. The consolidated and distilled findings of 
more than 21 separate NIMBLE TITAN experimentation events over the last ten years, as 
captured in the “NIMBLE TITAN Implementing Instrument,” served to highlight those 
recurrent BMD-related policy factors that seemed to matter to other countries. I took 
those factors, and created eleven IVs from them, as well as associated causal hypotheses 
leading to my DV, “the decision to join a coalition or alliance that uses BMD.” I built an 
initial causal theoretical framework to test these hypotheses. 
 From this framework, I derived a series of questions to ask Foreign Affairs and 
Defense subject matter experts from as many countries as I could, given my time 
constraints and the willingness of these subject matter experts to discuss such matters. In 
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most cases, there is very little existing national policy from any nation, including the 
U.S., on most of these topics, because there is no established normative international 
framework that addresses BMD. My qualitative data collection research was hence 
focused on gaining the perspectives of military and foreign affairs professionals of 
varying countries from the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Gulf, and North America to see 
whether there were differences in these perspectives by nation, region, and profession. I 
was able to get 22 interviews from defense and foreign affairs personnel of a wide range 
of ranks from around the world. Although this was not enough to establish the regional or 
professional variances I hoped to discover, it appeared I got close to consistent saturation 
within many of the answers.  
The general pattern that emerged from these qualitative answers took me in a 
different direction than I expected. I thought I would see a series of paralleling IVs that 
each would have some varying degree of causality in my DV, but what I found was that 
some of the IVs were causal in others, while only a few were directly causal of the DV 
itself. More interestingly, several of the IVs could actually be causal in the decision to 
leave a BMD-using coalition or alliance. This led to the development of a final causal 
model that shows not only the relationship of certain variables to the motivation to join a 
BMD-using coalition or alliance, but the relationships of those that seem to only matter 
once nations are within such a collective action body, as well as those that would, if 
mishandled, drive a nation out of the coalition or alliance. 
This final, three-phased causal model appears to lend itself to further exploration 
on the assurance and collective action motivations engendered by BMD. But more 
intriguing than this, it also seems to lend itself to further exploration of causality of 
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military coalitions or alliances on a more general basis, beyond those that specifically use 
BMD. This raises questions such as: 
 “Do these policy factors, when stripped of their BMD elements, hold true in 
the motivation to join any coalition or alliance?”  
 “Do these same causal relationships between the IVs exist in the three phases 
of the model (joining, operating together, leaving) when they are stripped of 
their BMD aspects?” 
 “Can this general assurance and collective action causal model be applied to 
other emerging military technologies or weapon systems such as cyberspace 
operations, space operations, advanced missile threats such as hypersonic 
glide vehicles and cruise missiles, etc.?” 
 
 In any case, I believe this work makes a significant contribution to military 
science as well as political science. The use of a Constructivist and Institutionalist 
approach to such an inductively-generated qualitative case study, using semi-structured 
interviews that have been triangulated with insights from a couple dozen sets of formal 
findings and recommendations from the NIMBLE TITAN Design, Analysis and 
Reporting Team, provides us unique insights into preference formation, specifically from 
where do states derive preferences.  Although there is contrast in this approach from the 
normal Realist predilection to assume preferences, it is interesting to see that my findings 
tended to reinforce more traditional Realist views of specific security factors.  I feel this 
work may be useful as a precursor to additional work on other military alliances or 
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coalitions, and how states make preferences to join or leave such collective action 
institutions. 
 
 At the end of the day, in today’s more globalized world, the future of warfare and 
competition below the level of conflict is characterized by multinational coalitions and 
alliances trying to defend themselves and each other against an emerging set of 
challenging military and civilian technologies used for nefarious purposes. Within this 
global trend, a better understanding of what would compel nations to want to bond 
together will become essential for policy practitioners and national leaders.  
 BMD, as a purely defensive system, seems innocuous enough in contrast to 
nuclear weapons, conventional precision strike capabilities, cyberspace operations, 
emerging artificial intelligence within military application, etc. But I hope this work has 
highlighted the complexity of policy challenges inherent within BMD as they apply on a 
multinational basis. If this final causal model, and the recommendations for policy 
makers laid out earlier in this chapter are deemed useful for policy practitioners in 
motivating states to come together, I will have achieved my aim. If it motivates greater 
multidisciplinary research into the motivations of binding together for collective action 
on a broader basis, it will have exceeded my wildest expectations. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Interview Questions 
 
Intro:  Thank you for taking time to meet with me today.  I am doing an analysis of the 
BMD-related policy issues which affect the decisions made by states to join or not join a 
coalition of other states in a military collective action in which BMD is an active mission.  
With your permission, I would like to record this interview only so that I can most 
accurately transcribe your responses; is that all right?  Your responses will be recorded 
only by country name and whether you are a Defense or Foreign Affairs professional—
no actual names will be recorded, to protect your anonymity. 
 
1. How does perception of the threat affect whether your state would join a military 
coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
2. How would your state weigh a possible negative reaction from either the adversary or a 
major third party who stated they were opposed to your state joining a military coalition 
or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
3. How would “the price of admission” (in other words, specified requirements from the 
coalition regarding your state’s national contributions and commitments in order to join) 
affect whether your state would join a military coalition or alliance which considers 
BMD a core mission?   
 
4. How would your state weigh the possible loss of political or military autonomy that 
might be required should your state join a military coalition or alliance which considers 
BMD a core mission?   
 
5. How would your state having a substantial say in collective BMD command and 
control structures and engagement authorities affect whether your state would join a 
military coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
6. How would the degree of multinational information sharing, information disclosure 
and shared early warning affect whether your state would join a military coalition or 
alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
7. How would having a say in collective defense prioritization, level of protection 
guidance, and defensive plans development affect whether your state would join a 
military coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
8. How would having a say in collective decision-making regarding posturing of forces 
(including the military need for deployment vs. the political need for deterrence & de-
escalation) affect whether your state would join a military coalition or alliance which 
considers BMD a core mission?   
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9. How would having a say in collective consultation processes and engagement with 
third parties (including strategic communications and declaratory policy) affect whether 
your state would join a military coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core 
mission?   
 
10. How would having a say in collective decision-making regarding offensive 
timing/triggers, authorities & legitimacy affect whether your state would join a military 
coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
11. How would the presence or absence of collective planning for Consequences of 
Engagement (COE) (including civil warning, consequence management and liability for 
damages from successful or unsuccessful intercepts) affect whether your state would join 
a military coalition or alliance which considers BMD a core mission?   
 
12. Are there any other BMD-related policy considerations we have not discussed that 
would weigh significantly in the decision by your state to join a military coalition or 
alliance which considers BMD a core mission?  If so, why do you consider it/them 
significant? 
 
13. Which of the BMD-related policy topics we have discussed do you think is most 
important and why? 
  
14. Lastly, since I need to find supporting, open source written material on BMD policy 
issues to help further refine my analysis, can you think of any works written by members 
of your country’s academia, military, or government personnel which would give me 
greater insight into the current thinking by your nation on any of the topics we have 
discussed today? 
 If so, would you be willing to send me this material or provide me a link to it? 
 If none come to mind right now, would you be willing to keep an eye out for any 
and send it to me later? 
 
Closing: Thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to help me with 
this.  As I promised at the Nimble Titan Steering Committee, I will be more than happy 
to provide you a copy of my findings and/or dissertation once completed, if you are 
interested.  
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
“Shield or Glue?  Regional and National Prioritization of Key Policy Issues  
Constraining or Enhancing Multinational Collective Ballistic Missile Defense” 
 
     This is a research project that will address a series of political factors that nations would have 
to consider should they consider joining a military coalition that includes ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) as a core mission; which factors incentivize or dissuade states from joining this coalition, 
and do they vary from region to region or state to state.   
     You must be 19 years of age or older to participate.  An interview was requested with you 
because you are an official working for a governmental organization involved in these programs.  
Participation in this study will require approximately 30-45 minutes of your time and will take 
place at an appropriately quiet location on the margins of a NIMBLE TITAN wargame event in 
which you participate; alternatively, the interview may be conducted via Skype.   
     There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. There are no direct 
benefits for participation in this research.  Any information obtained during this study which 
could identify you will be kept strictly confidential; all information will be coded purely by your 
nationality and whether you are a Defense or Foreign Affairs professional; your name will not be 
used at all in any data set created.  The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the investigator’s 
office and will only be seen by the investigator during the study and will be destroyed once the 
dissertation is completed.  The information obtained in this study may later be published in 
scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings, but none of it will be individually-
identifiable.   
     You may ask any questions concerning this research and have those questions answered before 
agreeing to participate in or during the study or you may call or email Marxen Kyriss at any time.  
If you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject that have not been answered by 
the investigator or to report any concerns about the study, you may contact the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board, telephone (402) 472-6965. 
     The University of Nebraska-Lincoln wants to know about your research experience. This 14 
question, multiple-choice survey is anonymous; however, you can provide your contact 
information if you want someone to follow-up with you. This survey should be completed after 
your participation in this research. Please complete this optional online survey at: 
https://ssp.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_aVvlNCf0U1vse5n. 
 
     You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without 
adversely affecting adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators, the University of 
Nebraska, or your employer.  You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate 
in this research study. Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read 
and understood the information presented.  You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
 
________________________________   ___________________________ 
Signature of Research Participant              Date 
  
Name, Phone Number and Email address of Investigator 
Marxen W. Kyriss, Principal Investigator,  Office: (402) 272-7958, mkyriss@cox.net  
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APPENDIX B: BMD TECHNICAL ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE IVs 
 
Historically, missile defenses have used one of two methods for killing their 
target missile: “proximity” or “hit-to-kill” (HTK); a third class, directed energy weapons 
such as high-energy lasers, have been experimented with, but none have, so far, been 
operationally deployed. Early BMD systems used proximity interceptors with high-
explosive fragmentation or even nuclear warheads to place a lethal cloud in the way of 
the inbound missile. The majority of modern missile defenses, however, use HTK 
interceptors which, in general, do not require any warhead at all. These interceptors use a 
maneuvering “kill vehicle” which closes with and hits the threat warhead or missile at a 
very high rate of speed; the combined kinetic energy of the two objects colliding destroys 
both of them. (U.S. Missile Defense Agency 2018) 
Although somewhat arbitrary, ballistic missiles (BMs) are today grouped into 
classifications based on their ranges. Short-range BMs (SRBMs) are those with a range of 
less than 1000 kilometers, or 600 nautical miles; Medium-range BMs (MRBMs) range 
from 1000-3500 km (600-1500 nm); Intermediate-range BMs (IRBMs) can fly from 
3500-5500 km (1500-3000 nm); Intercontinental BMs (ICBMs) include all those with 
ranges in excess of 5500 km (3000 nm).  (U.S. Defense Department 2017, Glossary) 
These missiles can be launched from fixed sites, mobile ground launchers (known as 
mobile- or transporter-erector-launchers, or MELs/TELs), or submarines (and are hence 
known as Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs). Because range is 
fundamentally driven by speed at the time of missile booster burnout, the longer the 
missile’s range, the faster it flies, and this, in turn, makes it harder to intercept.  
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Missile defenses themselves are generally comprised of three main components: 
sensors, interceptors (sometimes termed “shooters”), and some form of command and 
control (C2) system to link the first two elements together and connect it to other missile 
defense systems as part of a more comprehensive architecture. Sensors can be space-
based or surface-based (including both fixed sites and mobile systems, such as ships or 
ground-based radars). The space-based sensors form an “Early Warning” system which 
detects and rapidly reports enemy missile launches and directs other sensors to these 
threats; surface-based sensors consist of those which “search” a volume of space to 
acquire these threats, those which are used to provide “fire control” to guide the 
interceptors to their targets, and those which provide “discrimination” or a battle-damage 
assessment of whether the preferred target was hit and destroyed, or missed. Different 
sensors are required to do different missions; few can do them all. Few nations have 
space-based sensors, but those who do can provide early warning to coalition or ally 
partners who do not through “Shared Early Warning,” or “SEW.” (U.S. Missile Defense 
Agency 2018) 
BMD interceptors are generally categorized by where during the enemy missile’s 
flight they intercept; “boost phase” interceptors engage the missile shortly after it 
launches, while it is still “boosting” on its rocket generally over enemy territory and is 
still relatively slow. Once the rocket motors burn out, the warhead(s) normally separate 
from their “boosters” and fly a parabolic arc to their target; “Mid-course” interceptors 
generally intercept these warheads around the highest point of their trajectory, usually in 
the middle ranges. Most “mid-course” interceptors operate exo-atmospherically against 
the longer-range targets (e.g., IRBMs and ICBMs), although some can operate endo-
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atmospherically for shorter-range missile threats. Lastly, “terminal phase” interceptors 
are those which operate closer to the areas they are defending and “catch” missiles near 
the end of their flight. Terminal phase interceptors form the vast majority of BMD 
systems today, and are predominantly used against shorter-ranged (and hence, slower) 
threats (see Figure 4-1).  (Burns 2010, 9, 123-125; U.S. Missile Defense Agency 2018)  
 
Figure B-1. Phases of Missile Flight and BMD Classifications 
Another operational categorization of BMD systems is done by how much 
defended area they can cover; “Point defense” systems can only defend a small area, such 
as a city or port area, and these are generally terminal systems such as the U.S. Army’s 
PATRIOT or Russia’s S-300. “Area defense” systems can cover a much broader area 
because their interceptors are faster and longer-ranged; these generally can intercept 
longer-ranged enemy missiles in mid-course or earlier in their terminal phase; area 
weapons include the U.S. Army’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system 
(currently the only ICBM-capable BMD system, which defends the U.S. homeland using 
Ground-Based Interceptors, or GBIs) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) systems, and the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). (U.S. Missile 
Defense Agency 2018; U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-7) 
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Figure B-2. Point and Area Defenses 
Categorization of missile defense missions is confusing. The U.S. has divided it 
into “regional missile defense” (that which applies purely within a Geographic 
Combatant Commander’s area of responsibility (AOR)), “homeland missile defense” 
(which applies only to the U.S. homeland), and “global missile defense” (which 
encompasses missile defense which transcends AOR boundaries and which involves two 
or more Combatant Commanders). (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, Chapter I) NATO 
subdivides the mission into “BMD,” or “Territorial BMD,” which provides full 
protection and coverage for NATO nations and populations, and “Theatre BMD” (or 
“TBMD”) which covers deployed forces conducting operations in a military theater. 
(NATO 2018) 
The last key concepts we will discuss here are related to BMD employment. “Shot 
doctrine” is developed by military commanders to determine how many interceptors will 
be fired per incoming threat missile because no BMD systems are totally impervious, and 
it is a rare situation where missile defenders will get 1:1 kill ratios of interceptors to 
threats; the actual estimated engagement percentages are termed “Probability of Kill” (Pk) 
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or “Probability of Engagement Success” (Pes). (Gaither III 2011; U.S. Department of 
Defense 2011, 16) “Many have correctly pointed out that the United States would fire 
multiple interceptors to ensure the destruction of a single incoming missile. The number 
of GBIs that would be fired, a figure known as “shot doctrine,” is not readily knowable 
due to classification. We can assume, however, that it is probably more than two, and that 
it would vary depending on which model of GBIs are launched (i.e. the old ones or the 
new ones).” (Williams 2017) 
Shot doctrine must be developed in advance of an attack; during a missile fight 
there will be little time for operators to seek political or military guidance. “Level of 
Protection” (LoP) is normally based on the percentage of destroyed missiles, leaving a 
smaller percentage of “leakers” (enemy missiles that get through to the target) which a 
commander is willing to accept; the higher the LoP required, the more interceptors that 
must be fired per threat missile to improve overall Pk. Since interceptors are very limited 
in numbers, the more fired per inbound threat means less inbound threats can ultimately 
be engaged; this is the balancing act that political and military commanders must weigh 
during planning. (U.S. Department of Defense 2017, V-14) 
What goes up must come down. “Consequences of Engagement” (COE), 
“Consequences of Intercept” (COI), and “Consequences of Non-Intercept” (CONI) are all 
terms of art which refer to the possibility of damage resulting from interceptor booster 
stages falling to earth, damage from debris falling after an intercept, or even damage from 
the debris of an interceptor which falls to earth after missing its target. COE is the 
overarching term, which includes the political elements (liability for damages, warning of 
third parties, etc.); COI is used to discuss the physics results of an intercept (debris 
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patterns and so on); while CONI is used to address the physical effects of a missed 
intercept, including interceptor debris and the devastating effects of the enemy warhead 
successfully arriving on target. (Willis 2011; Neal 2018) 
Lastly, we have focused exclusively on BMD so far, but within several Western 
militaries it has become more apparent that BMD is only one element of a broader 
framework that is more frequently termed, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense” 
(IAMD). The main reason for this concept is because many BMD systems (especially 
shorter-range point defenses such as PATRIOT) have the capability to shoot down air-
breathing threats (manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, and so on), and many 
of the sensors and C2 systems used for BMD also conduct air defense. It is becoming 
harder to parse these missions from one another. The concept that has emerged for IAMD 
goes beyond just stapling the two terms together; it is a much more holistic approach 
which in U.S. doctrine adds four “pillars” of activities together in a comprehensive 
framework to defeat all enemy air and missile threats. These four “pillars” are “active 
defense” (the systems used to shoot down incoming threats), “passive defense” (measures 
taken to mitigate the effectiveness of enemy attacks which get through), “attack 
operations” (the use of offensive attacks to destroy enemy missiles or aircraft before they 
can launch), and “BMC3I” (“Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, 
and Intelligence,” which is the glue that ties the first three pillars together into an 
effective military force). (U.S. Department of Defense 2013 (1); U.S. Department of 
Defense 2017.) NATO’s doctrinal “pillars” of IAMD include “BMC3I, Surveillance, 
Active Defense, and Passive Defense,” and do not include “Attack Operations,” so it is 
clear the scope of “IAMD” is not universally accepted. (NATO 2018)  
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Of note, “passive defense” itself is comprised of several disparate activities, 
including operational security and military deception measures to deceive the enemy as to 
target locations, hardening of forces or facilities to make them more difficult to damage, 
dispersal of mobile forces to make targeting harder, and consequence management 
capabilities to quickly restore areas damaged by attacks. (U.S. Department of Defense 
2017, V-15 through V-18) “Attack operations” may include both physical destruction and 
“non-kinetic” strikes using cyber or electronic warfare weaponry. (Ackerman 2018)  
 With these basic concepts understood, we can now better understand the BMD 
policy variables themselves. To quote Handberg (2002, 3), “…ballistic missile defense 
represents a prime example of the influence of ideas rather than the technology itself 
upon American policy development; in this case, its security and foreign policy 
dimensions.” Such ideas manifest themselves in our policy variables. 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SUMMARY 
 
 
Country Region Type State Interviewee Background Interview Date 
Japan Asia-Pacific BMD State (1) Defense 17 Mar 17 
Australia Asia-Pacific BMD Supporter (2) Defense 9 Sep 17 
     
France Europe BMD State (1) Foreign Affairs 16 Nov 17 
France Europe BMD State (1) Defense 16 Nov 17 
Germany  Europe BMD State (1) Defense #1 29 Nov 16 
Germany  Europe BMD State (1) Defense #2 29 Nov 16 
Italy Europe BMD State (1) Defense 12 Sep 17 
NATO Europe BMD State (1) Defense 14 Mar 17 
Netherlands Europe BMD State (1) Defense 14 Nov 17 
Great Britain Europe BMD Supporter (2) Defense 3 Dec 16 
Romania Europe BMD Supporter (2) Defense 8 May 17 
Turkey Europe BMD Supporter (2) Foreign Affairs 14 Sep 17 
Denmark Europe Non-BMD State (3) Defense 1 Dec 16  
Estonia Europe Non-BMD State (3) Foreign Affairs 15 Mar 17 
Estonia Europe Non-BMD State (3) Defense 15 Mar 17 
Sweden Europe Non-BMD State (3) Defense 5 Dec 16 
     
Kuwait Gulf BMD State (1) Defense 20 Nov 17 
UAE Gulf BMD State (1) Defense 16 Mar 18 
Oman Gulf Non-BMD State (3) Foreign Affairs 1 Dec 16 
     
USA North America BMD State (1) Foreign Affairs 13Mar 18 
USA North America BMD State (1) Defense 2 Apr 18 
Canada North America Non-BMD State (3) Defense 22 May 17 
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